[MD] The differentiating nothingness

[Ham Priday]

Reinier --

I thought it might be helpful if you reviewed the first three paragraphs of
my FAQs sheet, a sort of digest of the philosophy of Essence in a Q&A
format.  Since talking to you, I've made some "refinements", but I'd like
you to point out to me those assertions which are problematic for you.

"Essentialism is uniquely predicated on the concept of a sensible Essence
that encompasses all as a "not-other" to itself.  Its metaphysics replaces
Cartesian dualism with a subjective reality whose being (essent) is
conditionally separated from its awareness (negate).  Existence is theorized
as the negation of Absolute Sensibility to actualize proprietary awareness
of an other.  The negate may be regarded as a "microcosm" of Absolute
Sensibility.  As the subject and sentient locus of existence, it creates the
appearance of finite being by negating its own essent, which accounts for
man's differentiated reality. The individual is thus estranged from Absolute
Essence but is born into an evolutionary world of dynamic 'beingness' that
is largely of his own creation.  This makes man a cognizant creature with
limited understanding but capable of exquisite sensibility of the values
experienced in an objective reality.  Although he does not sense Essence
directly, Value is realized in every experience and represents man's
timeless connection with the Primary Source.

"Meister Eckhart in the 14th century taught that 'To create is to give being
out of nothing'.  Yet, Absolute Essence contains no nothingness; Eckhart
described it as "the fullness of being".  The Platonist theologian Nicholas
de Cusa helped to resolve this paradox a century later by theorizing that
'the world is not God but is not anything  other than God'.  Cusa's 'first
principle' is posited as 'the coincidence of all opposition', which he
called the not-other.  Since Essence is all that is, and its antithetical
nothingness is actualized only in existence, the negate becomes the
cognizant subject of a relational world whose objects are selectively
delineated from Essence by its own intellect.  Attracted to its estranged
essent, the subjective self becomes aware of physical beingness as finite
forms that have relative value.  Unlike value, which is proprietary to the
self, the objectified forms of being are universally communicable to other
subjects.

"The 'other' created by Essence is a not-other only to itself.  In the
actualized world the 'not-' of that other is man's self-the negate of an
existential dichotomy in which otherness is the object of experience and the
source of beingness.  If man had any essence at all, it would latch him
eternally to an incomplete and imperfect entity of reduced value.  Instead,
he is free to derive the value of Absolute Essence incrementally, through
the life-experience."

I hope that the above will give you some "feel" for the overall ontology,
and how nothingness figures prominently in it.  Note that I've made only one
statement (3rd paragraph) to the effect that man's self (negate) is
nothingness.  (I do assert this directly in a later paragraph, but you could
convince to me to change it.)

If you could provide a brief synopsis of your theory in similar fashion, it
would aid us in nailing down our differences.  Specifically, I would be
interested in seeing how your "negation of opposites" factors into the
theory.

Thanks, Reinier.

--Ham