[MD] The Edge 2006 Annual Question

[Scott Roberts]

Ham,

Scott said:
> I would not say that there is a "possibility" of
> contradictory otherness which "becomes actualized
> when there is an awareness to experience it".
> Instead I would say that CI *is* the awareness, the
> experiencing, the actualizing. That's why I see CI as
> being triadic -- one always needs three terms,
> such as 'essence', 'existence', and 'awareness'.
> Essence and existence are a CI that, in contradicting
> one another, create themselves (and each other),
> and which is awareness.

Ham said:
I've been giving a lot of thought to what you said, and actually can see
some merit in it.

I'm not particularly happy with the "possibility-actualized' paradigm,
either.  And I have no problem with the concept that contrariety (your CI)
IS being aware.  But I regard this being-aware as the contingent (inferior
transitional) mode of a non-transitional source.  In other words, I regard
existence as the divided, evolutionary manifestation of Essence.  And, since
I define existence as "that which is experienced as occupying time and
space", I see it as encompassing both subjective awareness and objective
beingness.  With apologies to Peirce, this reduces your triad to the
traditional duality.

Scott:
I'm fine with "possibility-actualized". It is another CI (actually a 
different name for essence/existence).

I do not consider the subject to be occupying time and space. That is one 
feature that makes it contradictory to the object. So for me there is no 
reducing the triad: subject, object, and experience. (Note: this is S/O[2] 
I'm talking about, where O[2] is anything, mental or physical, that can be 
focused on, not Pirsig's/Descartes' S/O[1], which is mind and matter.)

Scott said:
> I do not know -- and in fact reject -- that what you
> call "existential experience" is not fundamental reality.
> That is, I do not distinguish "fundamental" reality as a
> separate category of reality. The physical world of objects
> and events is not at all an illusion. The only thing illusory
> about it is that we naturalistically believe that its
> spatiotemporal form is independent of our perception,
> and that these objects are dumb (they are "just there").
> Instead, I say (with Aquinas) that a natural object is a
> something between two intellects. That is, it is a sign,
> the outward manifestation of intellect.

Ham said:
This, of course, avoids having to name a source.  You are asking that we
take existence at face value, except for its differentiation by time and
space.  That's suggestive of pantheism, the belief that reality is the world
as an undivided Whole.  I think this misses not only the Source but
something equally vital to man -- namely, purpose and meaning.

Scott:
You're deforming what I am saying to fit into your categories again. If 
existence and essence are a CI, one can't really say that existence can be 
taken "at face value". For most people, "face value" is the "just there" 
notion, which I am trying to subvert. Also, I wouldn't say that existence is 
differentiated by time and space, rather I would say that it is the 
differentiation. The whole is more than existence, however. It is also 
essence, in contradictory identity with existence. Pantheism equates God and 
Nature. I do not. Nature as we perceive it is an expression of the divine 
(the non-spatiotemporal, whatever), not equal to it. As to purpose and 
meaning, I've said they are ubiquitous, so I don't understand why you think 
they are missing.

Ham said:
Also I'm not sure what Aquinas meant by "a natural object is a something
between two intellects."  Why does it take two intellects to define what a
single intellect can?  As for natural objects being the "outward
manifestation of intellect", you have me completely baffled.  I can accept
the Pirsigian idea that experience=reality (as long as we're talking about
existential reality); but not intellect=reality.  Whose epistemology is
this, and how does it work?

Scott:
Aquinas was referring to God as the other intellect. That is, natural 
objects are communications from God to man.

As to "whose epistemology", well Plato for starters. Eckhart is another. He 
considered intellect (or should I say Intellect) to be higher than being. 
Cusa, being a Platonist, also. It was common before nominalism came along. 
Owen Barfield and Georg Kuhlewind are modern non-nominalists.

- Scott