[MD] Emergent Consciousness

[Arlo J. Bensinger]

[Steve]
I have been away for a while and haven't heard you talk about the MOQ as an
emergent model. I've had some thoughts along the same line but I don't recall
ever discussing it much.

[Arlo]
The emergentist foundation of the MOQ is seen throughout Lila, but in the
following section he makes it quite clear.

"What makes all this significant [RELATING CIRCUITRY TO LOW-LEVEL PROGRAMMING TO
A NOVEL STORED ON THE COMPUTER] to the Metaphysics of Quality is its striking
parallelism to the interrelationship of different levels of static patterns of
quality.

Certainly the novel [HIGHER LEVEL] cannot exist in the computer without a
parallel pattern of voltages [LOWER LEVEL] to support it. But that does not
mean that the novel [HIGHER LEVEL] is an expression or property of those
voltages [LOWER LEVEL]. It [THE HIGHER LEVEL] doesn't have to exist in any
electronic circuits [LOWER LEVEL] at all. It can also reside in magnetic
domains on a disk or a drum or a tape, but again it is not composed of magnetic
domains nor is it possessed by them. It [HIGHER LEVEL] can reside in a notebook
but it is not composed of or possessed by the ink and paper [LOWER LEVEL]. It
[HIGHER LEVEL] can reside in the brain of a programmer [LOWER LEVEL], but even
here it is neither composed of this brain nor possessed by it."

In the current discussion, it's worth emphasizing the last sentance, as Platt
has stressed both "property" and "necessity" in order to "prove" that ideas
"are properties" of individuals.

[Steve]
I recently mentioned that I sometimes think of intellectual patterns as waves in
a sea of social patterns which are waves in a sea of biological patterns, etc.

[Arlo]
I like the analogy, no complaints from me.

[Steve]
I agree with your idea that identity emerges out of social patterns and that
there is a conection to the evolution of the intellectual level. Perhaps the
first idea was "I." 

[Arlo]
I agree with this general notion, although I think the first idea was likely
"There!". The "I" emerged as a dialectical locus in the symbolic representation
of experience. Einstein put it this way.

"A human being is part of the whole, called by us "universe," a part limited in
time and space. He experiences himself, has thoughts and feelings, as something
separate from the rest-- a kind of optical delusion of consciousness. This
delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and
to affection for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free
ourselves from this prison by widening our circles of compassion to embrace all
living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty."

That is, the "I" is an "optical delusion of consciousness".

But, the question becomes (albeit rhetorically), is (1) does the "I" emerge from
the social or biological levels (there are ramifications to either claim), or
(2) is the "I" and the "mythos" co-constructs on the social level, or is the
"I" the intellectual level (which says that it emerges from the social level). 

[Steve]
But I wouldn't equate consciousness with the intellectual level. There is
"consciousness" at all levels which can be equated with the ability to respond
to Quality at whatever level since to be aware is to value.

[Arlo]
Oh, I agree. And I don't. I was merely pointing out the post-modernism that
supports (to some degree) Platt's claim that "individual human consciousness"
is the "intellectual level". Not all post-modern, social constructionists would
place the "I" as some "superior level" to society. Like I said, to many (the
school I tend to agree with) plaves them (the individual human consciousness
and the mythos) as dialectically-related social-level constructs. But I think
Foucault's idea of individual "identity" as emerging from collective social
activity comes close to Platt's claims.

[Steve provides RMP Annotation 30]
"I think the answer is that inorganic objects experience events but do not react
to them biologically socially or intellectually. They react to these
experiences inorganically,according to the laws of physics."

In that way, I think inorganic objects are conscious. It's just the lowest
possible level of consciousness.

[Arlo]
Agree.

[Steve]
Likewise, biological objects (animals and plants) can respond to biological
quality, social subjects (humans, perhaps primates, or other animals) can
respond to social quality, and intellectual subjects (humans) can respond to
intellectual quality. These are all levels of consciousness.

[Arlo]
Agree. Which is why it was funny to see Platt laboring to place "static quality"
at the foreground of experience, despite everything Pirsig wrote about it. "DQ"
is simply "it's better here", "static quality" comes later, in the form of
analogues of various complexity. The "intellectual level" contains the most
sophisticated analogues so far produced. Amoebas, certainly, can't produce
these. People can. Primates, somewhere inbetween (an arugement for another
day).

[Steve]
I think that if intellect is the manipulation of abstract symbols, the first
symbols must have been social patterns. It is words that are being manipulated
and it is the collective activity (manipulation) of these words from which
intellect emerges.

[Arlo]
This is a big topic. Ian, I believe, argues that symbolic manipulation
(semiosis) occurs on all the levels to some degree. Others have proposed
semiosis is exclusive to the intellectual level, even defines it. This
underscores the problem Matt and others have been saying regarding the
distinction of the social and intellectual levels. If they are both "symbolic
manipulation", how are they different? I don't have an answer here, I've been
trying to put together thoughts based on their dialogue, but its a tough game
of chess for me.

[Steve]
Can you see abstract symbols as the "individuals" from which intellect emerges?

[Arlo]
I can see what you are getting at, but I'm not sure I'd agree unconditionally.
Like I said, my jury is still deliberating.

[Steve]
I don't understand why the Law of Gravity falls to the social level. I don't see
why whether we can "localize" an intellectual pattern matters.

[Arlo]
It doesn't "have" to. But if we populate the intellectual level with "individual
human consciousness", where does that place, say, "calculus"? It's not
"individual human consciousness", is it? Is it one level up? One level down?
Same level? Does "calculus" have the same moral level as "Platt"? Greater?
Less?

Foucault, I was saying, would likely place calculus, and all other symbolic
constructs, on the social level as devices of normalization and conformity. We
"hypnotize" children into believing them, so as to ensure conformity in thought
among the population.

Arlo