[MD] Where have all the values gone?

[Ham Priday]

Hi David --


> Creation hypothesis:
> Suffice it to say that the two primary essents
> are "nothing" and "not-nothing".  Essentially, "not-nothing" is
> experiential "beingness" (the not-nothing (or thing/object) of
> awareness), so that "nothing" is the "negate" or emptiness of
> awareness.  Both of these essents are contingencies of Value;
> that is, they exist by virtue of the Value of Nothing.
>
> same thing different words, better fit to MOQ

I find it both interesting and flattering that you would be willing to
compare my hypothesis to the MoQ.  However, I must take issue with your
all-negative reformulation -- even if it does make a "better fit".

"Not-nothing" equates to "something" which I call Essence.  (I assume Pirsig
would call it Quality.)  So how does "not-nothing" improve the proposition?

Also, if you define the negate as "emptiness of awareness", you not only
defeat its purpose but deny its place in existence.  The negate IS
awareness.  I know you want badly to assign it to not-nothing or Quality;
but that doesn't make metaphysical sense.  At least not according to Cusan
logic which is the cornerstone of my hypothesis.

Look at it this way.  If Quality is your 'not-nothing' it must be DQ, which
would mean that SQ is nothing.  But SQ is the differentiated Quality; it is
that level in which the particulars are experienced.  So it is necessarily
"something", i.e., things and events.   Furthermore, if your 'nothing' is
not awareness, I have to equate awareness with the particulars of
experience, which of course I'm not willing to do.

Proprietary awareness is outside the realm of the relational world it
experiences and is a primary roleplayer in existence.  While I realize that
this describes Pirsig's hated SOM, I believe you folks are too quick to
dismiss such a scenario.

What WOULD be a more workable ontology for the MoQ is a concept of
undifferentiated Quality as the absolute source -- the Essence of Reality.
But it would have to allow for proprietary awareness in the principal role.
These have been my two contentions concerning the inadequacy of Pirsig's
philosophy.  Sadly, I don't see any willingness to yield on these points.

Anyway, I appreciate your thoughtful suggestion, David.  It certainly
demonstrates the parallel of our two philosophies, and I'll admit it's a
damned good try at merging the fundamentals.

Essentially yours,
Ham