[MD] Julian Baggini Interview with Pirsig
Matt Kundert
pirsigaffliction at hotmail.com
Sun Feb 26 16:33:34 PST 2006
DMB,
DMB said:
I'm sure there is more than one way to read this [passage from Lila], but I
think its safe to say that DQ and sq are better understood in
epistemological terms than in ontological terms.
Matt:
I'm glad to see that we can learn to agree on something when its there to be
agreed on. We both agree that trying to formulate DQ and static patterns
into ontological terms can be confusing and probably a little misleading
(though I'm still not quite sure how that squares with saying that they are
"better concieved as categories of experience, kinds of consciousness or
ways of being" because those look like ontological terms to me). We do,
however, maybe still disagree on them being formulated in epistemological
terms (if at the least, "epistemological" is understood as making
distinctions between primary and secondary experience, and those
distinctions are understood in more than a temporal way).
One way of isolating what makes me feel queasy about it is this statement:
"Objects are derived from primary experience, but these 'objects' aren't
things or beings so much as deductions, interpretations, ideas." What I'm
not sure about is why we have to handle "objects" with scare quotes. Is it
in the same way that I might handle "absolute truth"? Because that would
imply that objects are, more or less, not as real as primary experience.
But I don't think that's what you want to say. Is it then the same way I
might handle "objectivity"? That would mean that your handling of
"objects," like my handling of "objectivity," is an attempt to redescribe
the usual meaning of the term. That makes more sense, but I still don't
quite feel right about making "deductions, interpretations, ideas"
secondary, except possibly in a temporal sense. This temporal sense is the
sense in which metaphors are primary to literal meanings, which is what
Pirsig was arguing for in ZMM when he said that rhetoric was primary to
dialectic. We have to have root metaphors for literalness to arise, we have
to have rhetorical place-setting for dialectical argumentation to arise.
So, say I take up the primary/secondary distinction in the temporal sense.
It would seem that what I want to say (in going back to our squabble over
knowledge a month ago) is that primary comes before secondary, but knowledge
is internal to secondary. And you want to say that we can have knowledge of
both. I'm still not sure what sense to attach to "knowledge of primary
experience." The way I would explicate what I'm trying to say is to recur
to Pirsig's "the Metaphysics of Quality is a contradiction in terms" and the
map analogy. The "Metaphysics" half is the secondary part and the map part.
The "Quality" half is the primary part and the landscape. So the
landscape is primary, it comes first before you build the map. But the
reason Pirsig says the Metaphysics of Quality is a contradiction is because
a metaphysics is definition, that's what it does, and Quality is undefined.
Knowledge, in this sense, is metaphysics, is definition and the push and
pull of definitions. I see Pirsig as saying that we can't have _knowledge_
of Quality, of primary experience--but knowledge, secondary experience, the
map, nevertheless helps us. We are never cut off from Quality, primary
experience, the landscape. Even if our nose is stuck in the map, we
couldn't be cut off from Quality because we're still stumbling around the
landscape (like the SODV paper's illustration, static patterns floating in a
sea of DQ). What happened was that we (we earlier philosophers) thought
that we were going to find out more about the landscape by sticking our
noses into the map. That didn't pan out at all. I take Pirsig's criticism
of this tendency to be that we need a map that has a little note at the
bottom that says, "If you stare too long at the map, your vision will get
blurry."
So I take Pirsig's map analogy as suggesting that it just doesn't make sense
to say that we have primary knowledge of the landscape and secondary
knowledge of the map. I take it, linking it to the last post, to be
suggesting that we only have knowledge of "things," and that "things" only
arise on the map, but not the landscape because the landscape is no-thing.
The only way I can make sense of having two kinds of knowledge (much like I
couldn't make sense of "interaction" or "relationship" to Quality,
no-thingness) is if there are two different senses given to the term
"knowledge," senses that aren't really analogous (and to which we could just
as easily use two different words). The knowledge of the landscape is the
stubborness of sensation, its the kicking of a stone, the low value of pain,
the primary experience before the secondary curses. Now, I wouldn't call
that _knowledge_. I would just call that sensation (or something). It's
confusing knowledge with sensation that caused some of the SOMist's mistakes
(truth based on the analogy of sensory experience; as you once put it, "the
very idea of sensory data is itself an assumption, an anatomical explanation
of experience that rests on the very assumption of subjects responding to an
objective reality" (the post you said it in is actually missing, disappeared
from the archives, but it was in one of the early posts in the "Rhetoric"
thread and chopped up pieces of the post appear in my response to the
missing post on Sept 15)).
You've made that same sort of distinction when you've said that we can't
have _intellectual_ knowledge of primary experience. But I wanted to
express what my qualms are about saying its knowledge we have of primary
experience. As I see it, if we have a relationship to primary experience,
its something that _breaks up_ knowledge, the Dynamic breaking of old static
patterns, but its not something we have a different kind of knowledge of.
And this is partly why I still don't like to formulate the distinction
between DQ and static patterns into epistemological terms.
Matt
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