[MD] Representationalism

[Steve Peterson]

Hi Matt, (MIke)

Steve said:
I think that Pirsig would say that the laws of physics
are intellectual 
patterns of value that describe inorganic patterns of
value. I say this 
because of the ghosts discussion in ZAMM where he says
that Newton's Laws of 
Gravitation exist only in our minds. At that time he
didn't describe them as 
referring to anything, but I think that is because he
had not yet defined a 
type of experience called inorganic patterns of value.
I think in the MOQ 
ideas do represent other types of experience. They can
represent inorganic, 
biological, social, or other intellectual patterns of
value.

Matt:
The trouble with "represent" is taking it in a
philosophically 
interteresting way, which I don't think you're doing
here.  The first step 
of purging representationalism was taken by Berkeley
when he said, against 
Cartesianism, that the only thing that an idea can
represent is another 
idea.  Thus modern idealism was born.  At that point,
however, we begin to 
wonder what the mind or ideas contrast with,
considering that now everything 
is mind.  That's when we take the next step by
becoming pragmatists.

Mike reproduced Paul's reply to him from some time ago
and at the end he 
says, "In thesis (1), everything is recognised as a
human invention; a 
pattern of knowledge.  But in thesis (2), the pattern
of knowledge called 
the MOQ is laid out as a 'plain of understanding' [I
think he meant "plane"] 
and IN THIS PATTERN inorganic patterns of values are
independent of 
intellectual patterns and evolved prior to them." 
These are the two steps, 
though they still contain that minor hint of idealism
(a little bit stronger 
waft then the hint that realists still always find in
pragmatism, but still 
negligible).  Paul's first thesis says that all
knowledge is linguistic; the 
only way we know things is by talking about them.  The
second thesis roughly 
says that one of the things we know is that rocks were
here before us--we 
didn't have to invent them (which is kinda' what
thesis one seemed to 
imply).

Steve:

That explanantion was helpful. I think we are in
complete agreement. I was afraid I was making some
error of representationalism.


Matt:
It is the push and sway of these two different theses,
which are implicit 
and can be drawn from Pirsig, that causes most of the
intermural activity in 
epistemology for us Pirsigians.  By the light of those
two theses, Pirsig 
and his followers can all be seen to be pragmatists
(and from my vantage, 
Arlo, Steve, and Mike, not to mention DMB, Anthony,
and Paul are all 
pragmatists), attempting to reformulate Pirsig's
insights into better and 
better nonrepresentationalist language--and keep
others from falling 
backwards.  I think most of the criticism we level at
each other in this 
area is because, say, one person starts talking about
thesis one and another 
one of us criticizes them from thesis two's vantage
point, which causes the 
first person to criticize the other person from a
stronger version of thesis 
one's point of view.  And on and on.

Steve:
That is a great observation about our discussions and
why pragmatists still find so much to argue about.


Matt:
 My suggestion for cleaning up is 
as above in how I exposited Paul's first thesis: all
knowledge is linguistic; the only way we know things
is by talking about them.  This at 
least has the virtue of leaving "humans" out of it
(humans more obviously 
have a physical element to them) and by not firing up
the claim in more 
bombastic terms by saying "everything is linguistic". 
Because by the time 
we get to thesis two, obviously not everything is
linguistic--rocks, 
sunsets, tigers, etc.

Steve:
I'm fine with "all knowldge is linguistic" in nature
but not that all knowledge is linguisticly obtained.
>From a thesis 2 perspective, don't we create
intellectual patterns to describe experiences that are
not verbal?

You say, "the only way we know things is by talking
about them."  I'm fine with saying that knowing is an
intellectual (linguistic) activity, but how is it we
come to know something? To know is to create an
intellectual pattern, but that creative act was not
necessarily motivated "by talking." It could have been
motivated by sitting on a hot stove.



Matt:
We can see this dialectic played out in the dialogue
you and I just began, 
Steve.   From the vantage of thesis two ("inorganic
patterns of values are 
independent of intellectual patterns") I said the
"laws of physics are 
inorganic patterns of differentiation".  From the
vantage of thesis one you 
remarked that "the laws of physics are intellectual
patterns of value".  
They are both right, just depending on what context
you're coming from.  
When you say that "in the MOQ ideas do represent other
types of experience" 
you are of course right.  But this kind of
representation is a far cry from 
the one we need to excoriate in the philosophical
tradition and not the kind 
I was talking about.  And you should be willing to say
(as I was referring 
when I said that the "laws of physics are inorganic
patterns of 
differentiation") that apples were falling off of
trees long before Newton 
was around.  Given agreement on those two points, I'm
not sure we have much 
of importance to quibble about.

Steve:
Good example. 

One quibble. I find using the phrase  "the laws of..."
as in "Newton's Law of Gravity" to suggest
intellectual patterns that describe inorganic
patterns, but would be fine with calling gravity
itself an inorganic pattern (while keeping in mind
that it is also an idea, therefore in a way it is an
intellectual pattern). Is that just quibbling?

Regards,
Steve




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