[MD] Julian Baggini Interview with Pirsig

[david buchanan]

Matt and all:

Matt said to dmb:
Don't find it useful?  Don't use it.  David asked what I thought.  So I told 
him.  Maybe he'll ask what you think next time.

dmb says:
Right. Personally, I found it impossible to use. But more to the point, I 
think you didn't answer the question. You told him what you thought, but not 
about what he asked. He wanted to know what you thought about how the "MOQ 
can be seen in relation to empiricism". Instead you talked about the 
worthlessness of empiricism. Not only is this irrelevant to the question, it 
directly opposes the self-described radical empiricism of the MOQ. What kind 
of interpretation could possible lead to the conclusion that radical 
empiricism should be seen as anti-empirical or non-empirical or 
post-empirical or anything remotely like that?

Matt:
Well, I was condensing. Part of the condensation was that the difference 
between James' radical empiricism and the post-analytic eschewment of "sense 
data" doesn't matter all that much for what
they were forwarded to correct.

Matt said:
And "empirical" is different from "empiricism."  Empiricism as a 
philosophical thesis would roughly be one that took really, really seriously 
(or "f-e-t-i-s-h-i-z-e-d") stuff that was "empirical," like sense data.  It 
was launched as a reaction to the a prioriness of the rationalists.  But 
three hundred years later we don't have many rationalists, and most 
philosophers are commonsensically empiricist (just like good ole' 
nonphilosophical, workaday common sense tells us), so we can just get on 
with saying, yeah, there are empirical studies (like sociology) and there 
are more analytic, push-around-concepts studies (like philosophy).  But, as 
I said before, I don't think there's anything philosophically interesting 
about the difference between the two, though when people took empiricism 
seriously, they did think there was an important difference (just as Pirsig 
may in fact, against my wishes, think there's an important difference).

dmb says:
People used to think there was an important difference and took empiricism 
seriously but not anymore and you wish Pirsig wouldn't either? Again, the 
criticism here is that your philosophological geneologies are not relevant 
to the MOQ. I don't see how the MOQ fits into the battle between the 
rationalists and the empiricists, except to point out how the whole debate 
was based on a false premise, that experience begins with subjects and 
objects. That's what James and Pirsig have rejected with their radical 
empiricism, right? And wouldn't it help to further explain that sense data 
and rational thought are re-situated in the MOQ's static hierarchy too? Or 
perhaps Pirsig's "data are data" realism should be mentioned somewhere in 
here too. I mean, Jeez, you're such a hack!

In response to quotes from Lila and Lila's Child, Matt said:
You can point out all the Pirsig material you want.  Almost none of it is 
surprising and would cause me to rethink what I was saying because the point 
of what I'm saying is to cause people to rethink
the way _they_ think about those passages.  In other words, what I write 
takes into account all those things.  I'm not saying there aren't passages 
I've forgotten about or neglected.  You could dig up something that would 
force me to rethink my opinion about Pirsig or philosophy.  But the more 
obvious passages that would apply to the types of things I write about I 
remember and fit within the condensed glosses and maps I offer.

dmb says:
So you are hereby denying that those quotes directly contradict your 
suggestion that empiricism is no longer important or useful? You're 
seriously suggesting that radical empiricism isn't empiricism and that it 
isn't important to the MOQ? We should talk about those deleted quotes 
because you think you've accounted for them in your view and I think they 
destroy it.

Matt said:
So, for instance, your quote from Lila's Child: "So in the MOQ experience 
comes first, everything else comes later. This is pure empiricism, as 
opposed to scientific empiricism, which, with its pre-existing subjects and 
objects, is not really so pure."  Let's see.  I said this, "On the one hand, 
Pirsig repudiates it in the Hegelian mold (that leads to James and Dewey) by 
making reality = experience, thus relinquishing the fetish with sense data." 
  Try and guess how I would view the passage you quoted.  That's right, the 
good, Hegelian answer (with that good ole' hint of Kantianism).

dmb says:
I have no idea what this means and so I have no idea what you're making of 
the passage. Maybe if you be less dense. What is a repudiation in the 
Hegalian mold, for example? How does that lead to James and Dewey? How does 
equating reality with experience relinquish the fetish with sense data? 
What's wrong with sense data? What's a good Hegalian answer? What do you 
mean by a "hint of Kantianism"?. There may be an audience for your density. 
Maybe I shouldn't speak for David. Maybe your explantions make perfect sense 
to him, but its just too vague for me.

Matt said:
Now, obviously what you've been bucking against is any intimation that there 
is anything wrong with Pirsig, that he looks like he makes any bad 
philosophical moves.  But why, then, throw at me a
passage that you already know how I think of it, because I've told you how I 
would think of it?..

dmb says:
No, not so much. As I said long ago, I'm not really worried by your 
"intimations" of the MOQ's wrongness because I think you don't understand 
it. And the reason I "threw" those quotes at you is because you seemed quite 
oblivous to them. You seemed to be guessing and equivocating about Pirsig's 
empistemology as if he hadn't ever answered such questions. You even went so 
far as to say, "I suspect that if Pirsig had been asked for his relation to 
empiricism, he would have..." How could you say that if you had taken into 
account Pirsig's self-description as a radical empiricist?

Matt continued:
...What would be by far more effective is to dig up a passage that would to 
me look bad, and then suggest a plausible interpretation that would look 
more like what I already consider good.  For instance, I just said that the 
above passage, while it for the most part looks alright, hints at badness to 
me.  Why would that be?  If you understand my position well enough (which I 
think you've said you don't), you should be able to predict what sends up a 
little red flag.  If you don't understand my position, then I can't quite 
figure out how you would argue against me so vociferously.  What's to 
dislike if you don't understand?  At this point, it would look like you just 
don't like my style. Which (I smile impishly and ironically) Pirsig said in 
the interview shouldn't matter at all to philosophy.

dmb says:
No, I don't understand your position well enough to know what you'd find 
good or bad in any particular passage. I'm not even convinced that you know 
your position that well. And no, its not just your style. And style would be 
irrelevant except that your philosophological style makes it hard to get at 
the actual content of your views. Despite this obstacle, I'm pretty sure 
that I dislike the substance of your position too.

You say that the neopragmatic reality is smooth and without joints or 
hinges. But to characterize the very same object, I'd say its flat, lacks 
depth and is unable to make important distinctions. I'd say that its 
intellectually paralyzing and that means its no damn good. It strikes me as 
a stance adopted out of futility. I think it comes with a lot of rules about 
what philosophers can and can't say, what philosophy can and can't do and 
otherwise puts the conversation in a straightjacket that three sizes too 
smalll. As I've said before, this is the kind of position one is forced to 
adopt because of the limits of SOM, not the limits of rationality, 
philosophy, epistemology, metaphysics or any of the other things you and 
your nihilistic friends has abandoned or shrugged off. See, the problem is 
with the underlying assumptions, not on intellectual activity as such. It 
seems to me that the neoprag position can't make that distinction because 
those underlying assumptions are seen as the problem. I don't think the 
neopragmatic critique knows how to criticize the MOQ, which continues to 
happily engage in epistemology and metaphysics with a different set of 
underlying assumptions.

And it seems pretty clear to me that RADICAL EMPIRICISM, the assertion that 
experience does not begin with subjects and objects, is part of Pirsig's 
move to get out of that box. See, this is the part I think you don't get. 
You keep interpreting Pirsig (and me) as if we were talking like SOMers, as 
if the MOQ's radical empiricism didn't get us out of the SOM box. Despite 
your protests, I don't think your rules about what's good and bad in 
philosophy are all that relevant to the MOQ. It seems to me that the whole 
thing is aimed at defeating a totally different creature. Surely part of the 
confusion is that the both Pirsig and Rorty level an attack on the 
correspondance theory of truth. Apparently, there are differences in the 
reasons for and consequences of that attack. But even more than than, one 
gives up and walks away while the other tries to paint a bigger picture.

This is my impression.

DMB had said:
Another reason I find your assertions so bizzare is that these clues from 
Pirsig should be taken up and expanded by philosophologists like yourself.

Matt replied:
Ah, but you forget DMB.  The James thread was the first one I picked up.  It 
was what led me to Rorty.

dmb says:
Oh come on dude, I don't even remember what thread I first picked up. In any 
case, what good does that do us now? I mean the point I was trying to make 
is that DM's question practically begs for some talk about James. Since 
Pirsig explicitly aligns the MOQ with it, I'd go so far as to say that you 
could have answered well by talking about nothing but James' empiricism. You 
can keep telling me what a great hand you have or you can just show me your 
cards. If you're holding aces, I'm gonna have to shut up real fast. Think 
about how much fun that would be! But I'm tired of all this bluffing, Mr. 
Philosophologists.

Matt said:
And besides, Pirsig teaches us to think for ourselves. ...I have a mind of 
my own and my own sense of what good philosophy looks like, a sense that was 
first developed by my teacher Kay Picart, then most especially by Pirsig, 
and then by Rorty, and now by a whole assortment of thinkers like Fish, and 
Geertz, and Stout, and Bernstein, etc., etc.  James and Northrop and Pirsig 
were writing in a huge philosophical milieu that extends further than the 
people they mention.  And sometimes in coming to terms with their thought, 
it helps to have some of that milieu in mind to understand what their 
philosophical moves mean, what they are reacting against.

dmb says:
Right. This is your game. Go for it. Tell me all about James' radical 
empiricism and the milieu in which it was developed. Tell us all what he was 
reacting to. What problem is it supposed to overcome? Is that the same 
problem that Pirsig is trying to overcome? Tell us all about it. Seriously. 
That sort of explanation is bound to shed some light on Pirsig's moves. 
That's what philosophologist should be doing here, don't you think? That's 
what I've been saying. You should be using your powers for good instead of 
evil.

And one more thing. Every time I dare to suggest that you have misread or 
misinterpreted Pirsig, you respond with that bit about how you're not doing 
biography. (As if that makes it OK to construe a radical empiricist as 
post-empirical.) You react as if such an error is just not possible. You 
refuse to discuss any differences in our interpretations except on your own 
weird terms  where I should be able to guess what you'll like and dislike 
about it. And generally, you seem to resent it whenever Pirsig is quoted.

I'm starting to think that you're just too proud to be a philosopher.

dmb

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