[MD] The differentiating nothingness

[Ham Priday]

SA --

Your comments under "Is Morality Innate..." (which were actually an attempt
to define nothingness) were quite to the point, and they have stimulated my
thinking about the Creation hypothesis.  Forgive my persistence, but back
around the 20th of February, after agreeing that nothingness is the
differentiator of beingness, you challenged my characterization of
proprietary awareness as the "not-" of not-other.

> This explanation seems to depend on a use of one word
> (which is "not" in not-other of Essence) to provide an
> explanation about negation, but this kind of explanation
> does not provide a firm answer.  Negation or nothingness
> in comparison to Essence is a renegade put into existence
> by finitude itself.  Yet, to have finitude nothingness
> needs to be present.

I saw the logic of what you were saying and voiced agreement -- even
admitting that "not-other" could not be broken up because of its specified
meaning.  Separating the "not-" out of this copula not only didn't provide a
"firm answer", it was illogical.  Since then I've had second thoughts.  Here
are the ideas that trouble me concerning the remainder of your challenge ...

I still believe existence comes about as a result of the primary negation of
Essence.  The question is: What does Essence negate?  It seems to me that we
have a choice of three options:
1)  It is conceivable that Essence could negate itself -- that is, its
"identity".
2)  Essence could negate Value, which is its sensible or esthetic
manifestation to the negate.
3)  Essence could negate Nothingness if it POSSESSED nothingness (which is
problematic, since Essence is absolute "is-ness").

I'm still inclined to go with #3, because it accounts for the negate that is
a critical part of my hypothesis.  I justify this by reasoning that Essence
does not possess nothingness BECAUSE it is always negated from Essence.  In
other words, nothingness is, was, and would remain an "other" to Essence,
except that the negation serves to make it "not-other".  I'd appreciate
hearing your opinion as to whether this makes sense -- not whether you
believe it, but is it a logical assertion?  (I know you think nothingness is
a "renegade" of finitude -- an excellent analogy, by the way -- but I may be
able to persuade you otherwise.)

As to the objection in your first sentence (above), your logic is correct
insofar as "not-other" is perceived from the absolute perspective.  However,
when we speak of Essence as "actualized" (in the Cusan sense) it is no
longer unified but relational, and the logic of a relative system
(existence) allows contrarieties such as duality and opposition.  Therefore,
I submit that from the actualized perspective it is perfectly logical to say
that what is not-other to Essence is both the existential "not-" and "other"
in the same way that it is both the experiential subject and object.

Why isn't this a valid argument?

Don't feel you have to rush back with an answer.  Think it over, and give me
the benefit of your considered opinion.

(Incidentally, I've sent a "reminder" to Clyde Miller that he promised to
get back to me on Cusa's "first principle", but have not yet heard from
him.)

Essentially yours,
Ham