[MD] Is Morality innate in the cosmos?

[Ham Priday]

Michael --

Welcome back.  It's always good to talk with you, although we disagree much
of the time, because you are always clear on your points of contention.
Actually, all the objections you raise here are quite reasonable and well
worth discussing.


For instance, you had asked:

> Sorry to have to ask another question, but by
> "physical existence", do you mean matter?
> Or, by "beyond physical existence", do you mean
> beyond experience of any kind?

Ham:
> Both.  Existence is our experienced physical reality.

Mike:
> I think I agree, but there's an ambiguity in that statement.
> Rather than existence being an independent physical
> reality that we just happen to experience (which could
> possibly be inferred from "existence is our experienced
> physical reality"), I say that existence is the experience
> itself. "Physical reality", i.e. 'independent' objects that
> we imagine in order to explain experience, become part of
> our experience as we imagine them, so can be said to
> exist as and when they are part of consciousness/experience.

I define existence is that which is experienced as occurring in time and
space.  So, yes, existence is the experience.  The reason I don't usually
phrase it that way is that it suggests that our physical reality is
hallucinatory or "imaginary", while it is the only reality we know.

I went on to say that existence is -- and here I should have said
"experienced as" --"constituted of matter (substance or beingness) and
proprietary awareness (sensibility or consciousness)."

Mike:
> Looks like Descartes to me. Or is there some nuance that
> differentiates this dualism from the Cartesian mind/matter?

No, not "nuance" but simply an incomplete definition on my part which,
hopefully, now stands corrected.  Like Pirsig I believe existence is largely
the creation of experience.  And BECAUSE it is experience, unlike Pirsig, I
see the whole of existential reality as subjective.

Mike:
> In any case, I would object that matter or substance is not
> a necessary or fundamental component of existence, but
> exists in as much as we hold it 'in mind' as we go about
> our lives (as we nearly always do from when we reach a
> certain age, because it is such a useful fiction). I should add
> that by "imagined" or "fictitious" I do not necessarily mean
> "illusory" or "unreal" (you know that I accept subject/object
> dualism as the current mode of our experience); I just mean
> that it is not fundamental or necessary.

If I understand you correctly, you are saying that "matter or substance"
isn't essential to the ontology of the Absolute, and I agree with this
assertion.

I also said:
> Existence is an individuated subject looking at a universal
> object.

You said:
> So far I understand what you're saying (although I may
> disagree with it), but after this point I'm struggling to
> comprehend.

I had contiued:
> What separates the two is nothingness.  In experience, this
> nothingness is converted to Value -- specifically, the value
> negated by Essence to create this dichotomy.  Essence
> remains undivided, encompassing all such differentiation
> as the absolute Not-other.

Okay.  This is an original hypothesis based in part on Cusa's theory of the
'not-other' and also on Eckhart's assertion that "to create is to give being
out of nothing."  I don't expect you to find it readily comprehensible, as
I'll admit to having some problems with it myself.  (I'm still hoping to
obtain some help from Prof. Lee Miller who stated Cusan logic as a formal
proposition.)  However, the logic is laid out as best I can in the Creation
section of my thesis.

In brief, the principal ideas are:
1) Essence is not other than any (particular) other, therefore is the
all-inclusive Not-Other.
2) Possibility and actuality are co-dependent in existence but coincide in
the Not-Other.
3) Actuality necessitates the "appearance of Other" by a division of
Essence.
4) Since Essence is indivisible by definition, this division is effected by
a negation of its            identity which creates the appearance of
Nothingness.
5) All things are experienced as divided by Nothingness, which is also the
conditional subject      of experience.

Mike:
> [W]hen you say that value is negated by Essence, I can only
> interpret this as saying that Essence is the antithesis of value.
> This leaves me thinking that Essence and value are opposites,
> but this can't be what you mean, because Essence is the
> Not-other that encompasses all differentiation. Essence is
> not other to value. What am I missing?

Your interpretation in the first statement is wrong, and I may have misled
you by saying that Value is negated by Essence.  While it is true that the
identity of Essence is "valuable", I now believe it is more reasonable
(according to Cusan logic) to see actualization as the negation of
Difference.  In any case, Essence is NOT the antithesis of Value, nor is it
'other' to Value.  Essence is the antithesis of Nothingness.

Ham also said:
> Only man is capable of rising above this causally-directed
> behavior.  Self-determination is unique to man; he is the
> Choicemaker of the universe.

Mike:
> I agree with the spirit of this, i.e. that value is common to all
> animals but the human sense of value contains greater possibilities
> for choice, and can be less confined to survival instincts.
>
> I only take issue with the word "causally-directed", because I take
> causation to be part of the mechanistic, so-called "natural world",
> which I think we agreed is more an "ornament" (although I hardly
> consider it to be decorative!) than a fundamental aspect of existence.
> Therefore I would rather say that "lesser creatures" are directed by
> their narrow, rudimentary sense of value, i.e. their survival
> instincts.

The point I want to stress is that biological instincts are causal and
promote the survival of the organism.  Man is the self-determinate creature
who is capable of directing his own life insofar as its direction does not
oppose the laws of Nature.  Again, man is the Choicemaker, and existence is
designed to ensure his autonomy in the choice of values.

Mike:
> I also believe that consciousness is the valuation of experience.
> But so what?  There is no rationale for meaning or purpose in
> this belief.  All it suggests is that we prefer what appeals to us,
> what comforts us, what seems better to us.  Unless this
> desideristic attribute is tied to a primary source as part of an
> overall ontology, it is meaningless.

The "rationale" is that Value IS tied to the primary source.  These
particular value choices are the real essence of man (individually), and
represent his unique link to Essence.  The conditional values realized
through experiencing Other (the objective "essent") nullify the primary
negation (appearance) and affirm the absolute Oneness of Essence.

Mike:
> Desire and need are basic, rudimentary senses of meaning,
> from which more subtle and sophisticated meanings can grow,
> with the aid of language.

Perhaps.  But I don't see language playng a significant role in the
value-sensibility of the individual.

Ham asked:
> Where does Pirsig explain man's valuistic connection to
> a creator or source other than Quality?

Mike replied:
> He doesn't, because for Pirsig, Value/Quality (which I
> claim is synonymous with Meaning) IS the creator,
> IS the source.

I won't deny that Essence represents the ultimate value.  But what does it
mean to BE that value?  I'm unable to answer that.  Such absolute truth's
are (purposefully) beyond our comprehension.

Mike:
> Lastly, could you point me to any crucial parts of your thesis that I
> should prioritise?  I'm eager to understand the basic tenets of
> Essentialism, but I won't have time to finish reading the entire
> thesis in the near future.

I would ask you to consider the other original postulate of Essentialism:
The inaccessibility of Absolute Truth is consistent with the principle of
Individual Freedom.  This affords a logical explanation for our inability to
possess absolute knowledge.  IMO it makes Individual Freedom the core
morality of the Philosophy of Essence, offering a meaningful teleology for
the experience of essential value.  (Something, I would add, that I do not
find in the MoQ.)

These are all excellent questions, Mike.  I hope I've helped to resolve them
for you, and am open to any suggestions that would make this philosophy more
coherent.

Essentially yours,
Ham