[MD] the prime directive of the MOQ

[Scott Roberts]

DMB,

Scott said:
...the gulf between the static and the dynamic is like the gulf between the
finite and the infinite,
namely, infinite. What I am saying is that if indeed intellect belongs to
the dynamic, then claiming that it is static, even the highest static, is
infinitely denigrating it. That means that either Plotinus or Pirsig is
fundamentally wrong, and it is, I would think, important to decide who is
right, no?

dmb said:
As I understand it, Pirsig and Plotinus don't actually disagree on this
point and Scott is the one who is fundamentally wrong. That was my point. As
I recall, Plotinus uses the term "Intellect" with a capital "I" and this has
led you to confuse things quite a bit.

Scott:
You are referring to a different point. I agree that both Pirsig and 
Plotinus (and Merrell-Wolff) say that the Ultimate X is "beyond" any attempt 
to know it intellectually. Another mystical philosophy that also says that 
the Ultimate X is beyond any attempt to know it intellectually is Christian 
theology. In other words, if one considers "philosophical mysticism" to be 
entirely the claim that the Ultimate X is beyond any attempt to know it 
intellectually, then there is no difference between the MOQ and Christianity 
*as philosophical mysticism*, though of course they are very different 
metaphysics. I would rather say that they (Christianity and the MOQ) are 
different philosophical mysticisms, and that so are Plotinus' and Pirsig's. 
In fact, Plotinian and Christian mysticism are closer to each other than 
either are to Pirsig.

The point I was referring to in my post was the role of intellect in their 
respective metaphysics, which leads to differences in their philosophical 
mysticisms. Plotinus holds that Intellect, as the first emanation of the 
One, is, on the one hand, the "place to get to" for the mystic to 
contemplate the One, and on the other, that Intellect is the fons et origo 
of everything else. Further, small-i intellect, while vastly limited in 
comparison to Intellect, is nevertheless the same ontologically, just 
limited, and so his mystical path is not to set intellect aside but to 
purify it and transform it (lose the limitations). Pirsig holds that 
intellect emerged as more SQ out of a non-intellectual universe, and that 
there is no Intellect. That makes their metaphysics very different, and so 
their philosophical mysticism. Pirsig doesn't have a role for Intellect, and 
therefore treats intellect very differently, especially vis-a-vis the 
mystical.. Plotinus does have a role for Intellect, and so sees intellect as 
a mystical starting-point.

DMB contihnued:
 Again, my complaint is that you are
misreading other forms of philosophical mysticism as if they were different
from the MOQ in some critical way and it just ain't so. As I see it, you
consistently present evidence that only undoes your case. Here's Plotinus in
a work called THE ONE. I think it shows that you're quite mistaken...

Scott:
Well, this all depends on what one considers critical, then. The "beyond 
intellectual knowing" is a given in any mysticism, or religion in general. 
That is, who is there (except possibly some scientific materialists) who 
would claim that everything is small-i intellectually knowable? So as a 
yardstick for distinguishing among philosophical mysticisms, or religion in 
general, and a great deal of philosophy, it isn't important.

- Scott [DMB's Plotinus' quote below]

"There must be something prior to all, simple, and different from the things
which are posterior to it, self-existent, unmingled with the things which
come from it, and yet able in another way to be present with the others,
being really one, not something else first then secondarily one, of which it
is false even that it is one;  but of this One no descripton nor scientific
knowledge is possible. Indeed it must be said to be beyond 'being'; for if
it were not simple, without any composition and synthesis, and really one,
it would not be a first principle. And it is wholly self-sufficient by
virtue of its being simple and prior to all things. What is not simple
demands those simple elements which are within it, that it may be composed
of them. Such a One must be unique, for if there were another such both
together would constitute a larger unit. For we hold that they are not two
bodies nor is the Primary One a body. For no body is simple, and a body is
subject to generation; it is not an ultimate principle. The ultimate
principle is unoriginated, and being incorpreal and really one it is able to
stand first.

Since substances which have an origin are of some form, and since it is not
any particular form but all, without exception, the first principle must be
formless. And being formless is is not a substance; for substance must be
particular; and a particualr is determinate. But this can not be regarded as
particular, for it would not be a principle, but merely that particular
thing which you may have called it. If then all things are included among
what are generated, which of them will you say is the first principle? Only
what is none of them could be said to stand above the rest. But these
constitute existng things and Being in general. The First Principle then is
beyond Being. To say that it is beyond Being does not assert it to be any
definite thing. It does not define it. Nor does it give it a name. It
applies to it only the appellaton 'not-this'. In doing so it nowhere sets
limits to it. It would be absurd to seek to delimit such a boundless nature.
He who wishes to do this prevents himself from getting upon its track in any
wise, even little by little. But just as he who wishes to see the
Intelligible must abandon all imagery of the perceptible in order to
contemplate what is beyond the perceptible, so he who wishes to contemplate
what is beyond the Intelligible will attain the contemplation of it by
letting go everything intelligible, though this means learning THAT it is,
abandoning the search for WHAT it is. To tell what it is would involve a
reference to what it is not, for there is no quality in what has no
particular character. But we are in painful doubt as to what we should say
of it; so we speak of the ineffable and give it a name, meaning to endow it
with some significance to ourselves so far as we can. Perhaps this name 'The
One' implies merely opposition to plurality. ...But if The One were given
positive content, a name and significantion, it would be less appropriately
designated than when one does not give any name. It may be said that
description of it is carried this far in order that he who seeks it
beginning with that which indicates the simplicity of all things may end by
negating even this, on the ground that it was taken simply as the most
adequate and the nearest description possible for him who used it, but not
even this is adequate to the revelation of that nature, because it is
inaudible, not to be understood through hearing, and if by and sense at all
by vision alone. But if the eye that sees seeks to behold a form it will not
descry even this."

Thanks.
dmb

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