[MD] The Edge 2006 Annual Question

[Scott Roberts]

Ham,

Scott said:
> ... physicalism is (from my point of view, of course)
> fundamentally wrong in starting with the assumption of
> the ubiquity of a physical substrate, while the MOQ is
> not fundamentally wrong in starting with the assumption
> of the ubiquity of value (though, again as I see it, it gets
> subsequently wrong pretty quickly by not recognizing
> the mutual implication of value, consciousness, and
> semiosis). And you would say that my metaphysics is
> fundamentally wrong in starting with the ubiquity of semiosis.

Ham said:
What is "the ubiquity of semiosis"?

Scott:
It is the claim that all events are triadic, that is, consisting of a 
signifier meaning a signified to an interpretant. Or to put it another way, 
it says that what we call "nature" is the outward manifestation of thinking, 
much like our words are the outward manifestation of our thinking. Among 
other things, this is a rejection of nominalism, that is, the belief that 
concepts are strictly creations of the human mind through abstraction from 
particulars.

Ham continued:
  If the MoQ is not wrong by positing the
ubiquity of value, then do you see value as the semiotic essence?

Scott:
No. I see semiosis as being implied by value, and vice versa.

Ham continued:
   I doubt
very much that Mr. Pirsig or anyone else here, with the possible exception
of Matt, understands Value or Quality as semiotic.

Scott:
So do I doubt it (except Erin and Mike have been to some extent supportive). 
Matt, being a nominalist, is not an exception. One shouldn't confuse what I 
am saying with the view (made by Matt, Arlo, and Ian, for example) that we 
are embedded within language. Of course this is true in my view as well, 
except I deny there is some reality that is not semiotic.

Scott said:
> The eternal is real, but you're right that we utterly
> lack the ability to think in eternal terms.
> What I see this as implying is that there is something
> seriously wrong with us, for which the correct word is
> "insane".

Ham said:
I think that's what we're all about here.  Metaphysics, as I understand it,
is an attempt to overcome this "insanity" by explaining existence as an
ontological system that has its source in ultimate reality.

Scott:
I see this characterization of metaphysics as part of the problem. My 
preference is to see metaphysics as an attempt to redefine words (such as 
'truth' and 'reality') so that our insanity is continually confronted. No 
system can encapsulate all of reality. New forms of reality are created by 
creating semiotic systems.

Ham continued:
  If we dismiss
reality by defining it as semiotic, it becomes an intellectual anagram -- a
fantasy of human thought.

Scott:
Why do you see defining reality as semiotic as dismissive of it? Answer: 
because you are a nominalist.

Ham continued:
  That is what I think is insane: it's a total
rejection of the metaphysical approach.  I submit that the first postulate
that should be assumed by any philosopher is that reality is REAL.  And,
while semiosis is a new concept for me, I can't envision it as anything but
"unreal".  I think this is also Ian's problem with your ontology.

Scott:
Yes, you have a problem. It's called nominalism.

Ham said:
Let's assume that what is "seriously wrong with us" is not that we're
insane, but that our existence is not indigenous to the fundamental reality
we are trying to understand.

Scott:
No, let's not assume that. The attempt to "understand" fundamental reality 
is part of the problem. It assumes that there is this stuff called reality, 
and then there is us, in some God-like independent stance, separate from 
reality, trying to "understand" it. That approach *is* a symptom of the 
insanity. In this I am in agreement with pragmatists.

Ham continued:
  Instead of blowing reality away, let's punch
some holes in the cognizant self.  Would you accept the view that conscious
awareness is full of holes?  Our knowledge of reality is limited to the
present and what we remember of the past; our perspective is limited to the
proximate space around us; and our awareness itself is only the content of
what we experience.

Scott:
I wouldn't call this situation a matter of holes. It is a matter of having 
only a limited repertoire of perspectives, but I don't see this as a 
problem. The problem is that the main perspective we tend to focus on in 
thinking about consciousness is sense perception, while underplaying 
thinking, feeling, and willing. This is compounded by the belief that our 
current kind of sense perception is fixed. It is one where the objects of 
sense perception are perceived *as* objects, and not as signs. Barfield 
shows that this kind of sense perception is recent, that in the days of 
original participation (which didn't entirely die out until about 500 years 
ago), this "objective" sort of sense perception didn't exist.

Ham continued:
These holes or "gaps" in conscious awareness can be defined as Nothingness.
We are all permeated by nothingness; indeed, it is what Ian would call the
"non-physicality" of subjective awareness.  In short, man's existence
consists of nothingness and substance, the former constituting the self, and
the latter the physical universe.  To make something "be", the intellect
delineates (separates) the thing from the rest of its substantive object by
wrapping it in nothingness.  This isolates the thing observed, giving it
form and dimensions.  In other words, nothingness is the operand in creating
a world of differentiated beings.  And that nothingness is our own
proprietary awareness.

Scott:
This has to be amended by considering the thinking behind that which we have 
formed. Barfield calls this "figuration", and he considers it to be a kind 
of thinking. Moreover, it is done in participation with that which we 
perceive (a tree, say). Hence the perceived tree is the "word" of the tree, 
an act of communication. Our current gap is that this figuration happens 
unconsciously (that is, it is a conscious process, but one that is not 
conscious to us in our waking state).

Ham continued:
If you've followed me so far, you'll see that we've reached a fork in the
road to Reality.  That is, we can say that whatever exists is derived from
nothingness, or that whatever exists is derived from something else.

Scott:
Why say it is derived at all?

Ham said:
  If you
conclude that nothingness is the source, you are a nihilist in the truest
sense.  If you hold out for another source, you open the door to
supernaturalism, one form of which is Pirsig's Quality thesis (although he
would deny it).  Frankly, I don't know where semiotics fits into this
scheme.  I can't see semiotics as a fundamental source, like nothingness or
Quality or Essence.  But I'd be interested in seeing where you come down on
this.

Scott:
Since I don't accept your "there must be a source" kind of thinking, I can't 
answer in a way that means anything to you. Ever hear of a fellow called 
Procrustes?

Ham said:
Just what is your fundamental reality, Scott?

Scott:
Semiosis is ubiquitous. Consciousness is ubiquitous. Value is ubiquitous. 
These are not three different substances, but three names (and there are 
others) of one (non-)thing. There is no distinct "fundamental" reality. 
There is no "source" distinct from what is. How much more explicit do I need 
to be?

- Scott