[MD] Reason, Tradition, Absolute Truth

[Michael Hamilton]

Matt,

> To me, "choice" and "decision" are just different words for what we might
> call, in a Pirsigian sense, "evaluation". And the "something different"
> about liberal social patterns of value is that they allow for a sphere of
> evaluation by individuals, alongside (and growing from) the customary sphere
> of evaluation by the society as a whole. Does that make sense?
>
> Matt:
> Well, I'm just trying to make sure no one goes in for a bad Enlightenment
> picture of the self.  The type of ethics that philosophical liberalism
> produced was the kind that thought there was something philosophically
> significant about "free choice".  But when you think that, you start to get
> parity between "I decided today to put my left leg in my pants first,
> instead of my right" and "I decided today to be an atheist."  I never
> _decided_ to be an atheist.  I never decided to be a pragmatist.  Putting
> those kinds of things in terms of choices doesn't seem to do justice to
> them.  You can probably pinpoint the day that I woke up and decided that
> "Christian" probably wasn't the best label for me.  But I didn't just up and
> decide to not believe in God, it was more like over a course of time on
> reflecting on a large mass of my evolving belief that I eventually came to
> the conclusion that perhaps going to Church shouldn't be the only
> requirement for calling oneself a Christian.
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by "a sphere of evaluation by individuals,
> alongside (and growing from) the customary sphere of evaluation by the
> society as a whole."

In Mill's words: "The only part of the conduct of any one, for which
he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part
which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right,
absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign."

So in Mill's liberalism, the society is allowed to evaluate conduct
which directly affects society, whereas the individual is allowed to
evaluate conduct which directly affects only himself. I added "(and
growing from)" as a nod to your point that individuals are not "empty
monads". The evaluations they make as individuals will be shaped by
pre-existing biological patterns of value, as well as social patterns
aquired during their upbringing.

> Mike said:
> I didn't think it was necessary to get out of the liberal paradox.
> 'Indoctrinating people to think for themselves' seems like a perfectly good
> description, paradoxical or not. However, I also agree with your
> non-paradoxical way of putting it: "Liberalism is a set of values, but it is
> the set of values that says that you can have your own conception of the
> good above and beyond the minimal one's set by liberalism." Is there really
> any difference, though?
>
> Matt:
> Depends on if you want to be called a paradox mongerer.  Having been lumped
> with so-called post-modernists for quite a while, I've caught that label
> enough to be tired of it.  Typically in philosophy, one wants to stay away
> from paradox and contradiction.  If you didn't, it would be hard to tell if
> dialectical argumentation had any use at all.
>
> What's worse for the liberal paradox is that it is aimed less at us for
> having dirty language use, then for calling us out on hypocrisy, much like
> we called the communists out on hypocrisy during the Cold War.  The Commies
> say they are all free and equal, but are they?  That was important to point
> out, so I take it to be important to untangle and answer the criticism,
> rather than taking it at face value and accepting it.

Yes, I see your point. I basically agree with what Gene said - the
paradox is only apparent, and can be untangled by the MOQ. More
specifically, I think the paradox is only apparent  when one assumes
the bad Reason/Tradition dichotomy that you're resisting. Under that
dichotomy, any inculcation of Tradition acts as an impediment to the
free and unbiased activity of Reason. In an MOQ context, we can say
that certain social customs enable and cultivate the personal skill of
reasoned argument.

Your objection might run along the lines of 'all social traditions
have an internal system of reasoning'. I would agree with this to an
extent. However, Mill made the point that most people follow
traditions with, at best, only a vague understanding of these internal
systems of reasoning. All too often, people believe things because
everybody else does, or because their friends and family do. This
could be described as a kind of internal non-reasoning of social
patterns in general. Anti-liberal social customs reinforce this
conformity of non-reasoning, whereas the customs Mill was arguing for,
such as freedom of discussion, can be said to cultivate reason,
without the capital 'R'.

> Matt:
> I'm not sure what you mean by "liberalism clears a space in which
> individuals can evaluate for themselves".

The space-clearing metaphor arose from the discussion between David M,
Ian and myself (Re: [MD] Mill: Quality & what is freedom?). In this
case, Mill is clearing a "space" in which society is not sovereign.
When the prevailing patterns of value (social norms) are suppressed,
DQ can fill the space with new patterns of value.

Before we can cultivate a garden, we need to suppress weeds - clear a
space without them. Biologically-speaking, weeds excel. They are
marvellously successful. But in a garden, they have no value.

Before a society can cultivate the skill of reasoned argument, it
needs to suppress the pressures of conformity - clear a space without
them. Socially-speaking, conformity is marvellous. If a tradition is
valuable, if it has a good internal reasoning, then from the
standpoint of social value it is more important that people follow the
tradition than that they understand the reasoning. But from a
4th-level standpoint, conformity is of no value unless it is
accompanied by understanding.

> The two places I underscored as not understanding are passages that make me
> suspicious.  They make me wonder if we are on the same page.  So I'm just
> wondering if you can offer some more gloss on them.

Hope that was enough.