[MD] Reason, Tradition

[Platt Holden]

Hi Steve, 
 
> Platt said:
> > A case could be made that the distinction between
> > these two types of 
> > morality -- personal and social -- is more in line
> > with an evolutionary 
> > morality than Pirsig's distinction between social
> > and intellectual. 
> > After all, what is so moral about such intellectual
> > patterns as 
> > Newton's Law of Gravity, Plato's Republic or Freud's
> > Introduction to 
> > Psychoanalysis?  
> 
> Steve:
> Newton's Law of Gravity is not supposed to be "a
> moral," but the MOQ still recognizes it as a pattern
> of value. 

Pirsig makes it clear that patterns of value are patterns of morals. 
"World is composed of nothing but moral value." 

> We can derive intellectual morals like consistency
> with experience, logical coherence, explaining
> experience in a broad way rather than specifically,
> etc. from studying such patterns of value. 
> 
> No one probably thought of using the term moral to
> describe Quality in the intellectual sense before
> Pirsig. As he said, what we normally think of as
> morals are the social-biological code.

Exactly. All levels are moral levels. "What the evolutionary structure 
of the Metaphysics of Quality shows is that there is not just one moral 
system. There are many. In the Metaphysics of Quality there's the 
morality called the "laws of nature," by which inorganic patterns 
triumph over chaos; there is a morality called the law of the jungle" 
where biology triumphs over the inorganic forces of starvation and 
death; there's a morality where social patterns triumph over biology, 
"the law"; and there is an intellectual morality, which is still 
struggling in its attempts to control society."
 
> I think that you are again confusing Pirsig's
> description of the inter-level moral codes -- the
> rules that our culture has developed to deal with
> conflict between levels -- and the levels themselves,
> but that is by far not the biggest problem...
> 
> Platt:
> >But many attributes of personal
> > morality are to be 
> > found in each of these giants of human
> > accomplishment. Thoughts 
> > (intellectual patterns) are not always moral. But
> > human individuals, 
> > possessing the characteristics of personal morality
> > outlined above and  
> > often contrarians to social moral conformity, have
> > been the shakers and 
> > movers of evolutionary progress. IMO they deserve
> > their own level at 
> > the top.
> 
> Steve:
> A 4th level that makes any sense does not "deserve its
> own level at the top" because you think that it
> represents a bunch of morals that you want to cheer
> for. That's just, like, your opinion, man.
> 
> To say that they form a level at the top you need to
> argue that they evolved out of the social level and
> evolved as something completely distinct from the
> social level.

That's exactly what I argue for in arguing for the top individual 
level. It evolved out of the social level with moral codes distinctly 
different from social moral codes. "Gumption" is entirely different 
from "affirmative action."

> When you say "thoughts (intellectual patterns) are not
> always moral," you are displaying a deep
> misunderstanding of Pirsig.

I 'm challenging Pirsig by asking him, for example, if the intellectual 
patterns of "Mein Kampf" are more moral than Christian social patterns. 
If you strictly follow his moral hierarchy that puts intellectual value 
patterns at the top, you would have to say yes. Nobody is going to buy 
that.
 
> The fact that thoughts do not even seem moral to you
> or to the average person is evidence that we are
> talking about something completely other than social
> patterns when we consider intellectual patterns.
> That's why they "deserve their own level at the top." 
> 
> It's not just because someone thinks they are better.
> It's because they are a whole new type of Good that
> someone thinking in terms of social morality may not
> even see as Quality.

So the intellectual patterns of "Mein Kampf" are a whole new type of 
Good? I don't think so. 
 
> Up until now I thought that you could see the
> difference bewteen the value that holds an idea
> together and the value that holds a society together.
> I just thought you merely wanted to use a different
> name for the latter. Now I see the problem runs much
> much deeper.

I thought you could see that the intellectual level in the MOQ is a 
moral level just like the other levels, but each operating under a 
different moral code. Problem is, Pirsig really doesn't spell out the 
moral code of the intellectual level. I do when I suggest it be the 
individual level which, incidentally, leads more directly to his hinted 
at next level above, the level of art. 

> By the way, there is nothing in your list of
> "individual level" morals that Rigel wouldn't cheer
> for, too. With the intellectual level we are talking
> about the sort of Quality that Rigel and Lila pretty
> much don't see.

You mean you wouldn't cheer for those personal morals, too?

> Can you tell me how you are different than the
> character of Rigel in how you view morality? I see you
> two pretty much voting for the same candidates and
> supporting the same traditional family values. 

Rigel viewed morality at the Victorian social level. I support some of 
those moral values like work hard, obey the law and don't cheat on your 
wife. I assume you also support some of those values. But I doubt if 
Rigel voted libertarian. I assume Rigel voted for Kennedy since Kennedy 
and Jackie were portrayed as the epitome of social graces. I didn't 
because I could see through their inherited veneer. As for how I view 
morality, I thought I made it clear that I see it primarily as a 
conflict between personal morality and social morality, e.g., "personal 
responsibility"  vs. "victim status, etc.  -- two widely different 
moral codes representing the individual and social levels.

I welcome your showing me where I've gone wrong. 

Regards,
Platt