[MD] Capital Punishment

[Ham Priday]

Mornin' Platt --


> Being away from the debate for awhile I've lost track of
> just what you mean by the "Quality vs. Value issue."
> Offhand I'd say that what I value more than something
> else has more quality than that something else, and that to
> choose the quality thing or action over the alternative(s)is
> a moral choice.  Do you agree?

Isn't it strange how words and their definitions seem to take precedence in
these discussions over the concepts behind them?  Those semioticists who
believe that reality=language/symbols ought to note the fact that, since
word meanings are different for each of us, language is a poor definer of
the reality we are individually cognizant of.

You say "what I value more than something else has more quality than that
something else,"  while the meaning of your assertion is: What I value is
more IMPORTANT than something else.  You are using Quality as a measure of
your personal priority or preference.  From a strict logical perspective
this is a tautology, because Value itself in this context is a measure of
your preference; i.e., you value what you value, or what's important is
important.  There's no CONCEPT here, except that 'some things are more
important than others'.  Sound familiar?

My interest in Value has to do with a concept rather than word definitions
or etymology.  I'm of the opinion that Value is more than a qualitative
measurement.  Value connotes an essential reality that exists independently
of man's experience, which (incidentally) I do not infer from  Quality
(MoQ).  What I've been looking for is evidence that I'm wrong in this
conclusion. Hence, the question: Is Quality Value?

> About Kant I appreciate your quoting at length from Wikipedia
> to remind us of that philosopher's huge influence on moral questions.
> Especially influential has been his categorical imperative:
>
> I looked up "categorical" in my trusty Merriam-Webster dictionary
> and found it defined as "absolute, unqualified." So even if the word
> "absolute" isn't mentioned, the meaning of the term "categorical" is
> clearly the same.

"Category" has a special meaning when attached to moral principles, which is
why Kant constructed the term "categorical imperative".  Here is the note
from Runes' Dictionary of Philosophy under "Category":

"(Gr. Kategoria) In Aristotle's logic (1) the predicate of a proposition;
(2) one of the ultimate modes of being that may be asserted in predication,
viz: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, state, action,
passion.  (In Kant) Any of twelve forms or relating principles of the
understanding, constituting necessary conditions of experience.  Kant sought
to derive an exhaustive list of pure forms of the understanding from the
forms of judgment in the traditional logic.  His list of categories
comprises three each of quantity, quality, relation, and modality."

An "exhaustive list" of "categories" was necessary in dealing with moral
choices in a relativistic (conditional) system.  Thus, Kant posited the
"categorical imperative" as a universal maxim relative to human
understanding as a contingency in this system.  Not absolute, in my opinion.

> I think you would have to agree that at the inorganic level (consisting
> of atoms and the like) and the biological level (consisting of breathing
> and the like) the individual doesn't have "full freedom of action and
> self-determination." Even at the social level (or context), individuals
are
> not free to do whatever they wish without risking punishment.

Yes, I would agree that, practically speaking, the individual's exercise of
freedom is limited.  However, that does not change my view that Individual
Freedom is an absolute principle.  The capacity for freedom is inherent in
man, despite the limits imposed on its full expression by socio-cultural
conventions.

[Ham, previously]:
> If you accept this definition, then I think you would have to
> conclude that autonomy is an "absolute principle" insofar as
> it applies to "free choice" in a relativistic world.  Any form of
> slavery works against this principle, hence is immoral by definition.

[Platt]:
> Here you invoke an absolute while previously you've denied
> the existence of absolutes except for Essence.
> Am I just being honery? (I've been accused of such in the past
> and hope to avoid that impression in the New Year.)

Since Freedom is absolute in principle, I don't believe I'm inconsistent in
asserting that slavery is immoral by this definition.

Have a great Year 2006 at Hilton Head!

Essentially yours,
Ham