[MD] Is Morality innate in the cosmos?

[Platt Holden]

Ham -

P
> > If you do not welcome my challenges to what you say,
> > just pass the word and I will desist. When debate ceases to
> > be fun, it's time to say, "No mas."

H 
> Perhaps "making my life difficult" came across as a personal accusation,
> which I did not intend it to be.  If so, I apologize.  I have always enjoyed our
> discussions in the past.  The "difficulty" I was referring to is really my
> disappointment at finding what began as a stimulating discussion turn into a
> debate about whose belief system is the more "reasonable" without exploring the
> fundamental differences that separate us.

Sorry if I came across that way. However, I do challenge seemingly 
contradictory ideas hoping the author will clarify so as to remove the apparent 
contradiction.  Like those who make self-contradictory statements such as,  
"There are no absolutes." :-)

> One of the problems I'm encountering is that the standard of "reasonability" by
> which you are judging my ideas is rooted in a concept of the universe that is
> foreign to me.  Your concept, which derives from Pirsig, makes Morality the
> central philosophical issue.  My concept, on the other hand, is intuitive and
> puts the major emphasis on Individual Freedom.  The consequence of working at
> cross-purposes is that we wind up 'chipping away at each' other instead of
> making genuine progress.  And this is where debates cease to be "fun".

I agree. But you see to me "individual freedom" is a high moral ideal. In fact, 
just about the highest. Do you agree?

> I think the crux of the matter is your application of "morality" to the
> evolutionary processes of Nature.  To me, this makes morality and its
> presumed "standards" something pre-human in the universe rather than a code of
> social behavior developed by man.  And a fixed cosmic morality invalidates the
> concept of man's autonomy.

Cannot a "fixed cosmic morality" include man's autonomy being a moral 
evolutionary step forward? In other words, cannot a fixed morality include a 
fixed openness to the new and better, just as the fixed scientific method 
remains open to new and better theories? In Pirsig's metaphysics, DQ (Dynamic 
Quality) represents this openness to the "new and improved." Is that 
unreasonable?

> This statement, for example, demonstrates why our discussion is stymied.
> 
> [Platt]:
> > Do you then consider men to be animals so that my saying "Animals
> > compete . . ." meant to you that I was espousing a universal moral
> > principle that applied to humans? I notice you avoided my question,
> > "Do you not see any moral difference between animals and men?"
> > And ignored my answer, "I certainly do."  Each evolutionary level -- 
> > inorganic, biological, social and intellectual -- operates under a
> > different, moral code. The only universal moral code consists of
> > these separate and distinct codes, each fighting for dominance.
> 
> My answer is that what distinguishes animals and men isn't morality (because
> animals have no morality), but the fact that man's sense of value enables him to
> exercise free choice in his actions, whereas the animal acts according to its
> biological instincts.  But I would also ask why we need four "evolutionary
> levels, each fighting for dominance" when the only REAL VALUE in existence is
> the value made sensible to man.

I don't think we "need" four evolutionary moral levels like we need food, 
shelter and clothing. But I do think we need a better foundation for moral 
judgments than "whatever man thinks makes sense." That leaves the door wide 
open for as many interpretations of moral values as there are men. Result: no 
common standards of right and wrong, leading to slaughters that marked the 20th 
century and threaten the 21st. (Think of the election of Hamas in Palestine and 
the stated goals of Iran's current leadership, not to mention North Korea.) 
IMO, Pirsig's analysis of reality based on an evolutionary morality lays the 
groundwork for a common morality based on reason rather than authority and/or 
tradition which serve as the source(s) of morality today, and the consequent 
slaughters. That's my hope, though a mighty slim one I agree.   

> You see, from my "reasoning standard", having four modalities of the
> universe in conflict with each other is not only redundant, but
> counter-productive and meaningless in an anthropocentric world.  Applying
> Occam's razor would make this four-fold division superfluous for a
> fundamental ontology.  You will of course challenge my belief that man is
> the sensible locus of physical reality, but at the same time will insist on the
> four-level ontology, despite the fact that it is MAN'S INTELLECT that has
> created this hierarchy.

In a sense, man's intellect creates all knowledge. The question is, does 
Pirsig's moral hierarchy have useful explanatory power? Is it helpful in 
understanding the way the world evolved and man's place in it?. I submit that 
it is. Pirsig's explanation in chapters 22 and 23 of Lila of the ills that 
beset the modern world seem eminently reasonable to me. You obviously
disagree.  
 
> Do you see my problem?   Do you have any suggestions to resolve this
> impasse?

I see the problem as a disagreement concerning basic premises, not on the 
rationale that follows. For example, you believe as a basic premise that 
consciousness (awareness) is restricted to entities with nervous systems. I 
don't. I believe that all entities respond to consciousness, each in their own 
way, i.e., I believe in panpsychism.   

> [Ham]:
> > Scientific methodology is objective.  What is truth to the scientific
> > community is what has been universally established by objective
> > evidence.  There is no objective evidence for metaphysical theories,
> > which is why they remain hypotheses.
> 
> [Platt]:
> > So there is no difference between science methodology and
> > objective validation?  Is that correct?
> 
> There is more to the methodology than objective validation, but objective
> evidence is the validating criterion.  Why do you ask, and what is the
> relevance to our discussion?

I'm trying to find out what you consider to be "objective evidence" since you base
your arguments on it. For example, is not the observation that an amoeba will move away from
a toxic compound objective evidence that it possesses purpose and values?
  
> [Platt]:
> > In a letter to Bo Skutvik, Pirsig made it clear that Quality is positively
> > verifiable:
> >
> > "Arguments that value is unreal can be reduced to absurdity by the
> question,
> > "Do you think a five dollar bill has the same value as an one dollar bill?
> If
> > so, are you willing to trade some bills?" and "If not, why not? What's the
> > difference?" If they give the standard answer that money is a convention
> you
> > can ask, "What kind of convention is a crash in the stock market?"
> Conventions
> > are static, but as every good trader knows stock prices are a mixture of
> static
> > and dynamic factors. This can be expanded hugely into a discussion of the
> stock
> > exchange indexes whose sole purpose is the measurement of value and
> expanded
> > further into the large areas of economics. Consider how many books have
> been
> > written on economics that don't touch on the real meaning of value! "
> 
> I'm familiar with this analogy, but one cannot make logical headway by a
> play on words.
> "Value" in monetary transactions simply implies relative purchasing "power" or
> "importance".  What the answers from Pirsig's imaginary respondent affirm is
> only that a five-dollar bill has more marketability than a one-dollar bill;
> i.e., some things are better than others.  It does not prove that Value exists
> apart from man's awareness of it, or that Value is a pre-intellectual principle
> innate to the cosmos.  In other words, Platt, it isn't valid objective evidence
> for the Quality of MoQ.

Maybe not. But IMO the explanatory power of the MOQ gives plenty of evidence 
for the quality of the MOQ. As for proving anything "beyond man's awareness of 
it" isn't that a conundrum that would apply equally to Essentialism?

> [Platt]:
> > The venus fly trap comes immediately to mind, but I remember reading
> > about trees who respond to the environment by increasing sap production
> > or some such response to stimuli which would indicate a form of
> consciousness.
> 
> Consciousness, like pregnancy, doesn't subscribe to "forms".  You're either
> pregnant or not pregnant; a biological entity either has consciousness or does
> not.  And, when you begin to talk to me "about trees WHO" I worry about your
> particular state of conscious sensibility!
 
See, you assert a premise: "Consciousness doesn't subscribe to forms." I 
disagree. I think consciousness can take many forms, like that of my cat.
The only way I can see for us to move forward in our conversations is to come 
to some agreement on such premises. Actually, all reasonable disagreements are 
fundamentally about premises. As for those trees being "who," a little 
personification of inanimate objects might not be such a bad thing. :-)

Morally yours in peace,
Platt

P.S. I hope others chime in on the question you pose as the subject of this 
thread.