[MD] Julian Baggini Interview with Pirsig

Tue Jan 17 06:11:21 PST 2006

Mike,

I think you'll find that additional static / dynamic (focus /
curiosity) thought is exactly Matt's point in his other post "Pirsig,
Baggini and The First Rule of Philosophy"

Ian

On 1/17/06, Michael Hamilton <thethemichael at gmail.com> wrote:
> Ian,
>
> I agree with you. I think it was an attempt to use SOM against itself
> - perhaps the same is true of his comment about "fittest" being
> subjective. This tactic seems to fall some way short of giving the
> reader (or Baggini) any idea of what Pirsig actually believes.
>
> Also, has anyone noticed the static/Dynamic nature of the division
> between Baggini's talk of philosophology providing "checks and
> balances", and Pirsig's refusal (most of the time) to engage in
> philosophology? Perhaps what's needed is some philosophological
> static-latching in order to further assert the superiority of Pirsig's
> Dynamic leap forward?
>
> Regards,
> Mike
>
> On 1/17/06, ian glendinning <psybertron at gmail.com> wrote:
> > Another excellent post Matt.
> >
> > I interpret Bob's quote about rhetoric slightly differently - in order
> > not to make it seem weird - a kind of cognitive dissonance response I
> > guess :-)
> >
> > The key word is "supposed" - is he just saying that traditionally in
> > the eyes of most metaphysicists it's supposed to be (meant to be)
> > irrelevant ? Whereas Pirsig's position really is that rhetoric is just
> > as relevant as logic ?
> >
> > Just guessing
> > Ian
> >
> > On 1/17/06, Scott Roberts <jse885 at localnet.com> wrote:
> > > Matt K et al,
> > >
> > > Good post, and yes, I also thought that remark about rhetoric to be weird. I
> > > want to also raise a different issue re philosophology, and that is about
> > > Pirsig's dissing Plato with respect to the Sophists by saying that Plato
> > > tried to corral the Good by talking of the Idea of the Good. (A side note:
> > > in doing so, Pirsig seems to be trying to eat his cake and have it too, that
> > > is, he can talk about other philosophers to bolster his argument, but nobody
> > > else can to question them. Another inconsistency lies in his talking at one
> > > point about metaphysics being metaphorical, and then at the end saying the
> > > MOQ has rock-solid foundations). But the point I want to make here is that
> > > Pirsig's criticism of Plato is based on a modernist view of ideas, not on a
> > > Platonic understanding of them. For modernists (I'm thinking of the Lockean
> > > tradition), an idea is something produced in the human mind as a consequence
> > > of having a lot of sense impressions. Hence, an idea is a secondary reality,
> > > while the contents of the senses are primary. For Plato, of course, ideas
> > > are primary, and are primarily external to the human mind (the human only
> > > "knows" by participating in an independently existing idea, not by
> > > constructing it internally). Thus, when Plato speaks of the Idea of the
> > > Good, he is referring to what he takes to be the *real* Good (the permanent,
> > > eternal Good) as opposed to the transient goods of everyday life. The
> > > significance of this is that what Plato was up to is the same thing that
> > > mystics say to do: don't be attached to the impermanent.
> > >
> > > Thus, Pirsig is making a philosophologiical mistake, in that he is judging
> > > Plato anachronistically, using a modernist's idea of idea rather than
> > > Plato's, and thus misses Plato's basically mystical message. Plotinus, after
> > > all, had no problem with calling himself a Platonist.
> > >
> > > - Scott
> > >
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: "Matt Kundert" <pirsigaffliction at hotmail.com>
> > > To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
> > > Sent: Monday, January 16, 2006 5:03 PM
> > > Subject: Re: [MD] Julian Baggini Interview with Pirsig
> > >
> > >
> > > David,
> > >
> > > David said:
> > > Don't you think a chat about substance was a very bad idea by JB?
> > >
> > > Matt:
> > > No, not really.  Baggini was beginning an elaboration of Pirsig's philosophy
> > > to establish some bridges between Pirsig and other philosophers, to help
> > > people understand what Pirsig is up to, where he falls on the philosophical
> > > map.  He was using substance in a fairly wide sense, as "fundamental
> > > constituent of the universe."  Now, on the one hand, pragmatists should
> > > eschew the question of "fundamental constituents."  But on the other hand I
> > > think one can answer the question suitably enough from the point of view of
> > > the person asking the bad question.  How many substances?  One, just as
> > > Pirsig said, "'Quality' or 'value' is the fundamental constituent of the
> > > universe."  As I said a little while ago, from a metaphysical standpoint
> > > (the standpoint that makes deep cuts in reality, like between mind/matter,
> > > subject/object, God/man, etc.) pragmatism will look like a monism because
> > > they deny deep cuts.  Reality is smooth, not riven with cuts and slashes or
> > > joints (though it isn't so much smooth as it is bumpy).
> > >
> > > Pirsig didn't answer that way because he'd already gotten defensive and
> > > combative.  I think he was being needlessly paradoxical and unhelpful on
> > > this point.  Granted, I'm not sure Baggini phrased the question all that
> > > well, but I think Pirsig got hung up on a side issue.  For instance, the
> > > classification of monism, dualism, and pluralism isn't arbitrary.  It's to
> > > the point.  It's a tool to aid comprehension.  It didn't help that Pirsig,
> > > after advancing Quality as the basic substance, then promptly denied that
> > > there were substances.  Granted, Pirsig was right to deny the question of
> > > substance or "fundamental constituent of the universe" when he said there
> > > was no basic substance, that the Buddhist's call it no-thingness.  But
> > > Pirsig wasn't explicating what he thinks very well by suggesting that the
> > > MoQ is a monism, that the question of "Monism, dualism, or pluralism?" is a
> > > bad one, and that the MoQ is a monism, dualism, _and_ pluralism in
> > > successive breaths.  There are ways to use paradox to create bombast, the
> > > impression of an explosion.  But there are times when the appearance of
> > > paradox just breeds confusion.
> > >
> > > I know a lot of people thought the appearance of Spinoza in the discussion
> > > was out of left field, and it kinda' was.  On the other hand, its uncanny
> > > for me.  I have a bunch of files on my computer of topics and ideas about
> > > Pirsig to look into.  One of the earliest was "Pirsig and Spinoza."  It's on
> > > there almost entirely because I was taking Modern Philosophy at the same
> > > time that I started researching Pirsig to write a paper on him in my
> > > Contemporary Philosophy class.  Now if I wrote down every damn fool
> > > connection I thought of I'd have several zip disks full of files.  But back
> > > then I didn't have that much to go on and the similarities between Spinoza
> > > and Pirsig struck me for pretty much the exact same reason that Baggini
> > > brought up Spinoza: instead of thinking that God is our eternal Other (thus
> > > breeding metaphysical divides that are hard to reconcile), Spinoza took
> > > Nature and Man and made them both facets of God.  The effects, of course,
> > > aren't exactly as Spinoza planned them.  Like idealism, once you make a
> > > monism, pragmatism starts to look better and better (my paper on Spinoza
> > > that semester was called "God: Now 100% All-Natural").
> > >
> > > The thing that I think bogged down the conversation was both Baggini's
> > > understandable puzzlement over Pirsig's reticence to place himself in the
> > > philosophical tradition and Pirsig's then strange continued insistence on
> > > the revolutionary aspect of his thought.  This is the philosophology
> > > controversy and I think Pirsig is at least as complicit in it as Baggini.
> > > Obviously, I agree with Baggini that there is a problem with Pirsig's
> > > distinction between philosophy and philosophology.  But I also agree with
> > > Baggini that there are ways to use the distinction that do shed light on the
> > > area.
> > >
> > > One of the things that I learned early on in engaging Pirsig's philosophy is
> > > that the status of Pirsig's originality swings free from the status of
> > > Pirsig's arguments and theses being any good.  One way to formulate the
> > > distinction between philosophy and philosophology is between the assertion
> > > of philosophical theses and intellectual history.  This means that the
> > > difference between doing philosophy and doing philosophology is the
> > > difference between able to tell whether a thesis, or position, or argument
> > > is any _good_ and being able to tell if its _original_.
> > >
> > > This means that when Pirsig says that his philosophy is original or
> > > revolutionary _he_ is doing philosophology.  This also means that I think
> > > Pirsig himself is distracting attention away from where he thinks attention
> > > should be paid: the merit of his arguments, not their relations to others.
> > > When Pirsig claims that his philosophy is original or revolutionary he is
> > > making a claim that he has no intention of backing up.  From Pirsig's own
> > > point of view, to back up that claim would be besides the point, so he
> > > doesn't feel the need to bother with it.  But Pirsig baits the trail by his
> > > continued insistence on these claims and so distracts his interlocuters.  I
> > > surely doubt Pirsig does this on purpose, but by baiting the trail he opens
> > > up space to berate his interlocuter from missing his point by focusing on
> > > philosophology instead of philosophy.
> > >
> > > If there's any truth in Erin's remark that she thinks I should have done the
> > > interview (and this would probably be the only small kernel of truth to it),
> > > its that I know better than to talk about intellectual history with Pirsig.
> > > I wouldn't have gotten bogged down in this.  Pressing him on points of
> > > originality _are_ besides the point.  Granted, I think there is a lot to be
> > > learned by seeing Pirsig in relation to the philosophical tradition, East or
> > > West, but any relationships brought up need to be about elucidating Pirsig's
> > > philosophy and arguments, what they are saying, not on how new what he's
> > > saying is.
> > >
> > > Matt
> > >
> > > p.s. Does Pirsig saying, "in philosophy rhetorical styles are supposed to be
> > > irrelevant to the truth" strike anybody else as incredibly weird for Pirsig
> > > to say?
> > >
> > > _________________________________________________________________
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> > >
> > >
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