[MD] The Edge 2006 Annual Question

[Scott Roberts]

Ham,

Ham said:
David has been quoting statements I've made to Arlo and Scott in past
discussions.  I'd like to put them back in context, along with a more recent
comment from Scott, so they'll possibly make more sense to others who may be
following this thread.

On 2/7 I asked Scott to define his fundamental reality.  This is what he
replied on 2/8:

> There is no distinct "fundamental" reality.
> There is no "source" distinct from what is.

Now, this sounded to me like classic nihilism, and I told him so.  But then,
in a note to Arlo on 2/10, and almost lost in a flurry of comments loaded
with such terms as "hardening", "monomythism", and "tetralemma", Scott makes
a pitch for contradictory identity (CI):

Scott:
> Another way to avoid hardening is to have metaphors
> that don't harden. That's why I preach the logic of
> contradictory identity (LCI), and the Buddhist
> tetralemma the LCI is based on. One can also find it in
> Coleridge's 'polarity' and Derrida's 'differance'.

[Ham continued]
I don't know what the 'L' stands for (Logic, maybe?), but it would seem that
if one believes in a "contradictory identity", he has at least affirmed his
belief in an 'identity' of some kind.  Isn't this identity the "it" we are
attempting to define?  At the risk of being a nominalist, I'll now ask Scott
why this isn't his fundamental reality.  I think there is some commonality
in the Buddhist 'tetralemma', Coleridge's 'polarity', and Derrida's
'differance' with Cusa's coincidental 'Not-other'.

Scott:
Yes, there is commonality with what Cusa said and CI, as I have said twice.

And yes, CI implies an 'identity' of some kind. But I am not attempting to 
define it except in the context of contradiction. And yes, CI is my 
fundamental reality. However, it is not something "behind" or "beyond" or 
"the source of" any other reality, so the word "fundamental" is nugatory. 
Which you will note is why I said "There is no distinct "fundamental" 
reality. There is no "source" distinct from what is." The key word is 
"distinct".

Ham said:
Cusa's 'first principle" is that which "cannot be other either than an other
or than nothing and likewise is not opposed to anything."  God is "not
other", he theorized, because God is not other than any [particular] other,
even though "not-other" and "other" are opposed.  But no other can be
opposed to God from whom it is derived.  Cusa argued that, although the
primary source (Reality of God) is indefinable, it can be stated that the
world (differentiated existence) is not God but is not anything 'other' than
God.  In other words, the Creator or source is the only entity of which it
can be logically said that it is 'not-other' with respect to anything else.

Now, Scott will find this objectionable for two reasons: it mentions God,
and it suggests that opposition is "derived" from a higher source.  But,
leaving that aside for the moment, Cusa went on to postulate that if the
possibility of contradictory otherness is always present (in the source) and
becomes actualized when there is an awareness to experience it, then it this
actualization that we call existence.  Scott, if this isn't the logic of
'contradictory identity' that you are preaching, please tell me why.

Scott:
As I said before, it is except for what you mention: it assumes a source 
"behind" it. I would not say that there is a "possibility" of contradictory 
otherness which "becomes actualized when there is an awareness to experience 
it".  Instead I would say that CI *is* the awareness, the experiencing, the 
actualizing. That's why I see CI as being triadic -- one always needs three 
terms, such as 'essence', 'existence', and 'awareness'. Essence and 
existence are a CI that, in contradicting one another, create themselves 
(and each other), and which is awareness. (BTW, I don't object to the 
mention of God per se. That is, I am not an anti-theist like Pirsig. Rather 
I prefer a non-theist vocabulary just because it is so difficult to mention 
God without bringing in idolatrous connotations. And yes, the 'L' is for 
'logic', which is obviously not Aristotelian logic.)

Ham said:
I suggested this to you back on 2/2:

> What you are proposing is a unitary subjective reality
> whose finite differentiation is caused by nothingness.
> That's also the ontology I've laid out in my thesis.

But you rejected it on 2/3:

> No, I am not proposing a "unitary subjective reality whose
> finite differentiation is caused by nothingness". I deny that
> there is a "subjective reality". Rather I say that subject and
> object are a contradictory identity. I deny that differentiation
> is caused by nothingness. Rather I say that nothingness
> (no-thingness) and differentiation (thingness, for example)
> are a contradictory identity.

Subject and object are, of course, contradictory, as are being and
nothingness.  But these are the contradictions of existential experience,
which (as we know) is not fundamental reality.  I submit that if
contradiction has a non-contradictory identity, that identity is the Source,
by whatever name you choose to call it.  Cusa called it God; Pirsig called
it Dynamic Quality; you call it Contradictory Identity; I call it Essence.

Scott:
I do not know -- and in fact reject -- that what you call "existential 
experience" is not fundamental reality. That is, I do not distinguish 
"fundamental" reality as a separate category of reality. The physical world 
of objects and events is not at all an illusion. The only thing illusory 
about it is that we naturalistically believe that its spatiotemporal form is 
independent of our perception, and that these objects are dumb (they are 
"just there"). Instead, I say (with Aquinas) that a natural object is a 
something between two intellects. That is, it is a sign, the outward 
manifestation of intellect.

Ham said:
Aside from your rejection of nothingness as the differentiating factor,
Scott, are we really so far apart in our ontologies?

Scott:
As noted, I am sympathetic with Cusa (and with Eckhart), with negative 
theology in general, and so yes, our ontologies are not so very far apart.. 
But I think that the post-Nietzschean criticism (e.g., deconstruction and 
neo-pragmatism) of traditional metaphysics needs to be addressed. You are 
too quick to reject all that criticism as nihilism, because they conflict 
with your notions of what metaphysics should be. I don't reject those 
criticisms. You also reject Buddhist philosophy. I don't. Instead, I think 
that one can use these criticisms as ways of rebuilding metaphysics. Once 
more, I recommend Robert Magliola's book "Derrida on the Mend". Magliola, 
who is a Catholic theologian, shows how Derrida's deconstruction has been 
prefigured by the Buddhist Nagarjuna, and how one can use deconstruction, or 
anti-logocentrism, (which I call LCI, and he calls "differential mysticism") 
to think about Christian mysteries (in particular the Trinity), or reality 
in general, in a non-idolatrous way

- Scott