[MD] The Edge 2006 Annual Question
Scott Roberts
jse885 at localnet.com
Fri Jan 13 10:12:09 PST 2006
Ian,
Ian said:
As I said before ... so you have something unexplained, even if you
invent the category of things that don't need explanation. I'm sure
the physicalists would not be alone in crying - Foul !
Scott:
What I was trying to distinguish in that category business was my view (that
consciousness is not the sort of thing that "explanation" applies to, since,
like value, it is fundamental) from (a) the usual physicalist view (that it
is something that eventually we will get around to explaining as emerging
from a non-conscious universe) and (b) the view of Colin McGinn that, though
he is a materialist of some sort, claims that consciousness is not
fundamental, yet is unexplainable.
And did I invent the category of things that don't need explanation?
Wouldn't you say that physical reality does not need explaining, given that
you are a physicalist? Or do you think "why there is something rather than
nothing" could conceivably have an explanation?
- Scott
On 1/12/06, Scott Roberts <jse885 at localnet.com> wrote:
> Ian,
>
> Ian said:
> Scott I agree with your points.
> Something I said earlier in another conversation with you was that
> this ineffable gap may be a common theme in any metaphysics, but the
> size and complexity of the gap in terms of the explanation missing
> does of course vary. This is the point I have against people like
> yourself, who (seem to) claim that the gap is bootstrapped by
> pre-existing "sophisticated" consciousness.
>
> Scott:
> I'm not sure I understand the last sentence. But in any case, I don't see
> consciousness (or DQ) as being a gap in "things that are explained (or
> explainable)" -- that's only a problem for a physicalist. Rather, I see
> consciousness as not belonging to the category of things explained,
> unexplained, explainable, or unexplainable.
>
> - Scott
>
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