[MD] Does the MOQ invalidate Subjectivity?

[Ham Priday]

Hello Steve --

You said:
In the MOQ [mind and matter] are separate and different. They are separated
by two levels of evolution. Behind this "I cannot buy" is your unwillingness
to postulate that reality is Quality.

Ham:
"Separated by two levels of evolution" implies a difference in time
placement, which I don't think Pirsig intended but you still push for.
Surely you're not suggesting that the difference between mind and matter is
the sequence of their appearance.  (I know that materialists consider mind a
"highly organized" form of matter, but I doubt that this is how Pirsig meant
to define his Quality levels.)

Quality, like Goodness and Morality, are values perceived by the cognizant
individual in a relativistic universe.  They presuppose a range or scale of
value that can only be experienced in a differentiated system (i.e.,
existence).  Value sensibility is therefore an esthetic function of
subjective awareness.  Neither quality nor value causes existence -- does
not "create" reality --but a large part of our cognizant experience and
behavior is value-oriented.

Ham, previously:
They represent the dichotomy of existential
experience.

Steve:
This is an axiom in your philosophy, but is it the
only way to slice experience? You seem to be saying it
is, but there is no evidence for that claim.

Ham:
Obviously, there are many "slicers" and many ways to "slice".  I don't see
any point in attempting to slice a universal system that is already highly
differentiated.  If we need to classify specific types of organic or
inorganic matter, scientists are much more efficient in doing that
philosophers.  My college Biology and Chemistry textbooks consisted largely
of information by category.  For me, it's sufficient to say that the
fundamental division in experienced reality is between subjective awareness
and objective beingness.

Ham, previously:
It is a logical fallacy to posit [mind and matter] as two levels of value;
first, because they are not value [and second, because they are altogether
different phenomena.]

Steve:
I'm not sure what you mean by the "Pirsig/MOQ says
game." Do you mean that I'm not saying what my views
are? You can take it to be the same thing as "Pirsig
says and I agree that."

Ham:
If your views are totally dependent on what "Prisig says", then you have
answered your own question.  I am not bound to the beliefs or statements of
others.  I consider this submitting to "indoctrination" as opposed to being
a free thinker.

Ham:
(Incidentally, I don't say that "subject" comes before
"object".  They are contingencies of the dichotomy we
call existence; therefore they exist concurrently.)

Steve:
[Pirsig] is not defining Value as the pragmatic test of
truth. He's saying that truth is an aesthetic judgment
and can be understood as Value. Value is part of the
pragmatic test of truth as in James' assertion that
truth is that which proves itself to be good by way of
belief.

Ham:
You quoted RMP as saying "Value, the pragmatic test of truth, is also the
primary empirical experience."  If "the pragmatic test of truth" is not the
author's definition of Value in this statement, either the author doesn't
mean what he says or I don't understand English.

Steve:
Could you say more about what you mean by a separate
aesthetic sense and quantitative sense. Are there
other categories of senses?

Ham:
The normal individual has tactile, auditory, visual, olfactory, and flavor
(taste) sensibility.  He also has proprioceptive (neuro-muscular)
sensibility for anatomical balance.  He senses external objects by their
physical attributes -- shape, size, symmetry, color, density, hardness,
etc. -- properties that are typically quantifiable by universal standards.
The worth, price, or utility of a thing may also be considered a
quantitative value.  Aesthetic (I prefer the spelling "esthetic") values
include intellectual or moral virtues such as nobility, justice, honesty,
peace, generosity, love, beauty, and goodness, in addition to their negative
counterparts.  Such values are not experienced universally, but are
proprietary to the individual observer.

Steve:
I wonder if you could also give me some background
about your self. Have you read Pirsig's books? I think
you said something about RMP suggesting you discuss
your philosophy here. Can you tell me how that all
came about?

Ham:
Yes, I've read ZMM, LILA, the SODV paper, and Anthony McWatt's doctoral
thesis on the MoQ.  As for Pirsig's suggestion to join the MD, check the
archives under "Ham Priday" for my post of 8/12/04 which includes the full
text of my query to Pirsig of June, 2004 and his brief reply in July of that
year.  (If you can't locate it, I'll send it to you off line.)  Here is the
retired professor's closing sentence which enticed me to look into this
forum:

"I'm getting quite old now and more interested in sailing than
philosophy these days, but I think you might get some interesting comments
from the contributors to www.moq.org in the Discuss section of that web
site."

I sent a follow-up letter some time later, to which he never replied.

Steve:
Finally, if in your philosophy the subject and object
are primary and exist concurrently, and values are
sensed by the subject through a special aesthetic
sense, where does Quality reside, in the subject or
the object? As you say value is sensed by the subject,
I assume value must reside in the object. But if value
is objective then why do different people come to
different conclusions about what objects have quality?

Steve, my Value concept is explained in great detail in a thesis which you
claim to have read.  Now that you know the fundamentals, I recommend that
you give it another try.  The URL for the thesis page is
www.essentialism.net/mechanic.htm.  Here's an excerpt from the Values
section that addresses your question, but for a full understanding of the
terms you'll have to read what leads up to it:

"Undifferentiated Essence can have no properties.  Value cannot be an
exclusive attribute of the subjective self, because it is realizable only as
associated with otherness.  Nor can it be an exclusive property of the
objective Other which lacks sensibility.  Logical reduction leads to the
conclusion that Value is shared provisionally by both essents.
Metaphysically, Value is the complementary Essence lost to the negate at
creation but incrementally realizable through the individuated subject's
(secondary) negation of experiential beingness."

Essentially yours,
Ham