[MD] Representationalism

[Matt Kundert]

Hey Steve,

Steve said:
I'm fine with "all knowldge is linguistic" in nature but not that all 
knowledge is linguisticly obtained. From a thesis 2 perspective, don't we 
create Intellectual patterns to describe experiences that are not verbal?

You say, "the only way we know things is by talking about them."  I'm fine 
with saying that knowing is an intellectual (linguistic) activity, but how 
is it we come to know something? To know is to create an intellectual 
pattern, but that creative act was not necessarily motivated "by talking." 
It could have been motivated by sitting on a hot stove.

Matt:
I think saying the above is fine.  The one danger we have to avoid, which 
has been the scourge of 20th century philosophy of language, is saying that 
non-intellectual patterns offer _justification_ for our utterances.  All a 
non-intellectual pattern can do is _cause_ us to shift our intellectual 
patterns around.  The idea that non-intellectual patterns justify in 
addition to causing our linguistic patterns is part of a (complicated) 
epistemological project of finding a foundation for our knowledge.  It 
eventually leads to (by only finding foundation in perceptual impacts) the 
view that only non-intellectual stuff can ground the intellectual stuff, 
then that anything that isn't so grounded isn't knowledge, then to art is 
cognitively meaningless.  And now we have full-fledged SOM which says that 
we can't have knowledge about morals because they aren't grounded in nature.

Donald Davidson, to help avoid this problem, suggests that we distinguish 
between reasons and causes.  Davidson suggests that reasons are internal to 
language.  We can be caused to think things by, say, touching a hot stove.  
Touching it makes you say, "Ouch, that's flippin' hot!"  But it doesn't 
offer you a reason for saying it--it makes you say it.  And on the other 
hand, we could be offered a reason for not touching the stove like, "Hey, 
that stove is hot."  Davidson points out, as in this example, that reasons 
can be causes, though not vice versa.  So, in this case, I was caused to not 
touch the stove because of what the person said and it also functions as a 
reason.

So my instinct is to shy away from "not all knowledge is linguistically 
obtained" because to me it still sounds a little like we can get knowledge 
from non-linguistic items.  There isn't any knowledge in non-language.  
Non-linguistic items _cause_ us to think things, but they don't _give_ us 
knowledge.  All knowledge is internally generated in language.  We may think 
that seeing, for instance, a tiger gives us knowledge of seeing a 
tiger--that seeing the tiger doesn't just cause us to think "Holy shit, I 
see a tiger!", but it justifies us saying, "Oh my god, guys, there's a tiger 
over there!"  Davidson, however, is suggesting that reasons and 
justification can only be generated in whole sets of linguistic practices or 
language games.  For instance, we have linguistic practices that say 
"Believe people in Asian backwaters and American zoos when they say, 'I saw 
a tiger'".  However, we also have linguistic practices that say "Don't 
believe people in American suburbs when they say, 'I saw a tiger'".

The idea that non-linguistic perception undergirds our knowledge has strong 
appeal, in that, wouldn't it be pretty strong justification to actually 
_show_ them the non-linguistic item, that the non-linguistic item itself 
provides its own strongest justification? ("Guys, get the eff over here!  I 
swear to God there's tiger in my backyard!")  Davidson is suggesting that we 
not think of it that way.  Showing is different from justifying.  Showing 
simply reproduces the cause, reproduces the causal experience that you had.  
("Geez-ez, Bob, there _is_ a tiger out by your swingset!") It doesn't itself 
justify.  The reason it looks like it does is because we have other 
linguistic practices that say, "Believe groups of two or more who say they 
each individually saw a tiger, even if they are in an American suburb 
(though particularly if they live near a zoo)."  ("I swear Susie, me and the 
guys saw a tiger.  Didn't we guys?")

The main objection to the above is given by people like DMB who want to make 
room for "mystical knowledge" which they take to mean "non-linguistic 
knowledge."  Obviously my definitions deny such a thing, so they take it as 
a reductio ad absurdum.  My reply usually takes the form of 1) I "deny" 
knowledge to rocks as much as I do mystical experiences (so no scientistic 
motive), 2) How do you avoid the SOMic problems of representationalism?, and 
3) while I may deny non-linguistic _knowledge_ there are still 
non-linguistic _causes_.  And by this I mean, there's still room in 
Davidsonian philosophy of language for mystical causes, and in fact for 
mystical knowledge, its just the case that in this rendering all mystical 
knowledge is linguistic, generated by the linguistic practices of mystics 
(who are caused to utter certain things in certain circumstances).

So to sum up, I'm less comfortable with "obtain", but more comfortable with 
"motivated".  But they are for specific, technical philosophical reasons.  
In common speech, and in the context of knowing you want avoid the same 
things I do (assuming for the moment that you find acceptable the above 
spin), the language is fine and the point right.  Not all linguistic 
activity is linguistically motivated, though some of it is.

Steve said:
One quibble. I find using the phrase  "the laws of..." as in "Newton's Law 
of Gravity" to suggest intellectual patterns that describe inorganic 
patterns, but would be fine with calling gravity itself an inorganic pattern 
(while keeping in mind that it is also an idea, therefore in a way it is an 
intellectual pattern). Is that just quibbling?

Matt:
Well, ya' know, yeah, but you're right it would've been clearer for cutting 
the difference between the two.  My intention was just to refer to the 
physical phenomena, like gravity, and flying through as I was I thought I 
could just get away with saying "laws of physics".  When you say, "while 
keeping in mind that it is also an idea," you're definitely making good 
reference to the sneaky part of thesis one that realists don't like.  They 
think its asinine to have to keep sticking on addenda like that when there's 
just a plain, obvious difference between what you read in a textbook and 
dropping a rock.  But people like us, people who are trying to shake off an 
entrenched thought paradigm and continue to hammer out an as yet half-formed 
new one, we have to do it to make clear what we mean.  That's why, as you 
said, "pragmatists still find so much to argue about."  Its because they're 
trying to hammer out a new language game to play by, but as of yet there are 
not many rules to it, and a linguistic item with too few rules for 
interpreting it is an ambiguous item that could mean different things (some 
of which could be bad).

Philosophy itself is basically just this tightrope act because philosophy is 
that activity where all the rules can be put into jeopardy (though not all 
at once).  That's why philosophy is so dangerous and exhausting--you have to 
keep explaining yourself and it seems like you can be attacked from anywhere 
about anything at any time, particularly if you don't know the person you're 
talking to, their concerns and preoccupations and such.  (For instance, its 
because I've been talking to DMB so long that I can predict his objection.  
And because I can predict it, and he mine, we would be able to move the 
conversation along.)

Matt

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