[MD] Is Morality innate in the cosmos?

[Ham Priday]

Michael --

> This leads me to hope that we might be able to have a
> productive conversation, although it seems that I'm going
> to have to steer around this tricky sticking point, namely
> the metaphorical nature of language and consequently of
> all thought, including philosophy.

I have no problem with the idea that language is a metaphorical tool -- even
symbolic.  What annoys me is the notion that language is EVERYTHING, and
that there is no other reality.

Ham (finally) said:
> Suffice it to say, I make no claim that my
> hypothesis is absolute truth (period).

Mike:
> Okay, I have no disagreement here. I believe the maxim
> does originate with Popper, but in any case, you understand
> it. Sorry for nit-picking.

I think the term Popper came up with is "fallibilism" - the doctrine that we
have no sure way of knowing whether any belief about the world is absolutely
true or not.

Ham said:
>  I have yet to hear a logical explanation for how
> "Some things are better than others" can be a
> rationale for meaning and purpose.

Mike:
> There is a great deal more to Quality than its
> common-sense connotation ... Among other things,
> the MOQ rescues meaning and purpose from the
> vague and arbitrary status that they hold in materialist
> and nihilist worldviews, by replacing matter
> as a first principle with the valuation/experience that is
> consciousness. In other words, the MOQ subsumes
> meaningless/purposeless scientific reality under
> meaningful/purpose-laden spiritual reality (Quality).

I also believe that consciousness is the valuation of experience.  But so
what?  There is no rationale for meaning or purpose in this belief.  All it
suggests is that we prefer what appeals to us, what comforts us, what seems
better to us.  Unless this desideristic attribute is tied to a primary
source as part of an overall ontology, it is meaningless.

> It isn't just that "some things are better than others" - it's that
> this sense of value (which is a sense of meaning) pervades reality,
> and hasn't merely been tacked-on to a mechanistic world by human
> beings as some kind of decorative ornament.

Value itself isn't a sense of meaning; it's simply the sense of something
desired or wanted.  This isn't to say that man's discriminating choice of
values doesn't have a teleological purpose.  But it can have no meaning for
man if he is not aware of its purpose.  Where does Pirsig explain man's
valuistic connection to a creator or source other than Quality?

Mike:
> Sorry to have to ask another question, but by
> "physical existence", do you mean matter?
> Or, by "beyond physical existence", do you mean
> beyond experience of any kind?

Both.  Existence is our experienced physical reality.  It is constituted of
matter (substance or beingness) and proprietary awareness (sensibility or
consciousness).  Existence is an individuated subject looking at a universal
object.  What separates the two is nothingness.  In experience, this
nothingness is converted to Value -- specifically, the value negated by
Essence to create this dichotomy.  Essence remains undivided, encompassing
all such differentiation as the absolute Not-other.

Mike:
> And is "valuistic attribute of human feeling or sensibility"
> roughly equivalent to a "tack-on" or "decorative ornament",
> limited exclusively to human beings?

No.  The value we sense represents our true essence.  If anything is a
"decorative ornament", it is the so-called "natural world".  While lesser
creatures are capable of sensing value in a rudimentary way, their "choices"
are directly related to their survival instincts.  Only man is capable of
rising above this causally-directed behavior.  Self-determination is unique
to man; he is the Choicemaker of the universe.

Mike:
> Like you, the MOQ shows respect for the
> more positive aspects of religion (namely, spirituality).

He may show "respect" for it, but he avoids defining it as a primary or
essential value.  I think this is because of its "supernatural" connotation
to the audience he wants to reach.  Obviously, he has sought acceptance by
the "naturalists" of the scientific community.

Mike:
> I follow you so far (and I thoroughly agree with creation not being a
> singular event in space/time).

Ham, previously:
> The Value of Essence (Quality?) is realized by the subject
> (awareness) in the object (being) of experience.  In my
> hypothesis, Creation is a constant manifestation of Essence
> negating nothingness to divide awareness from beingness,
> thus actualizing man as the "free agent" in value realization.

Mike:
> This is where you lose me. I don't yet understand your
> terminology. Could you exemplify, or expand upon, what
> you mean by "the object (being) of awareness"?

This just paraphrases what I stated above.  (I think it will become clearer
when you've revewed my Creation hypothesis.)   Unlike Pirsig, I don't
dismiss the duality of existence: it is our everyday experience of reality.
Nothingness divides awareness from its object (beingness), and from all
discrete entities ("beings") experienced.  The primary division is the
negational aspect of Essence which actualizes self-awareness; the secondary
division is a negation of the intellect (intellection).  In other words, man
is a collaborator in creating his physical world.  And that "double
negation" results in the appearance of differentiated reality.  As Hegel
said, "Appearance is the negation of the negation of Being, while Actuality
is the negation of the negation of Essence."

SA must have been awestruck by my thesis; he hasn't come back with any
questions.  I fully expect you to be less timid. :-)

Essentially yours,
Ham