[MD] The Edge 2006 Annual Question

[Ham Priday]

Scott --


 Ham said:
> You are asking that we take existence at face value, except for its
> differentiation by time and space.  That's suggestive of pantheism,
> the belief that reality is the world as an undivided Whole.  I think
> this misses not only the Source but something equally vital to man
> -- namely, purpose and meaning.

 Scott:
> You're deforming what I am saying to fit into your
> categories again. If existence and essence are a CI,
> one can't really say that existence can be taken "at
> face value". For most people, "face value" is the
> "just there" notion, which I am trying to subvert.

Most people do take existence at face value.  This is what I'm trying to
subvert, also.  But I'm not sure that you can effectively subvert this
notion without positing a transcendant source.

> Also, I wouldn't say that existence is differentiated
> by time and space, rather I would say that it is the
> differentiation. The whole is more than existence,
> however. It is also essence, in contradictory identity
> with existence. Pantheism equates God and Nature.
> I do not. Nature as we perceive it is an expression of
> the divine (the non-spatiotemporal, whatever), not
> equal to it. As to purpose and meaning, I've said they
> are ubiquitous, so I don't understand why you think
> they are missing.

Existence is the differentation of Essence by time and space.  The problem
we're having is that you cannot accept existence as the differentiated
modality of a transcendent source.  You stop at existence, while at the same
time claiming that "the whole is more than existence".  What is the "more"?
You say it is also essence in contradiction with existence.  Does that not
define two identities?  Is one higher than the other?  For me, existence and
Oneness are two modes of Essence -- the "actualized" and the "potential", if
you will, or "appearance" and "source".  That's one reality without
contradiction apart from its differentiated appearance.

Also, saying that purpose and meaning are "ubiquitous" does nothing to
define these terms or to explain their value to the individual.  (Possibly
you have dealt with value in other posts, but your position is a blank slate
to me.)

> Aquinas was referring to God as the other intellect.
> That is, natural objects are communications from
> God to man.

Aquinas may have alluded to God's "intellect", as do many theists.  But,
since Aquinas' essence was "being" and "form" -- to him even Nature was an
essence -- it has little in common with what I propose as Essence.

> As to "whose epistemology", well Plato for starters.
> Eckhart is another. He considered intellect (or should
> I say Intellect) to be higher than being.
> Cusa, being a Platonist, also.

Yes, but what they meant by "intellect" was what we would call cognizant
awareness; in a sense, they were arguing for the Platonic "Idea" as a higher
value than the objects perceived.
I can't speak for Barfield and am not acquainted with Kuhlewind.  But, since
you mention my favorite theological essentialist, I think this Eckhart
anecdote is relevant here:

"Twenty-four scholars got together and tried to say what God is and were
unable to do it.  They met again at an appointed time and each presented
what he had to say.  Let me quote two or three.  One said: 'God is something
compared to which all that changes with time is nothing, so that whatever
has being gets it from him and is small before him.'  The second said: 'God
is something that must transcend being, that by itself needs nothing and yet
which all things need.'  The third said: 'God is intelligence occupied with
knowing itself.'

"I shall neglect the first and third and speak only of the second, and say
that God is something that must transcend being.  Anything which has being,
date, or location does not belong to God, for he is above them all and
although he is in all creatures, yet he is more than all of
       -- Meister Eckhart [trns. by R. Blakney]

I'm going to follow Eckhart's example and neglect the first and third also.

Essentially yours,
Ham