[MD] Does the MOQ invalidate Subjectivity?

[Ham Priday]

Hi Gene, Steve --

You both seem to feel that objects are "subjects" in that they are aware of
their identity and surroundings.  Such mythology is reminiscent of ancient
Phoenician and native American cultures, and it would have no place in
contemporary philosophy were it not for Mr. Pirsig's obsession with
"overcoming duality".  I find it ironic that in the effort to put down the
mythos of religion, the author of the MoQ has re-introduced an even more
primitive belief system.

I asked Gene if he believes the the world really perceives itself.

[Gene]:
> I don't so much think it perceives itself, as that it is aware
> of itself. A Rock knows it's a Rock, and remains a Rock simply
> because it doesn't know Not to be a Rock. I honestly have no
> source to ascribe that idea to, as far as I know it's one of my own.

Steve equivocates on this belief but quotes RMP to support the universal
experience ideology.

[Steve]:
RMP Annotation 30
"I think the answer is that inorganic objects experience events but do not
react to them biologically socially or intellectually. They react to these
experiences inorganically, according to the laws of physics."

> I think to go further and say a rock is aware that it is a rock
> is going too far. Self-awareness requires intellect to create the
> idea of self and rocks don't think.
>
> Related to Ham's question about subjectivity I dug this one out:

RMP:
"Yes, the relationship of the MOQ to philosophic idealism is an important
one that is not adequately spelled out in Lila. In a materialist system mind
has no reality because it is not material. In an idealist system matter has
no reality because it is just an idea. The acceptance of one meant the
rejection of the other. In the MOQ both mind and matter are levels of value.
Materialist explanations and idealist explanations can coexist because they
are descriptions of coexisting levels of a larger reality. The MOQ does not
deny the traditional scientific view of reality as composed of material
substance and independent of us. It says it is an extremely high quality
idea. We should follow it whenever it is practical to do so. But the MOQ,
like philosophic idealism, says.this scientific view of reality is still an
idea. If it were not an idea, then that "independent scientific material
reality" would not be able to change as new scientific discoveries come in."

What I can't buy is the assertion "mind and matter are levels of value".
Mind and matter are two distinctly separate and different phenomena.  They
represent the dichotomy of existential experience.  It is a logical fallacy
to posit them as two levels of value; first, because they are not value, and
second, because they are not levels of the same thing.  One can say that a
tree and a flower are levels of biological organization, or that fear and
anxiety are levels of emotional feeling; but we can't say that fear is a
level of a tree.  Unlike objects, awareness is not an "existent" -- it can't
be quantified, localized, or objectively observed.  Awareness is not a level
of material objects; it is the conscious perception of them.

Gene said:
> And that's cool man. You're in a place where that's simply
> not ncessary for your ideas. I just think it's a nice idea.
> There's no real Reason for it.

Sorry, but I don't catch your drift here.

> And yeah, I pretty much just mean The World.  Same one
> you're talking about. We're seeing the same Rock. I think of it
> this way: If all life on earth were completely wiped out, I'm
> pretty sure the earth would continue to orbit the sun much
> unchanged for our absence.

Not if finite things are a construct of man's mind, as Pirsig suggests.

> Protagoras said: "Of all things the measure is man, of the things that
are,
> that [or "how"] they are, and of things that are not, that [or "how"] they
> are not."
>
> I would amend that to say: "To men, of all things the measure is man."
> It seems circular, I guess. But I think it's important to put that kind
> of idea in context. Of course to us, our perception is of the utmost
> importance. It just strikes me as vain to assume it's All that is
important.
> The sparrow doesn't give a damn whether you see it or not, it has
> young to feed and a life of it's own to lead. The fish in the deep ocean
> lived eons without anyone noticing them, and they seem to be doing
allright.

If the sparrow had self-awareness it might well care that you are aware of
it.  Likewise the fish.  Instead they survive and flourish by virtue of
their natural instincts.  Man is a very different kind of creature.  He
cares very much what others think of him and wants to be noticed.  (This is
proved every ten minutes when some dude drives by our house with his woofer
blasting.  "Look at me!" he's saying.)   If man depended solely on his
natural instincts to survive, he would have died out long ago.

> I just don't expect that much of Myself I guess. I don't much care
> if it knows I'm around or not, I'm happy to be here and enjoying
> myself. I just like to think that once I'm gone, it'll all keep going.

What a depressing thought, and how blase for a philosopher!  Do you not feel
you contribute anything to your world?  Even the aetheist Sartre, who said
"It isn't necessary that man exist; the world would get along just as well
without him", also believed that man becomes an "object for others" upon the
completion of his life.

> There's a Zen Koan I once read and it's influenced my thought
> immensely. I'll paraphrase what I remember of it here.
> Apologies to anyone if I mess it up.

You recounted it very well.  Here's the original koan as it appears on line
at AshidaKim.com:

"Hogen, a Chinese Zen teacher, lived alone in a small temple in the country.
One day four traveling monks appeared and asked if they might make a fire in
his yard to warm themselves.
While they were building the fire, Hogen heard them arguing about
subjectivity and objectivity. He joined them and said: 'There is a big
stone. Do you consider it to be inside or outside your mind?'   One of the
monks replied: 'From the Buddhist viewpoint everything is an objectification
of mind, so I would say that the stone is inside my mind.'

That is funny, but not very enlightening.  I like this one better:

"Yamaoka Tesshu, as a young student of Zen, visited one master after
another. He called upon Dokuon of Shokoku.  Desiring to show his attainment,
he said: 'The mind, Buddha, and sentient beings, after all, do not exist.
The true nature of phenomena is emptiness. There is no realization, no
delusion, no sage, no mediocrity. There is no giving and nothing to be
received.'
Dokuon, who was smoking quietly, said nothing. Suddenly he whacked Yamaoka
with his bamboo pipe. This made the youth quite angry.

"'If nothing exists,' inquired Dokuon, 'where did this anger come from?'"

Steve, you quoted the second thesis of the MOQ as saying that "the idea that
matter comes first is a high quality idea!"  I replied that it has no more
meaning than what you try to make of it.  You apparently object to that
appraisal.

> I don't know what to make of your assertion that
> my assertion has no meaning.

I think you're playing the game of "Pirsig Says" with me.  The author likes
the idea, so he says its a "high quality" idea.  If he liked the idea that
the subject comes first, he would have lauded that as a "high quality" idea.
(Incidentally, I don't say that "subject" comes before "object".  They are
contingencies of the dichotomy we call existence; therefore they exist
concurrently.)

> I don't think that saying that reality is conscious awareness
> of objective beingness is THE truth is an empirically based
> statement. Maybe this isn't what you mean.

Everything in existence is relative.  Hence, existential Truth is relative.
But I still maintain that what is directly experienced is empirical
knowledge.  You quiote RMP once more:

"What the Metaphysics of Quality adds to James' pragmatism and his radical
empiricism is the idea that the primal reality from which subjects and
objects spring is value.  By doing so it seems to unite pragmatism and
radical empiricism into a single fabric.  Value, the pragmatic test of
truth, is also the primary empirical experience.  The Metaphysics of
Quality says pure experience is value. Experience which is not valued is
not experienced.  The two are the same."

This is one of the best statements to come from Pirsig's hand.  Observe that
he's chosen the word "value" for his definition of "pure experience".  A
minor point, but I would call the perception of value "sensibility" rather
than experience, because value is sensed esthetically while objects are
experienced quantitatively.  I also think he's stretching things a bit by
defining Value as "the pragmatic test of truth".  Again, truth is relative,
and I don't see Value as pragmatic at all.

Essentially yours,
Ham