[MD] Experience, essentialism, physicalism

[David M]

Scott/Matt

I certainly agree that the material is limited and contingent.
Being contingent means taking on a particular form when
it was not necessary, i.e. contingent. What is not necessary
yet contingently the case is something actual, something actual
that has reduced the possible to a finite actuality. When we
try to explain the actual,what we need to explain is why 'this
something' rather than all the other possible somethings.
This is the collapse of a wave of possibility into the particular
event. From the other end, I can think of no better description
of agency than selecting from the possible what becomes actual
-a process of reduction, the from infinite/possible to finite/actual.

David Morey



----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Scott Roberts" <jse885 at localnet.com>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Tuesday, March 14, 2006 8:13 PM
Subject: Re: [MD] Experience, essentialism, physicalism


> Matt,
>
> Matt said:
> I'm not sure it is physicalism, understood as I've followed Rorty in
> defining it, that opposes what you suggest the mystics are saying.  I 
> think
> it is still the appearance/reality distinction that would divide us.
> Because if you accept the usefulness of physics, biology, etc. in dealing
> with the "natural," then you've accepted all there is to physicalism so
> defined.
>
> Scott:
> You seem to be ignoring Rorty's word "every" in his definition. If 
> accepting
> the usefulness of physics, biology, etc. in dealing with the "natural" is
> all there is to physicalism, then it is a useless word to describe someone
> philosophically. The question is whether there are events that have no
> physical component. I say that the physical is derived from consciousness,
> and so there can be conscious events in the absence of all physicality. A
> physicalist -- if the term is to have any philosophical use -- says that
> consciousness is derived from the physical, and so there can be physical
> events in the absence of consciousness.
>
> Matt said:
>  Any differences you may have in the functioning of physics or
> biology or evolution is either a scientific difference, one that can be
> resolved by the activities of science, or a philosophical difference which
> is the gloss we place on them.  The only philosophical difference I can 
> see
> is the desire to say that the supernatural _really is_ the reality behind
> the natural.  But that conflict, between the use of the appearance/reality
> distinction or not, doesn't touch whether or not I would reject mysticism
> _unless_ mysticism is essentially based on the appearance/reality
> distinction.  I'm inclined to say, with DMB, that mysticism is not drained
> once we reject that distinction.  Whatever "the natural is a manifestation
> of the supernatural" means after rejecting the appearance/reality
> distinction can be discussed, and that would be the part of mysticism we
> keep.  It would have to do with what that suggestion means, something like
> what static patterns come out of Dynamic Quality will come to mean.
>
> Scott:
> Yes, the philosophical difference between you and Merrell-Wolff is that 
> M-W
> says that there is something else that really is the reality behind the
> natural. However, he says that he Knows this (through Identity), so for 
> him
> it is not, strictly speaking, a philosophical difference. It is a
> difference -- for him -- in moving from one "appearance" to another, so to
> speak. Or one could say from one reality to another. Hence if you see 
> Pirsig
> as removing the A/R distinction from mysticism, I would see that as 
> removing
> the only thing that matters in mysticism, namely self-transformation. So I
> would say that mysticism is drained of all that is important by removing 
> the
> A/R distinction -- if that is what it is. After all, M-W would not say 
> that
> the natural is not real. Just that the way we think about it (that is, in
> Cartesian terms) is contingent and, in a sense, false. When the self is
> transformed, so is nature. And a transformed self would reject physicalism
> as I think Rorty defined it.
>
> Matt said:
> So the way I would array the conflict you set up is that, between
> essentialistic physicalism and essentialistic mysticism, to affirm one
> _would_ be to deny the other.  And there would be no way to 
> argumentatively
> adjudicate between them (if for no other reason then we haven't found a
> non-question-begging way to yet).  However, the conflict between 
> pragmatism
> and essentialism (of which both the physicalism and mysticism from above 
> are
> a subsection of) takes place at a higher level of abstraction, a place
> further back in our confict-enabling assumptions.  A pragmatist's
> physicalism can't come in conflict with an essentialist's mysticism 
> because
> the physicalism in question (along with the pragmatist's mysticism) has 
> been
> redescribed along different lines.  Once the pragmatist drops the
> essentialist assertion, his non-essentialist assertion can't be described 
> as
> in conflict with an essentialist one because the entire conflict between
> essentialist assertions is made possible by their _common essentialism_.
> "It is all really X."  "No, it is all really Y."  They're arguing about 
> what
> it all _really_ is.  But antiessentialists aren't arguing about what it 
> all
> _really_ is.  They are just arguing what is the most efficacious thing for
> us to say for specific purposes.  So if you want to argue that physics
> doesn't predict the movements of rocks very well, you would be arguing 
> with
> the pragmatist, but not the pragmatist-cum-pragmatist, but the
> pragmatist-cum-physicist.  You'd be arguing with a physicist about how
> useful physics is.  And I don't think you want to do that (insofar as you
> are not a physicist; if you are, you could, but it still wouldn't be on
> essentialistic mysticism grounds).
>
> Scott:
> How, then, could an anti-essentialist argue for neo-Darwinism as an
> explanation for the existence of language and consciousness? If I say that
> physical reality derives from consciousness, does that make me 
> automatically
> an essentialist, while saying the opposite (as a promoter of neo-Darwinism
> must) is somehow able to do this without being an essentialist?
>
> Matt said:
> So you may criticize Pirsig's take on mysticism, that you don't think he
> handles the relationship between static patterns and DQ very well, but I
> think that criticism may have a lot to do with the fact that Pirsig is
> attempting to offer a non-appearance/reality distinction enabled 
> mysticism.
>
> Scott:
> Actually, no. My criticism is that he privileges DQ over SQ, which I see 
> as
> a step toward idolatry, which could be thought of as being overly
> essentialist about DQ.
>
> Matt said:
> Pirsig is trying to "naturalize" mysticism, as DMB has said, where
> "naturalization" simply means "antiessentialism".  And you offer
> essentialist criticisms of how Pirsig's drained a lot of the power from
> mysticism because of his antiessentialism.  These may be appropriate, but
> its not because Pirsig is a physicalist (as he is on my reading) or 
> because
> I'm a physicalist.  It is because both Pirsig and I are antiessentialists.
>
> Scott:
> I think he is draining power from mysticism because he doesn't want to get
> into natural/supernatural controversy. I don't mean to imply that he is
> being intellectually dishonest -- I guess he really thinks that mysticism
> can and should be "naturalized" in this way (though the bit about his
> daughter maybe being a reincarnated Chris makes me wonder). But as I see 
> it,
> this can only be done by being highly selective of the mystical data.
>
> Matt said:
> Alright, given my above picture of how I see things being layed out, I 
> would
> counter you divisions of the playing field (from another post) with this
> one:
>
> Matt K, Ian, Arlo, DMB: antiessentialist, physicalist
>
> Platt, Ham, Scott:  essentialist, nonphysicalist
>
> While I know you take on many of pragmatism's attacks on traditional
> philosophy, I still can't square your use of the appearance/reality
> distinction.  And it seems the only major philosophical thing that divides
> us.  But even if it is, then I wouldn't even be sure about calling you a
> nonphysicalist unless you're prepared to say that physics doesn't help 
> with
> our way of life.
>
> Scott:
> I would say that the difference between us is that I pay attention to what
> mystics like FM-W, Bernadette Roberts, John Wren-Lewis, and Rudolf Steiner
> say, and you don't. From what they say (and from my own reflections on
> things like evolution, perception, and quantum reality), I philosophize, 
> and
> what I come up with are various conclusions. One is that idealism of some
> form or other is a better way of thinking about things in general than
> materialism of some sort or other. I don't see how this makes me an
> essentialist (see above). Another conclusion is that short of
> self-transformation of the sort they talk about, one isn't capable of
> Knowing What is Really Going On. But this does not imply that one should
> deny the supernatural. It only implies that we are limited in our ability 
> to
> think about it. This, I argue, makes me an anti-essentialist in your sense
> of the word. That is, because we are fallen (ignorant), we should be
> pragmatic. Otherwise we get drawn into error. The Buddhist tetralemma is a
> good guide to how one can avoid falling into error. Hence I see Ham, and
> Pirsig, and physicalists (as I understand the term) as people who have
> violated the tetralemma in one way or another.
>
> Matt said:
> And this last reason is why I thrust DMB, against his
> current protestations, into camp as a physicalist.  I haven't seen any
> reason not to consider him one based on his commitment to antiessentialism
> and his desire to say that "I would also object to the notion that mystics
> accept the supernatural, unless by 'supernatural' you mean 'extremely
> natural'."  In my book, the only people who could be committed to
> nonphysicalism here are essentialists because _nobody_ who was attracted 
> to
> Pirsig would be a scientific materialist (an essentialistic physicalist).
> The only people left are quasi-idealists who want to assert something as
> _more real_ than something else.
>
> Scott:
> See above about whether being a physicalist means saying "every" event has 
> a
> physical component. If an anti-essentialist is one who says that phrases
> like "concsciousness is derived from the physical" (or vice versa) 
> shouldn't
> be said (since it implies one is more fundamental than the other), then it
> seems to me that an anti-essentialist must be skeptical about Darwinism,
> about the belief that the mental is only brain function, and not say that
> the biological develops out of the physical, the social out of the
> biological, and the intellectual out of the social. In other words, Rorty
> and Pirsig would be essentialists. If they are not, then why can't a
> quasi-idealist such as myself be an anti-essentialist?
>
> I actually do not consider the supernatural to be "more real" than the
> natural, except in the sense that there is always consciousness (and 
> quality
> and intellect) but physical reality is contingent. What I say is that the
> natural is an expression of consciousness, and that consciousness always 
> has
> some expression or other. Further, the expression and the expressed are
> mutually dependent, so though the physical is contingent and consciousness
> is not, expression (manifestation) is also not contingent -- that is, 
> there
> is no such thing as unexpressed reality. And for that reason, I also don't
> define myself as an essentialist or as an anti-essentialist, but here I am
> changing the meaning of the words somewhat, that is, in the sense in which
> essence is contrasted with existence, and where the latter is seen as 
> "just"
> particulars, which we then categorize with our language. But that's 
> getting
> into a different area.
>
> Matt said:
>  Even with DMB's desire to say that Pirsig
> gives us super-strength idealism, I don't think he or Pirsig is a
> quasi-idealist in this sense because they most assuredly should not be
> saying one thing is more than real than something else.  Any "reductions"
> made, either by use of physical explanations or Quality explanations (the
> kind implied when DMB said Pirsig "'reduced' all of reality to different
> kinds of quality"), are not _reductions_ down to the primal substance of 
> the
> way the World Really Is.  They are suggestions about how we talk for
> particular purposes.
>
> Scott:
> My purpose in philosophizing is to aid in self-transformation, which is to
> say, I hold that mystical self-tranformation is a possibility. I see no 
> way
> of saying this without falling into what you will regard as essentialism 
> and
> making an A/R distinction. While I think the essentialism charge is
> spurious, as I see it a "naturalized" (non-A/R) mysticism is a mistake.
> Mainly, it would deny the reality of the eternal (the non-spatiotemporal)
> which is a given with mysticism (and, pari passu, I believe is required to
> deal with the quantum measurement problem and consciousness).
>
> - Scott
>
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