[MD] Mill: Quality philosopher

[Platt Holden]

Hi Matt, 

I'm very familiar with your predictable postmodern "language games" and 
have expressed my views before that you can go that way if you want, 
but I prefer to stay with Pirsig's "logical consistency" when it comes 
to identify high quality truth. I agree not only with Pirsig but with 
Ken Wilber who pointed out that making a truth claim (except for one's 
own privileged stance) that denies all truth claims is "profoundly 
incoherent."  

Be that as it may, my question at the moment is simply after all you 
say below do you agree with Pirsig's "logical consistency" as a 
characteristic of quality truth or not?  I anticipate you will avoid 
answering yes or no since in your worldview, yes or no is a simplistic, 
foolish dichotomy. For the rest of us, yes and no move evolution 
forward.

Platt

> Ian, Arlo, Platt,
> 
> Platt said predictably:
> I can't resist pointing out that when you quote Matt asserting . . .
> "There is no single, absolute truth. There are simply better and better
> truths" . . . the contradictions are evident. His assertions are
> presented as absolute truths.
> 
> Ian said:
> The assertion that there are no assertions, the axiom that there are no
> axioms, is only a problem for people who are stuck in a simple logical
> view of the world.
> 
> Arlo said:
> Was it Spock who paraphrased the Buddhist sentiment, "The gates to truth
> are guarded by paradox and confusion. And if you attempt to enter, by
> turning your back on them, the truth will remain closed behind you."
> 
> Platt replied:
> When it comes to philosophy I'm perfectly happy to join with many other
> philosophers who "stuck" in a "simple" logical view of the world....
> 
> Matt:
> Arlo and Ian are quite right.  The problem that Platt has is that his
> weapons are too simple.  I, probably more than anyone, have had this
> conversation many, many times with Platt, but Platt refuses to upgrade
> (and move the conversation along), despite the fact that I give him the
> weapons to do so.  All paradoxes and contradictions are apparent,
> created by language games being played the wrong way.  Any paradox that
> can't be dissolved simply shows the limit of ingenuity or the creation
> of a language game that requires us to give up things we wish to keep.
> 
> Since I have shown Platt many, many times how to dissolve the apparent
> paradox created by "there are absolutely no absolute truths" (which is a
> bad/bombastic way of expressing the desire for a new language game that
> leaves out certain forms of "absolute"), his continued insistence on it
> reflects either 1) a desire to keep something being thrown away in the
> new language game or 2) a lack of ingenuity to keep up with the logical
> moves being made.  I've always insisted on the principle of charity, so
> I've always simply assumed that it was 1 (despite periodic evidence to
> the contrary, like never learning the new tricks).  But if 1, then that
> means that Platt is committing fraudulent sleight of hand every time he
> claims that "the contradictions are evident" because Platt (having
> learned from past experience that he and I are talking about two
> slightly different things) knowingly substitutes his own definition of X
> (truth, absolute, universal, etc.) into _my_ sentence, which only makes
> sense with _my_ definition of X, thus screwing up what I meant and
> creating a factitious version of the sentence meaning something other
> than I intended--what's more, creating a spurious version that he
> _knows_ I did not intend.  He's breaking the rules of argumentation to
> score cheap rhetorical points, and he accuses me of ignoring logic.
> 
> Platt is indeed begging the question, a logical fallacy.  Even after
> realizing that (and stopping it), we are still faced with two different
> language games (one where "absolute truth" means something big and
> powerful and the other where it is simply redundant) and the choice
> between them: Platt likes his, I like mine.  We can't join in argument
> over them because we would both proceed to beg the question over each
> other, using different definitions of key words as we are.  But,
> realizing all that, we could then get on with a conversation about the
> consequences of these differing language games, a conversation that
> perhaps wouldn't lead us to any more agreement, but would at least,
> perhaps, narrow down where our disagreements might be and give greater
> understanding to where we each exist in philosophical space.
> 
> But after five years I've learned that Platt would rather score cheap
> rhetorical points.
> 
> Matt