[MD] Knockouts

[Michael Hamilton]

Matt,

I agree. Unlike boxing, there are no rules in philosophy, except for
ones that are agreed upon by the members of a discussion on a
provisional basis. But even if this agreement isn't reached, it may be
useful to be able to claim a knockout in some situations, particularly
seeing as distortion can be done unintentionally, as I almost did in
the first post. If nothing else, it can encourage a conscious
tightening-up of one's arguments.

Also, I think philosophical 'boxing matches', in which knocking out
the opponent is the only aim, tend to be more frustrating than
productive. However, there will be the occasional boxing match, and
the occasional call of "Knockout!" could at least add a bit of fun to
an interminable struggle, although the other side will inevitable
dispute the claim. Which of course illustrates the way in which the
game of philosophy involves arguing about the rules as much as
anything else.

Re: Dilbert and Scott Adams. Yes, the man is a genius. I believe he's
diagnosed many of the big problems with our corporate culture, without
even a whiff of run-of-the-mill anti-capitalist rhetoric. And he's
done it in the most entertaining way possible!

Regards,
Mike

On 2/8/06, Matt Kundert <pirsigaffliction at hotmail.com> wrote:
> Mike,
>
> I think Adams is wrong, at least in the case of philosophy.  The only way
> knockouts could occur is if two people are playing by the same rules.  The
> trouble with philosophy is that there are no rules, or rather that all the
> rules are potentially up for grabs.  If one of the rules of philosophy that
> we learned from Socrates is "question everything" then that doesn't leave a
> whole lot stapled down.  What we end up with are proliferating subject
> matters and conversations, some that dovetail together, some that go in
> different directions, and a meeting of two philosophers can be a great
> exchange, but rarely are there any definitive blows delievered and rarely
> are minds changed because of the debate.  I think its extraordinarily rare
> to be able to uncover bad dogmatic reasons for lack of change in the
> "loser," and when looking at such debates its important to try and figure
> out _why_ they end up as standoffs--find the crux of the issue.  What you'll
> usually find at the crux are contradictory assumptions that lead both
> philosophers in different directions and its usually impossible to argue for
> those assumptions conclusively.
>
> And that's not to mention that Adams' examples aren't universally correct
> either.  The introduction of a strawman usually doesn't bode well, but
> sometimes there's a different point being worked towards.  The author is
> willing to sacrifice whatever particular point his opponent is writing in
> detail about to say something broader (look at Pirsig's SOM).  Slippery
> slope arguments are also usually bad, but in philosophy the slippery slope
> can usually be constructed through diligence and ingenuity--its what's
> called following an idea to its logical conclusion.  And guilt by
> association arguments are sometimes entirely in point---as when an opponent
> tries to drain the history out an idea, making it lose its context, and
> making us forget the lessons of history.  And sometimes you have to ignore a
> simple, direct question because the question is all wrong (look at Pirsig's
> S/O Dilemma).
>
> I love Dilbert.  Having read a bunch of Scott Adams, I think he's the
> latter-day Marx.  But I've also read some of his attempts at philosophy.
> Its wild and fantastic, but he definitely has a strong grasp of how to
> insulate a position.  What I don't think he understands is that when you put
> up tough insulation--an impregnable defense--you usually then preclude
> yourself from delievering knockouts.  When you build a wall around yourself,
> nobody can hit you, but how are _you_ supposed to hit anybody else?
>
> I developed something like this topic (including Hitler) in relation to
> Pirsig a few years ago in a series of posts call "Begging the Question,
> Moral Intuition(s), and Answering the Nazi" (Oct 11, 2003) (and even further
> back in my "Confessions of a Fallen Priest" post from July 2002).  Its an
> underdeveloped set of interrelated ideas with much to expand on (and I've
> continually been trying to go back and develop them), but I take the issue
> to be pretty important to understanding the activity of philosophy.
>
> Matt
>
> p.s.  If anybody does go back and read that little sketch, just remember
> that I wrote it when I was being less careful about what I called
> "metaphysics."  By metaphysics I meant then (and I mean now) "Platonic/SOMic
> metaphysics," not "Pirsigian metaphysics."  (I usually call Pirsigian
> metaphysics "philosophy.")  The suggestion of many of my articles is that
> Pirsig appears to be more Platonic in some places.
>
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