[MD] Argumentation: Social/Intellectual

[Steve Peterson]

Hi Matt, (Platt),

I agree with your interpretation of Pirisig in your
paper for the most part, especially that Pirsig's idea
of patterns of value is not that the person has the
patterns but that the patterns define the person.

He wants to start with Quality from which we infer
patterns from which we infer subjects and objects
rather than starting with subjects and objects and
finding no place for Quality. Platt would like to give
the subject supremacy in the MOQ rather than take all
of RMP’s talk about patterns to heart.

Matt:
"The social level is where we as social 
beings exist and the intellectual level is where our
arguments exist."  

Steve:
I didn't like your locations analogy for the levels.
These levels are better thought of as types of
experience rather than places where different types of
things exist.


Matt:
But the reason we confer authority to people in
intellectual discourse is _because_ they’ve had good
arguments.  These good arguments aren’t disembodied 
from the person, as is possibly suggested by Pirsig’s
description of the intellectual level as
"independently manipulable symbols." (See "Letter 
to Paul Turner")  These arguments _are_ the person. 
We don’t _have_ static patterns, we _are_ static
patterns.


Steve:

I agree. 

I would say the MOQ description of the person making
an argument is that our experience creates a subject
(individual) as an inference from observed patterns.
To the extent we are thinking of this person as a
physical object that has mass and takes up space, we
are talking about inorganic patterns. To the extent
that we are perceiving this person vocalize and move
and look sexy we are talking about biological
patterns. To the extent we are talking about a
personality we are talking about social patterns and
to the extent we are talking about ideas we are
talking about intellectual patterns. We further infer
that this collection of patterns forms a whole, and we
call this entire collection of patterns of all types
an "individual."

This collection of patterns is also always changing.
Pirsig’s affinity for Buddhism is obvious. His
metaphysics is consistent with Buddhism in that this
collection of patterns, this small self, is not
substantial. To cling to these static patterns is
immoral compared to identifying with Big Self which I
think Pirsig points to with DQ. This tie to Buddhism
is just one more reason why Platt’s Individual level
could in no way be what Pirsig means by the
individual.


Matt:
But if arguments aren’t easily distinguishable from
the person, how can we confer authority to the
argument and not the person?  What is authority in
intellectual discourse if not trust in the argument’s
power and the argumentative skill of the person 
propounding it?  I’m not arguing that there aren’t
distinctions in the area to be made.  But these
distinctions will be more ad hoc and fluid then 
the discrete, universal distinction Pirsig wants to
maintain between social and intellectual. 

Steve:

I agree that our truth-sense in evaluation of
someone’s arguments is not easily distinguished from
our sense of authority, celebrity etc. It is likely to
be confused with our physical attraction for the
person or fear that they might get angry if they are
big and strong so biological patterns are a part of
this too.

But I disagree that the fact that they aren’t easily
distinguished means that the levels themselves can’t
be thought of as discrete. It is still useful to try
to identify these different types of experience so
that we may choose to emphasize our truth-sense in
such a case by trying to think about the argument in
purely intellectual terms and weighing authority
appropriately  in the overall evaluation while
forgetting about how charming socially or physically
attractive or intimidating the person arguing may be.

Regards,
Steve


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