[MD] Julian Baggini Interview with Pirsig
david buchanan
dmbuchanan at hotmail.com
Sun Feb 12 15:08:00 PST 2006
David, Matt and all MOQers:
Last Sunday Matt said to David M:
I think you did a seamless blending of Heidegger and Pirsig in the middle
passage.
dmb says:
Firstly, I wanna thank DM for sending me info on Heidegger and Pirsig.
Secondly, I gotta say that I just don't see it. It seems to me that the
similarities are superficial and are pretty much overwhelmed by their
differences. I've only just begun to look into it, but it seems to me that
Heidegger was an anti-humanist, a crypto-theologian and a NAZI while Pirsig
is the quite the opposite. And, as Richard Wolin writes in the February 20
issue of THE NATION, "According to Heidegger, Being determines everything.
The contributions of individual men and women is epiphenomenal and, for the
most part, pointless. Hence the only thing we can do, as Heidegger once
claimed, is patiently wait for God, who 'can save us'." "By the late 1980s
the moral vacuity of Heidegger's philosophy stood fully exposed. Above all,
it lacked an ethics." I'm trying to keep an open mind on this point, but at
present I'm of the opinion that if Pirsig was ever in the same room with
Heidegger he would have punched him on the nose, so to speak. But, again, in
the interest of keeping an open mind, here's a question for either of you;
In what sense is Being like Quality? I mean, what sort of description does
Heidegger himself use for that term? Are you telling me that he indentified
it with the Tao? Nirvana? Zen sitting? Please, be specific.
Matt said to DM:
...What I don't like is reading Being as being reacted to by beings, DQ by
static patterns. I'd prefer to say that beings react to each other, and in
their expansion, in their creativity, they acheive Being. Being and DQ
represent creativity and openness, but I don't think they represent
another--and here's where the concepts we're using to start to muddy
up--kind of being. ...I guess that's a good way of putting the way Heidegger
and Pirsig sometimes look to me (or at least Pirsig does). It sometimes
looks as if they create two different ontological categories, being and
Being, static patterns and Dynamic Quality. I'm not sure what that's
supposed to suggest other than an
appearance/reality type situation...
dmb says:
OK Matt, I'm gonna try this again. Maybe this time it WON'T be like water
off a duck's ass. In various ways, you keep saying that the MOQ's
distinction between static and Dynamic is "an appearance/reality type
situation". And I keep trying to explain why its not, but it always seems to
slide right off your back. For example, a week before you wrote the section
above you posted this brief exchange...
DMB had said:
What if the mystics' distinction between the menu and the food is NOT like
the appearance/reality distinction?
Matt replied:
After Pirsig gets done with that section, yes, you're right. That's what I
was saying. Because I think its pretty clear from _that_ section that the
mystical position Pirsig creates is textbook appearance/reality distinction.
And Pirsig amends it.
dmb now says:
The mystical position is a textbook case? No, Matt, this is exactly where we
disagree. And, as I already said in the very post you were responding to, I
don't think Pirsig amends it. I think he simply adopts it. He doesn't need
to amend the mystic's position to get out from under the appearance/reality
distinction BECAUSE the mystic's positon does NOT entail that distinction.
For a reality check, I literally went to the textbook. Since you apparently
refuse to acknowledge this point when I make it, maybe I'll let the OXFORD
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY make this point for me.
"...transcendentalism is belief in the existence of things that transcend
sense-experience or, more reflectively, belief in the possibility of
transcendent metaphysics, that is to say, philosophial reasoning which aims
to establish beliefs about transcendent entities. *God might seem an obvious
example of a transcendent, but those who accept religious or mystical
experience might resist that. The *Forms or Ideas of Plato, which are not in
space and time and not encountered in the world of the senses, are more
incontestably transcendent."
dmb resumes:
See it yet? What I keep saying is that the static/Dynamic split is not like
the appearance reality distinction because DQ is not like a theistic God nor
is it like Plato's Forms. You may recall that Pirsig explicitly announced an
anti-theistic stance and attacks Plato for converting Quality into a fixed
and rigid thing. In both cases Pirsig is rejecting any kind of transcendent
ontological reality. As I said over and over again in the "Rhetoric" thread,
the DQ and sq are categories of experience. There is nothing to suggest any
ontological reality behind or beyond these categories of experience. Pirsig
won't even accept Kant's things-in-themselves because that is really just a
kind of place holder for these same kind of realities beyond experience.
Basically, I think you're looking at the MOQ's empiricism and reading it as
ontology. Pirsig is so NOT doing ontology here, that he is even rejecting
the idea of matter and substance because it is basically asserted as the
CAUSE of experience, an ontological reality behind experience. Instead, he's
saying that experience is the CAUSE of objects, so to speak.
As I understand it, you think the mysticism and/or the MOQ has to be altered
in order to avoid making the appearance/reality dististinction. But I'm
repeatedly trying to tell you that the MOQ contains no such thing in the
first place. I think the only thing that needs to be altered here is your
understanding of the MOQ's central distinction. And when this point is
properly understood, there is no longer a need to reduce DQ to some
epiphenomenon of creativity or otherwise distort its meaning. I mean, the
thing that really kills me, is that you want to alter the MOQ to remove
something it doesn't have in the first place because DQ is misconcieved in
your imagination. And I think if you understood it rightly, you'd see that
such an alteration would be a disaster perpetrated for a false reason.
I'd sincerely be happy to have a real disagreement with you about this, but
at this point I'm pretty well convinced that when you and I talk about DQ we
are not even talking about the same thing. At this point I'm pretty well
convinced that you have no idea what I'm saying. Or rather, I see no reason
to believe that you've heard this point.
Thanks.
dmb
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