[MD] Is Quality Value?

[Arlo Bensinger]

Ham, Platt, All,

Hopefully you gentlemen had a good holiday. Platt, I hope you are moved 
into your new abode with no problems. One thing I wanted to respond to, and 
I hope draws the interest of other MOQers, is the following exchage.

[Platt]
Pirsig says a convicted murderer shouldn't be executed if he poses no 
threat to the structure of society, saying even a murderer has ideas, and 
ideas take moral precedence over society. I disagree with that view. I 
don't see any evidence that convicted murderers, rapists, pedophiles and 
other assailants can become messiahs.

[Ham]
I agree with your rejection of Pirsig's assertion, but not because 
murderers and terrorists do not become messiahs.  (Actually, they 
occasionally do. Mohammed's history was not exactly that of Little Orphan 
Annie, but he was viewed as a prophet despite the blood on his 
hands.)  Pirsig's statement would exonerate the likes of Adolph Hitler 
(although he committed suicide), because he "had ideas".  Surely Saddam 
Hussain has ideas; would a death sentence by the Iraqui Court therefore be 
immoral?

There are a number of issues here, but I'll answer Ham's final question 
about Hussein with "yes". It would be immoral to execute Hussein unless it 
could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that his ongoing existence poses 
serious threat to society. Maybe such a case could be made, maybe it can't. 
But that's where the discussion over execution must be centered.

Consider Platt's statement above. Although he was vocal in favor of Terri 
Shiavo's life, couldn't one just as easily say "I don't see any evidence 
that comatose, brain-dead patients can become messiahs", and use such a 
sentiment to favor euthanasia? Or, chillingly, what about severely retarded 
people, or people suffering from severe neurological disorders? If life 
depends on evidence that one can "become a messiah", wouldn't we be able to 
execute the severely retarded? As Pirsig noted, there is no way to 
determine who will or who won't become a messiah. Pirsig wrote, "It's not 
the "nice" guys who bring about real social change. "Nice" guys look nice 
because they're conforming. It's the "bad" guys, who only look nice a 
hundred years later, that are the real Dynamic force in social evolution. 
That was the real moral lesson of the brujo in Zuni. If those priests had 
killed him they would have done great harm to their society's ability to 
grow and change."

If there is only one lesson in the DQ/SQ MOQ, it is this, you never, ever 
can predict from where DQ growth will derive, and often it is only seen in 
retrospect. No matter how little it seems that Hussein or Shiavo could be 
"messiahs", it is that small potential that the MOQ values, that the MOQ 
says must be preserved above the desire for retribution, or euthanasia. I 
believe that the MOQ makes it absolutely clear that killing anyone who does 
not pose an immediate, serious threat to others or to society is absolutely 
immoral.  You can't pick and choose "who" we can kill and who we cannot 
based on "predicting their potential to become messiahs".

Yes, it would be very emotionally soothing for many to see Hussein 
executed, but is that reason enough to murder? Yes, it would have been 
quite convenient and easy to euthanize Shiavo, but was that reason alone to 
murder?

Now, let me get back my initial response to Ham's question, that executing 
Hussein would be moral if it could be proven that he represents a serious 
threat to society. An interesting question arises, and that is "which 
society?" Theirs? Ours? Any? And, let's talk a little about what 
constitutes a "threat". Change? Didn't GWB, and the American army, 
represent a serious threat to Iraqi society when he invaded their country? 
Would you say it was moral or immoral for Iraqi citizens to murder American 
soldiers? Would it be moral or immoral for American citizens to murder a 
foreign army invading our soil? Would it make a difference if that invading 
army believed they were doing "what was right"?***

Is it moral for China to execute dissidents who threaten the fabric of 
present-day Chinese society?

These are the questions, serious questions, that arise when we start 
talking about society's "right to murder" when it is "threatened", without 
a clear and precise definition of "threat", an understanding of that 
threat, and policy based on some type of "predicting" who will and who 
won't "become a messiah".

Your thoughts?

Arlo

*** I remember having a similar conversation with Platt not too long ago, 
and if I recall correctly Platt suggested that "it was moral for us to 
invade, and it was moral for them to defend". I'm not sure, but if that's 
not a case of moral relativity, I'm not sure what is.