[MD] The differentiating nothingness
David M
davidint at blueyonder.co.uk
Wed Mar 15 13:57:25 PST 2006
Ham
You just don't answer the questions, you change the subject completely
to different concepts, can you try again please.
Also. if you rely on your own intuition, what can you say to someone who's
intuition differs?
DM
----- Original Message -----
From: "Ham Priday" <hampday1 at verizon.net>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Tuesday, March 14, 2006 6:51 AM
Subject: Re: [MD] The differentiating nothingness
>
> Hello David --
>
> How did you manage to post two messages at 2:26 PM? One asks two
> questions, the other offers an alternative ontology for Creation.
>
> I'll tackle the questions first.
>
>> What makes potential and actual different?
>> How does the potential become actual?
>
> I'm not sure that they are different in the "absolutist" sense. As Peter
> Corteen and others have pointed out, the definition for a pure Absolute is
> the same as for pure Nothingness. Neither has attributes or properties in
> itself. Yet, pure Nothingness cannot give rise to anything -- even an
> appearance of anything, whereas the Absolute not only can but does, as
> evidenced by our experience. That is why Essence cannot be Nothingness.
>
> Cusan theory and Hegel's ontology hold that potentiality and actualization
> are two sides of the same coin. That is, there can be no actualization
> without potential, and potentiality is meaningless without actualization.
> I've searched high and low for a metaphysically plausible cause for
> Difference, which to me is the fundamental property of existence. I even
> tried (unsuccessfully) to get an answer from the MD, asking "What is the
> primary difference?"
>
> Intuitive reasoning had led me to Nothingness. Nothingness divides all
> existential phenomena; it marks the beginning and ending of every finite
> thing, including the life of an organism. My hypothesis was that Essence
> negates Nothingness to create a differentiated reality. This would make
> sense, except that the "standard" definition for Essence is absolute
> 'Is-ness'. An absolute Is cannot contain Nothingness, therefore Essence
> cannot logically negate what it doesn't possess. So I've had to revise my
> hypothesis -- specifically, to move Nothingness down one step from the
> primary differentation of Essence to its actualized phase. I now see
> primary differentiation as the negation (abnegation or annulment) of
> Sensibility, which I have always believed to be the nature of Essence.
> Negation, then, is the other side of the coin. Or, if you prefer, Essence
> is negational. Either way, Nothingness is actualized as a "product" of
> negation.
>
> Now to your suggestion ...
>
>> Try, the source, or essence if you insist, is prior
>> to being and nothingness but is the source of being
>> and nothingness, a contradictory identity that cannot
>> exist one without the other.
>>
>> Being can only emerge as it manifests the nothing by
>> appearing and before too long beings just emerge
>> back into the nothing before the next round of
>> being-nothing emergence.
>
> Your first paragraph accurately expresses my Creation hypothesis as it
> currently stands, so I have no objection to it.
>
> I have some problems with the second paragraph, however, which seems a bit
> ambiguous. For instance, when you say "Being can only emerge AS it
> manifests the nothing," is the "as" intended to be descriptive or causal?
> I disagree in either case. Nothingness must be prior to Being because it
> is
> what defines and separates beings as finite entities.
>
> Your final sentence concerning "rounds or emergences" of beings has no
> relevance for me. For one thing, your perspective here is temporal or
> sequential, and for me time and space are intellectual constructs based on
> our serialized mode of experience. Actually, I don't see what problem
> this
> assertion is supposed to resolve or clarify, unless you feel it necessary
> to
> explain biological evolution in your epistemology.
>
> In answer to your previous suggestion, "you really should make the effort
> to
> use your ideas to criticise the MOQ if you have something to offer that it
> lacks in your opinion," I'm not so arrogant as to try to force-fit my
> ideas
> into any other philosophy. I've made clear what I think the MoQ lacks,
> but
> it is not up to me to "correct" it. That, it would seem to me, is the
> author's choice. Besides, Pirsig abhors metaphysics, has not posited a
> primary source, avoids the mere mention of transcendence, and does not
> attribute special significance to the human animal. In the absence of
> these
> fundamental Essentialist concepts, can you conceive of any way they could
> be
> "inserted" into the MoQ without drastically altering his philosophy?
>
> Anyway, I appreciate your interest in my metaphysics, David. Although I'm
> aware that we see things differently, I will try to look upon all your
> suggestions as constructive.
>
> Regards,
> Ham
>
>
>
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