[MD] Distinguishing Levels (Individual level)

[Platt Holden]

Hi Steve, 

> Platt:
> Yes. But as I've said many times, the levels are defined in large part
> by their relationship to other levels.

Steve:
> I'm sure this is true for
> the way that you think of the levels, but Pirsig has defined intellect
> for us many times and to do so he never needed to relate it to other
> levels or individual people.

As a matter of fact he did relate intellect to other levels, especially 
the social level. For example, in Lila he wrote: "Intellect has its own 
patterns and goals that are as independent of society as society is 
independent of biology." As for relating the level to individual 
people, he identified many intellectual level individuals in the New 
Deal -- Hopkins, Douglas, Moregenthau, Frankfurter among others. 

> You want to say that all his definitions imply individuals since only
> individuals think, but only individuals participate in social patterns
> as well.

I have never denied that only individuals participate in social 
patterns. In fact, I have made it quite clear that the social and 
intellectual levels are reserved for humans. Animals and atoms need not 
apply. What I do suggest is that at the intellectual level, individuals 
dominate society. Thus, to rename it the individual level is not only  
in line with Pirsig's divisions but reinforces his theory that the 
higher the level, the more moral. The moral principle that supports  
democracy, the most moral social pattern yet devised, is based on the 
freedom of the individual. The "intellectual good" is an "individual 
good." By contrast,  the "social good' is the central principle of 
totalitarian societies. 

> The individual versus collective understanding of Pirsig's
> levels is looking more and more like a dead end as people dig up more
> and more quotes to contradict your view.
> 
> Here's another from ch 21 of Lila:
> "In a value metaphysics, on the other hand, society and intellect are
> patterns of value.  They're real.  They're independent.  They're not
> properties of "man" any more than cats are the property of catfood or a
> tree is a property of soil."
> 
> Not only is Pirsig contradicting that the levels are independent rather
> than as you say defined in relation to other levels, but he says that
> the levels aren't to be thought of as properties of individuals (or
> collectives) but rather  as patterns of value.

I have no objection to Pirsig's description of ideas as patterns of 
value, and that ideas are independent of society. In fact, many ideas  
are anti-social as Pirsig points out when he described freedom of 
speech, freedom of the  press, freedom of  religion, etc.  as 
reflecting "the moral right of intellect to be free of social control." 
That these "rights" are individual rights further cements my argument 
that the intellectual level might well be called the individual level. 

> Intellect is not the property of the individual who Pirsig always talks
> about as a social entity.

Pirsig talks about the individual as entity comprised of all levels 
plus the ability to respond to DQ. But it his intellect that dominates 
the other levels.   

>"The pattern of the tree is dependent upon the minerals in the soil 
>and would die without them, but the tree's pattern is not created by 
>the soil's chemical pattern.
> You always say that the intellectual level should be called the
> individual level since only individuals have ideas, but the analogy of
> this quote suggests that though ideas dies without individuals, ideas
> are not created by these individual social entities any more than dirt
> creates trees.

Above you quoted Pirsig saying the levels are independent. In this 
quote, he says the levels are dependent. Can you perhaps clear up this 
contradiction. I can't. As for where idea are created, I maintain they 
are created by individuals. Societies don't think. 

> If you want to think of the individual as not just a social entity but
> also one who partipates in intellectual patterns, Pirsig's analogy here
> suggests that it is not biological man that creates social man which
> creates intellectual man, the individual man is rather a product of all
> theses types of patterns.

As said above, I agree that individual man is a product of all level 
patterns. However, his intellect dominates the social level at the most 
moral intellectual level. 

> The types of patterns of value point of view in contrast to your types
> of people understanding of the levels turns your individual idea on it's
> head and says that this individual is inferred from his patterns rather
> than seeing the patterns as a creation of the individual.

If you are saying that Pirsig, the individual created the levels and 
the patterns, I agree. If not, then I don't understand your point.

> If you don't want to go there, fine, but you are missing a lot of
> Pirsig's work by rejecting patterns of value for your Ken
> Wilber-filtered version of the MOQ.

I 'm not aware that I was proposing a Wilber-filtered version of the 
MOQ. Perhaps you can explain further.

> An individual behaving socially 
> is mostly a social level person. Lila, for example, was "intellectually
> nowhere." 
 
> Steve:
> Can you cite any examples where Pirsig calls someone "a social level
> person" versus "a biological level person"? 

Well, he calls criminals as acting at the biological level. Is that 
what you mean? I presume when they desist from crime they rise to the 
social level. 

> I really wish you could forget all your Wilbur and start over with
> Pirsig. They are really not saying the same thing. It's funny that you
> and DMB think so when you disagree about everyting else.

Funny. I don't think DMB agrees with my individual level suggestion at 
all. He loves government regulations. 

> Pirsig says about ideas that "They're not
> properties of "man" any more than cats are the property of catfood"

Right. They are properties of individual men and women, not "man" in 
general, although "properties" is rather a strange word to apply to man 
or cats. 

Hope I've clarified my position for you, Steve.

Regards,
Platt
.