[MD] The differentiating nothingness

[Ham Priday]

Hello David -- 

How did you manage to post two messages at 2:26 PM?   One asks two
questions, the other offers an alternative ontology for Creation.

I'll tackle the questions first.

> What makes potential and actual different?
> How does the potential become actual?

I'm not sure that they are different in the "absolutist" sense.  As Peter
Corteen and others have pointed out, the definition for a pure Absolute is
the same as for pure Nothingness.  Neither has attributes or properties in
itself.  Yet, pure Nothingness cannot give rise to anything -- even an
appearance of anything, whereas the Absolute not only can but does, as
evidenced by our experience.  That is why Essence cannot be Nothingness.

Cusan theory and Hegel's ontology hold that potentiality and actualization
are two sides of the same coin.  That is, there can be no actualization
without potential, and potentiality is meaningless without actualization.
I've searched high and low for a metaphysically plausible cause for
Difference, which to me is the fundamental property of existence.  I even
tried (unsuccessfully) to get an answer from the MD, asking "What is the
primary difference?"

Intuitive reasoning had led me to Nothingness.  Nothingness divides all
existential phenomena; it marks the beginning and ending of every finite
thing, including the life of an organism.  My hypothesis was that Essence
negates Nothingness to create a differentiated reality.  This would make
sense, except that the "standard" definition for Essence is absolute
'Is-ness'.  An absolute Is cannot contain Nothingness, therefore Essence
cannot logically negate what it doesn't possess.  So I've had to revise my
hypothesis -- specifically, to move Nothingness down one step from the
primary differentation of Essence to its actualized phase.  I now see
primary differentiation as the negation (abnegation or annulment) of
Sensibility, which I have always believed to be the nature of Essence.
Negation, then, is the other side of the coin.  Or, if you prefer, Essence
is negational.  Either way, Nothingness is actualized as a "product" of
negation.

Now to your suggestion ...

> Try, the source, or essence if you insist, is prior
> to being and nothingness but is the source of being
> and nothingness, a contradictory identity that cannot
> exist one without the other.
>
> Being can only emerge as it manifests the nothing by
> appearing and before too long beings just emerge
> back into the nothing before the next round of
> being-nothing emergence.

Your first paragraph accurately expresses my Creation hypothesis as it
currently stands, so I have no objection to it.

I have some problems with the second paragraph, however, which seems a bit
ambiguous.  For instance, when you say "Being can only emerge AS it
manifests the nothing," is the "as" intended to be descriptive or causal?
I disagree in either case.  Nothingness must be prior to Being because it is
what defines and separates beings as finite entities.

Your final sentence concerning "rounds or emergences" of beings has no
relevance for me.  For one thing, your perspective here is temporal or
sequential, and for me time and space are intellectual constructs based on
our serialized mode of experience.  Actually, I don't see what problem this
assertion is supposed to resolve or clarify, unless you feel it necessary to
explain biological evolution in your epistemology.

In answer to your previous suggestion, "you really should make the effort to
use your ideas to criticise the MOQ if you have something to offer that it
lacks in your opinion," I'm not so arrogant as to try to force-fit my ideas
into any other philosophy.  I've made clear what I think the MoQ lacks, but
it is not up to me to "correct" it.  That, it would seem to me, is the
author's choice.  Besides, Pirsig abhors metaphysics, has not posited a
primary source, avoids the mere mention of transcendence, and does not
attribute special significance to the human animal.  In the absence of these
fundamental Essentialist concepts, can you conceive of any way they could be
"inserted" into the MoQ without drastically altering his philosophy?

Anyway, I appreciate your interest in my metaphysics, David.  Although I'm
aware that we see things differently, I will try to look upon all your
suggestions as constructive.

Regards,
Ham