[MD] Platt's Individual Level

[Gene M]

> >The idea of a self is indeed false, but that doesn't mean that the idea
> of
> >others is false as well. Even if I have no self, and you have no self, I
> >have a you. You see?
>
> I see that you have a concept of me. I fail to see how you can have a me
> when I don't even have a me.


You'll just to accept I have a you. It's an entity that exists in my mind.
It might not be you, but then again you might not be you. So I don't see how
it is any worse.

>I have a version of you in my mind, a set of intellectual patterns with
> >which I identify your behaviour and mannerisms, and I believe it to be
> >actturate. If you were to die, I would still have that idea of you.
> >Although
> >you no long have your idea of you. So even if you no longer exist, my
> idea
> >of you lives as long as I do.
>
> Of course it does. That's not me.


Nope. It's my Idea of you.

>Or how about this:
> >If you were our driving and smashed your car into a tree at 60 mph, do
> you
> >believe that tree exists?
>
> As tree is imaginary and car too, no. I do not believe tree exists. Do you
> believe imaginary trees exist?


I simply cannot wrap my head around this. I can't. I'll try, and get back to
you.


> >I learnt that quote for the first time in a university history course. It
> >was used to sum up the Rennaissance, in which the idea of comparing
> >ourselves and our works to God, and thus showing them as insignificant
> and
> >shitty, we compared them only to ourselves. We no longer measure
> ourselves
> >and our creations based on some mythical omnipotent Creator, but we
> measure
> >ourselves to ourselves, and see how things Really stack up.
> >
> >Man is the measure of all things. All things are in relation to us, to
> us.
>
> This is very interesting and as the MOQ is anti-theistic could you please
> explain what it has to do with the quote.


Well, it is the origin of the quote. Hence seems related to me.

> >[Dan]
> > > >We presume there's a person behind our idea of the person. And that
> is
> >a
> > > >high quality presumption, I should think. At the same time however,
> >since
> > > >we are unable to experience reality directly, we cannot know with
> > > certainty
> > > >that there really is a person there behind our idea of the person.
> All
> >we
> > > >have are our assumptions. Always.
> > >
> > > How is the existence of a person scientifically verifiable? Where is
> >that
> > > person at?
> >
> >
> >I think what Steve is saying is that the biological patterns that make up
> a
> >person are "verifiable", in that we have objective measurements that can
> >show they exist. A scale for example, will prove that the person standing
> >on
> >it exists. However I think you're talking about the person in the social
> >and
> >intellectual sense.
>
> Biological patterns are indeed verifiable but they are not the person. Are
> they?


They are Part of the person! The self is all the levels combined. The
biological has it's role to play. If you get a big chunk of metal embedded
in your brain, it might not kill you, but it can have effects on who you
are! An inorganic pattern disturbing the biological pattern of your body can
alter your social and intellectual patterns! It seems clear to me that the
biological is tied into the Self.

>
> >And I agree. All we have are our assumptions. So it's best to just go
> with
> >them I find. As long as they prove consistent with experience reality.
>
> Do you have a choice?


I like to think yes. But I hardly know for sure.

> > >I disagree with "we are unable to experience reality directly." In the
> > > MOQ
> > > >reality is an abstraction from experience or is considered equivalent
> >to
> > > >experience.
> > >
> > > All experience is a remembrance, an after-the-fact
> intellectualization.
> > > There may be a "dim apprehension of we know not what" but until we put
> > > sense
> > > to it, that's all it is.
> >
> >
> >I think True experience is DQ, that which occurs before anything. What
> you
> >experience without words, without thoughts, without any filters.
> >Intellectualization is not experience, it is after that fact, it is
> >classifying and organizing, but it's not the same as experiencing in my
> >opinion.
>
> If you don't know what you're experiencing, how can it be classified as
> experience?


Experience precedes cognizance. Experience is classified after the fact,
post-mortem if you will. By the time you know and have organized what you
experienced, it's done. Thinking simply distracts from experiencing. It's
not the experience itself.

>
> > >
> > > >In the MOQ objects are not intellectual patterns as you say, they are
> > > >inorganic and biological patterns.
> > >
> > > The MOQ is a collection of intellectual patterns of value.
> >
> >
> >Yes. That does not invalidate the point Steve made here.
>
> Good. You've made the connection that there can be more than one correct
> point of view.


Duh.

>The MOQ is indeed a
> >set of intellectual patterns, but these patterns tell us that physical
> >objects are made up of inorganic and biological patterns.
>
> In a conventional sense, yes.


In a Real sense.

>I personally
> >believe social and intellectual patterns should be called objects as
> well,
> >but I don't mix the levels. A chair, and my idea of a chair are different
> >objects, but both objects, both true, and both real.
> >
>
> I respectfully disagree. There is no chair. Only the idea of chair.


I would say you are missing half the MOQ in that case. Half of Reality in
fact. It's like trying to drive from boston to Seattle with a map that stops
in Dubuque Iowa.

-Gene