[MD] The Edge 2006 Annual Question

[David M]

Ham

Refusing a proper name for these things feels
seriously right to me. A name is limiting
and finite and particular.

DM


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Ham Priday" <hampday1 at verizon.net>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2006 11:25 PM
Subject: Re: [MD] The Edge 2006 Annual Question


>
> Scott --
>
>
>> Ham,
>>
>> I would not say that there is a "possibility" of
>> contradictory otherness which "becomes actualized
>> when there is an awareness to experience it".
>> Instead I would say that CI *is* the awareness, the
>> experiencing, the actualizing. That's why I see CI as
>> being triadic -- one always needs three terms,
>> such as 'essence', 'existence', and 'awareness'.
>> Essence and existence are a CI that, in contradicting
>> one another, create themselves (and each other),
>> and which is awareness.
>
> I've been giving a lot of thought to what you said, and actually can see
> some merit in it.
>
> I'm not particularly happy with the "possibility-actualized' paradigm,
> either.  And I have no problem with the concept that contrariety (your CI)
> IS being aware.  But I regard this being-aware as the contingent (inferior
> transitional) mode of a non-transitional source.  In other words, I regard
> existence as the divided, evolutionary manifestation of Essence.  And, 
> since
> I define existence as "that which is experienced as occupying time and
> space", I see it as encompassing both subjective awareness and objective
> beingness.  With apologies to Peirce, this reduces your triad to the
> traditional duality.
>
>> I do not know -- and in fact reject -- that what you
>> call "existential experience" is not fundamental reality.
>> That is, I do not distinguish "fundamental" reality as a
>> separate category of reality. The physical world of objects
>> and events is not at all an illusion. The only thing illusory
>> about it is that we naturalistically believe that its
>> spatiotemporal form is independent of our perception,
>> and that these objects are dumb (they are "just there").
>> Instead, I say (with Aquinas) that a natural object is a
>> something between two intellects. That is, it is a sign,
>> the outward manifestation of intellect.
>
> This, of course, avoids having to name a source.  You are asking that we
> take existence at face value, except for its differentiation by time and
> space.  That's suggestive of pantheism, the belief that reality is the 
> world
> as an undivided Whole.  I think this misses not only the Source but
> something equally vital to man -- namely, purpose and meaning.
>
> Also I'm not sure what Aquinas meant by "a natural object is a something
> between two intellects."  Why does it take two intellects to define what a
> single intellect can?  As for natural objects being the "outward
> manifestation of intellect", you have me completely baffled.  I can accept
> the Pirsigian idea that experience=reality (as long as we're talking about
> existential reality); but not intellect=reality.  Whose epistemology is
> this, and how does it work?
>
> -Ham
>
>
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