[MD] Argumentation: Social/Intellectual

[Steve Peterson]

Hi Matt:


Matt:
I don't think the distinctions between personality and ideas works for this 
philosophical issue.  ...For instance, when I said "authority", you started 
interpreting it with things like celebrity and charm as opposed to "purely 
intellectual terms".  Celebrity and charm are not what I mean by "authority" and "purely intellectual terms" is the kind of thing I'm trying to call into question when its put to philosophical use.

I'm suggesting that "authority," while traditionally thought of as an 
obviously bad, anti-rational side show like celebrity, social grace, and 
sexual appeal, is actually where we see most clearly that the 
social/intellectual discrete distinction breaks down.  
Steve:

I don't think of authority as a pattern of value in purely intellectual terms beyond that we can talk about the idea of authority. I see authority as a social pattern that like many social patterns can be good for intellect. In this group we often talk in terms of intellect=good, social=bad, but that is not what the MOQ says.

  We could perhaps think of authority as "power to influence"? Even if the power is based on intellectual skill, our response to it still qualifies as social Quality in my book.


Matt:
For instance, do any 
of us here take Pirsig as an authority figure on such issues as Greece, 
Buddhism, or insanity because he's famous or because we're strangely 
attracted to older men with oblong noses?  No, we consider him an authority because his arguments won us over.  He holds intellectual authority over us, and other philosophers we read are in a contest with Pirsig when we read them.  
Steve:
I still wouldn't call authority intellectual. Can you see that one can achieve social quality through intellect?

Think of all the chicks who wanted to get wit RMP after writing ZAMM who never would have given him a second look before.


Matt:
I'm suggesting that "intellectual authority" is a strange bird that oesn't quite make sense as being explicated by truth (as it might be on the 
intellectual level) or by commandment (as it might be on the social level).  

Steve:
Even if you do find a concept that doesn't fall neatly into the MOQ levels, this is in no way fatal for the MOQ. A concept can refer to a collection of patterns from multiple levels.

Matt:
I think those are false dichotomies, along with the Reason/Tradition, 
Dialectic/Rhetoric, and Objective/Subjective distinctions--and if any 
distinction between levels banks on those distinctions, then its gotta' go, too.  There _are_ distinctions to be made, just as all eight of the terms I just used can be demarcated from each other for certain purposes, but when we start generalizing, theorizing, when we wax philosophical, I think danger begins staring us in the face.
Steve:

You mention Reason/Tradition often and I'm not sure what you mean. 

If by tradition you mean customs I could see tradtion as referring to social patterns. Customs are patterns of human behavior as opposed to patterns of thought. I see them as discrete.

Regards,
Steve




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