[MD] Does the MOQ invalidate Subjectivity?

[Ham Priday]

Steve, Gene --


Gene said:
> But how does the world perceive itself?
>
> Maybe it's all just a bunch of subjects interacting.

Steve said:
> That's pretty much how I interpret the MOQ. Reality
> composed of value is like saying that reality is
> composed of awareness. You have to be careful with
> words like "awareness" or "consciousness" since they
> imply a subject being aware of an object, and
> subjects and objects are secondary inferences in the
> MOQ.

I don't know what you mean by "secondary inferences".  Subjective awareness
of objects describes primary experience for me.  If anything is a "secondary
inference", it is a metaphysical ontology such as the MoQ or Essentialism.

Proprietary awareness, consciousness, or perception in actualized existence
do, indeed, imply a "subject being aware".  However, physical reality is not
composed of awareness.  Our reality is a subject/object dichotomy, the
objective part manifested as "beingness" to the subjective self.  Ultimate
reality is not "composed of" awareness either, but encompasses it and is of
the same essence.  (I call it "Absolute Sensibility".)

> Imagining  the world as "subjects interacting" is a
> little problematic for that reason, but it sounds
> pretty consistent with Pirsig's idea of experienced
> reality as patterns of value.

Steve, it would seem to me that calling inanimate objects "subjects
interacting" is a perversion of logic and common sense.  I think Pirsig
found it necessary to dismiss objectivity in order to "overcome" the
dichotomy (dualism).  But he would he would not have settled for
"interacting subjects", either -- although the notion of electrons and
amoeba "experiencing value" makes one wonder!

I don't think we can dismiss the empirical truth of our reality: that it is
the conscious awareness of objective beingness (i.e., differentiated things
experienced in a space/time universe).  Even the Buddhist mystic with his
Big Self insight will concede that the finite world appears in this form.  I
 do not deny that existence is phenomenalistic -- an "appearance", if you
will.  Even Heidegger spoke of the appearance of Being and how it arises in
otherness: "The nothing itself nihilates.  Nihilation is not some fortuitous
accident.  Rather, as the repelling gesture toward the retreating whole of
beings, it discloses these beings in their full and heretofore concealed
strangeness as what is radically other-with respect to the other."

In my thesis I posit the subjective self as the denied nothingness of
Essence which negates its otherness (beingness) incrementally as a
multiplicity of finite objects and events. The whole relational system is
held together by the essential value of its absolute source.  (Please note
that, in this respect, Essentialism parallels the DQ thesis of Pirsig.)
But, for the essentialist, all experience is an affirmation of value; hence,
man's real essence is the value he affirms in existence.  This affords a
valuistic purpose for existence which is not apparent in the MoQ.

> As I understand Buddhism (which is probably not all
> that well, and I welcome help), Nirvana is identifying
> with this fundamental nature of the world instead of
> static patterns (what might be called conditioned
> awareness), and such an experience is thought to give
> insight into the unity of the world as the many
> (static patterns) are seen to be manifestations of the
> One (DQ).

>From what little I have read on Buddhism, I think that is the general
concept.

> So as Arlo quoted, "I am he as you are he as you are
> me and we are all together" from perspective of Big
> Self.  So in Buddhist terms it's not such a far out
> idea to say that the universe is composed of
> awareness. Since Pirsig identifies Big Self or
> Awareness with DQ and static patterns are
> manifestations of DQ, then static patterns are also
> awareness.

A composition is made up of discrete elements or parts.  So, it is illogical
to speak of the universe as "composed of" awareness.  It would appear that
what you're saying is that awareness is the essence of the universe, which
equates to Donald Hoffman's assertion that "Consciousness and its contents
are all that exists."   I think this is overly reductive because it doesn't
account for Heidegger's "appearances" or what I call "objective beingness".
That's why I define consciousness specifically as the proprietary awareness
of an individual.  Since there are no individuals in Essence, the human
"property" of differentiated awareness has its source in the
undifferentiated Sensibility of Essence.

But you still haven't provided a direct answer to the question: Does the MoQ
invalidate Subjectivity?

Essentially yours,
Ham