[MD] MOQ & Continental Philosophy

[David M]

Hi Matt

I think what we are talking about here is not so much priority
as order and levels (re: human development and evolution).
Language, consciousness, subjectivity have a history and
an evolutionary story. 'Prior' to being able to do science all
kinds of other structures & capacities, both perceptual,
cognitive, practical and linguistic need to be in place.
So there is a necessary order in terms of 'construction' of
one level on top of another to make the higher order structures
or processes or activities possible -which is part of Pirsig's point
about levels I imagine. A lot of this story contruction about history
and evolution is speculative in sits in philosophy better than science
because we then know it is speculative and based on assumptions
about experience and is not backed up by the sort of testing science
can do. And there are concepts within this speculation (important
speculation about our evolution and the natureof experience and
learning) that we will need and go beyond the concepts that science
enjoys but is limited to (if it is to remain science -as we currently know 
it).

Now you see & agree?

ta
David M

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Matt Kundert" <pirsigaffliction at hotmail.com>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 9:39 PM
Subject: Re: [MD] MOQ & Continental Philosophy


> Hey David,
>
> I meant _with_ Pirsig.  I first did a systematic exploration of Pirsig in 
> a
> comtemporary philosophy class some years ago and the professor suggested
> that I do a comparison with some other established thinker or something.
> Surveying the material we had studied that semester, Husserl's notion of 
> the
> lifeworld jumped out at me.  The fruits were
> "Phenomenological-Existentialism and the Metaphysics of Quality" which is 
> in
> the Essay Forum (though it isn't an all together very good paper).
>
> The notion of the lifeworld still strikes me as useful.  What doesn't are
> Husserl's notions of method that sometimes still pervade people who 
> identify
> as phenomenologists.  For instance, your snippet from Critchley read
> "Phenomenology shows that the scientific conception of the world, in 
> Carnap
> and Neurath, say, is parasitic upon a prior practical view of the world as
> pre-reflectively there in a handy, matter-of-fact, sort of way."  I think
> leveling down science's pretensions is great, but I'm suspicious of
> prioritizing.  I take all conceptions or views to be no more prior than 
> any
> other, if for no other reason than having a view or conception means
> learning a language.  Critchley is probably pointing to something 
> different
> than that with his "practical view of the world," but I still don't know
> what to do with "priority".
>
> Matt
>
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