[MD] Does the MOQ invalidate Subjectivity?

[Steve Peterson]

Hi Ham,


Ham:
What I can't buy is the assertion "mind and matter are
levels of value". Mind and matter are two distinctly
separate and different phenomena.  

Steve:
In the MOQ they are separate and different. The are
separated by two levels of evolution. Behind this "I
cannot buy" is your unwillingness to postulate that
reality is Quality.



Ham:
They represent the dichotomy of existential
experience.  

Steve:
This is an axiom in your philosophy, but is it the
only way to slice experience? You seem to be saying it
is, but there is no evidence for that claim.



Ham:
It is a logical fallacy to posit them as two levels of
value; first, because they are not value


Steve:
There is no argument to be made here. If you don’t
feel like postulating that experience is value after
reading ZAMM and Lila, there is nothing I could say to
convince you.



Ham:
Steve, you quoted the second thesis of the MOQ as
saying that "the idea that matter comes first is a
high quality idea!"  


I think you're playing the game of "Pirsig Says" with
me.  The author likes the idea, so he says its a "high
quality" idea.  If he liked the idea that the subject
comes first, he would have lauded that as a "high
quality" idea.

Steve:
I’m not sure what you mean by the "Pirsig/MOQ says
game." Do you mean that I’m not saying what my views
are? You can take it to be the same thing as "Pirsig
says and I agree that
"



Ham:
(Incidentally, I don't say that "subject" comes before
"object".  They are contingencies of the dichotomy we
call existence; therefore they exist concurrently.)

Steve:
This sounds similar to Pirsig’s Quality thesis in ZAMM
where Quality creates subjects and objects.



RMP:
"What the Metaphysics of Quality adds to James'
pragmatism and his radical empiricism is the idea that
the primal reality from which subjects and objects
spring is value.  By doing so it seems to unite
pragmatism and radical empiricism into a single
fabric.  Value, the pragmatic test of truth, is also
the primary empirical experience.  The Metaphysics of
Quality says pure experience is value. Experience
which is not valued is not experienced.  The two are
the same."

Ham:
This is one of the best statements to come from
Pirsig's hand.  Observe that he's chosen the word
"value" for his definition of "pure experience".  
A minor point, but I would call the perception of
value "sensibility" rather than experience, because
value is sensed esthetically while objects are
experienced quantitatively.  I also think he's
stretching things a bit by defining Value as "the
pragmatic test of truth".  Again, truth is relative,
and I don't see Value as pragmatic at all.

Steve:
He’s not defining Value as the pragmatic test of
truth. He’s saying that truth is an aesthetic judgment
and can be understood as Value. Value is part of the
pragmatic test of truth as in James’ assertion that
truth is that which proves itself to be good by way of
belief.

Could you say more about what you mean by a separate
aesthetic sense and quantitative sense. Are there
other categories of senses?

I wonder if you could also give me some background
about your self. Have you read Pirsig’s books? I think
you said something about RMP suggesting you discuss
your philosophy here. Can you tell me how that all
came about?

Finally, if in your philosophy the subject and object
are primary and exist concurrently, and values are
sensed by the subject through a special aesthetic
sense, where does Quality reside, in the subject or
the object? As you say value is sensed by the subject,
I assume value must reside in the object. But if value
is objective then why do different people come to
different conclusions about what objects have quality?

Regards,
Steve



__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Tired of spam?  Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around 
http://mail.yahoo.com