[MD] Is Morality innate in the cosmos?

[Michael Hamilton]

Greetings Ham,

I hope you don't mind the (extremely) slow pace of our conversation.
I've been fairly busy, and seeing how well this exchange seems to be
going, I didn't want to jeopardise that by rushing a response at the
expense of clarity. Let's hope that clarity continues to honour us
with her presence in this conversation! I'll do my best to invite her
in...

> I define existence is that which is experienced as occurring in time and
> space.

This prompts me to query the status of non-spatiotemporal experience
in Essentialism. If you do not label such experience under
"existence", does this mean you believe it to be 'less real' or
secondary in some way? Or are you using "existence" merely as a label
for a sub-category of reality as a whole, and I'm just reading too
much into the name you have chosen for it? Apologies for having to
continue my relentless questioning at the first sentence!

> So, yes, existence is the experience.  The reason I don't usually
> phrase it that way is that it suggests that our physical reality is
> hallucinatory or "imaginary", while it is the only reality we know.

Yes, physical (spatiotemporal) reality should not be labelled as an
illusion or a hallucination, because these have unaviodably pejorative
connotations. However, I think "imaginary" can be used, if we drain it
of its philosophically pejorative connotations, so that we are left
with "images" (for example, of atoms bouncing around in a void) that
are closely involved with our participation in them (in other words,
they are dependent on the way in which we pat attention to them, or
hold them in our consciousness, as we go about our lives).

Also, the very concept of "illusion" is based on the notion of
'primary reality to which our experience is secondary'. An "illusion"
is an experience that doesnt not match up with a putative primary
reality, for example a stick in water 'looks bent'. Philosophically,
this is a formulation I'd like to avoid. Regarding the stick in water,
I'd rather say that, when I saw it as a child, I _imagined_ that the
stick itself had been bent by the water, but, I was troubled by the
inconsistency between this image and my image of sticks as tough
objects that take a good deal of physical force to manipulate. So,
when I was offered the alternative explanatory image that light is
diffracted at the surface of the water, I adopted this image instead.
Visual data is visual data, there can be nothing illusory about it. It
is our imaginations, not the data, that deceive.

It might be useful to ask: where do you stand on the issue of
illusions? Is your Primary Source such that we could speak of an
'illusion' in the case of mistaking reality for something that it
fundamentally isn't?

[snip]

> Mike:
> > In any case, I would object that matter or substance is not
> > a necessary or fundamental component of existence, but
> > exists in as much as we hold it 'in mind' as we go about
> > our lives (as we nearly always do from when we reach a
> > certain age, because it is such a useful fiction). I should add
> > that by "imagined" or "fictitious" I do not necessarily mean
> > "illusory" or "unreal" (you know that I accept subject/object
> > dualism as the current mode of our experience); I just mean
> > that it is not fundamental or necessary.
>
> If I understand you correctly, you are saying that "matter or substance"
> isn't essential to the ontology of the Absolute, and I agree with this
> assertion.

I'd rather leave it at "matter/substance is not essential", although
I'm quite willing to listen to what you're saying about "the
Absolute".

> I also said:
> > Existence is an individuated subject looking at a universal
> > object.
>
> You said:
> > So far I understand what you're saying (although I may
> > disagree with it), but after this point I'm struggling to
> > comprehend.
>
> I had contiued:
> > What separates the two is nothingness.  In experience, this
> > nothingness is converted to Value -- specifically, the value
> > negated by Essence to create this dichotomy.  Essence
> > remains undivided, encompassing all such differentiation
> > as the absolute Not-other.
>
> Okay.  This is an original hypothesis based in part on Cusa's theory of the
> 'not-other' and also on Eckhart's assertion that "to create is to give being
> out of nothing."  I don't expect you to find it readily comprehensible, as
> I'll admit to having some problems with it myself.  (I'm still hoping to
> obtain some help from Prof. Lee Miller who stated Cusan logic as a formal
> proposition.)  However, the logic is laid out as best I can in the Creation
> section of my thesis.
>
> In brief, the principal ideas are:
> 1) Essence is not other than any (particular) other, therefore is the
> all-inclusive Not-Other.

Check.

> 2) Possibility and actuality are co-dependent in existence but coincide in
> the Not-Other.

Check.

> 3) Actuality necessitates the "appearance of Other" by a division of
> Essence.
> 4) Since Essence is indivisible by definition, this division is effected by
> a negation of its            identity which creates the appearance of
> Nothingness.

So, for Essence to manifest itself as distinct or separate
particulars, it has to give up its identity as Essence? And
Nothingness becomes involved somehow at this stage? Please bear with
me here!

> 5) All things are experienced as divided by Nothingness, which is also the
> conditional subject      of experience.

Okay... So, crudely speaking, Nothingness is the 'empty space', the
'gap', [that allows us to distinguish] between distinct
particulars/objects? Does Nothingness only divide objects from each
other, or from our awareness, or both?

I'm afraid I don't yet grasp what you mean by "conditional subject" of
experience.

> Mike:
> > [W]hen you say that value is negated by Essence, I can only
> > interpret this as saying that Essence is the antithesis of value.
> > This leaves me thinking that Essence and value are opposites,
> > but this can't be what you mean, because Essence is the
> > Not-other that encompasses all differentiation. Essence is
> > not other to value. What am I missing?
>
> Your interpretation in the first statement is wrong, and I may have misled
> you by saying that Value is negated by Essence.  While it is true that the
> identity of Essence is "valuable", I now believe it is more reasonable
> (according to Cusan logic) to see actualization as the negation of
> Difference.  In any case, Essence is NOT the antithesis of Value, nor is it
> 'other' to Value.  Essence is the antithesis of Nothingness.

Minor query: Would it be acceptable if, in my own thinking, I
substituted "Void" for your "Nothingness"? I'm assuming that your use
of "Nothingness" is not intended to be the same as Nothingness as used
to denote in English the Buddhist notion of 'no-thing'-ness, which is
not absolute Void, but rather denotes a lack of inherent or essential
existence in something that nonetheless exists conventionally and
dependently (thus, no-thingness is not quite a nihilistic term).
"No-thingness" refers to emptiness of inherent form or essence (which,
thinking about it, might fit somewhere into a theory of Essentialism),
but I assume you're referring instead to absolute nihilistic void.

> Ham also said:
> > Only man is capable of rising above this causally-directed
> > behavior.  Self-determination is unique to man; he is the
> > Choicemaker of the universe.
>
> Mike:
> > I agree with the spirit of this, i.e. that value is common to all
> > animals but the human sense of value contains greater possibilities
> > for choice, and can be less confined to survival instincts.
> >
> > I only take issue with the word "causally-directed", because I take
> > causation to be part of the mechanistic, so-called "natural world",
> > which I think we agreed is more an "ornament" (although I hardly
> > consider it to be decorative!) than a fundamental aspect of existence.
> > Therefore I would rather say that "lesser creatures" are directed by
> > their narrow, rudimentary sense of value, i.e. their survival
> > instincts.
>
> The point I want to stress is that biological instincts are causal and
> promote the survival of the organism.  Man is the self-determinate creature
> who is capable of directing his own life insofar as its direction does not
> oppose the laws of Nature.  Again, man is the Choicemaker, and existence is
> designed to ensure his autonomy in the choice of values.

To hopefully iron-out our minor disagreement about causation: I'm
happy to say that "biological instincts are causal", but only if
"causal" is used in the older sense, as in "fighting for a cause" or
"rebel without a cause", NOT if used in the sense of mechanistic
causation. The cause (in the old sense) of most creatures is limited
to survival. Man is able to choose his cause.

> Mike:
> > I also believe that consciousness is the valuation of experience.
> > But so what?  There is no rationale for meaning or purpose in
> > this belief.  All it suggests is that we prefer what appeals to us,
> > what comforts us, what seems better to us.  Unless this
> > desideristic attribute is tied to a primary source as part of an
> > overall ontology, it is meaningless.
>
> The "rationale" is that Value IS tied to the primary source.  These
> particular value choices are the real essence of man (individually), and
> represent his unique link to Essence.

So we each create our own essence through our value choices? I like
that! I'm far more inclined to the notion of a mutable essence than a
fixed one. But, is "mutable essence" an oxymoron?

> The conditional values realized
> through experiencing Other (the objective "essent") nullify the primary
> negation (appearance) and affirm the absolute Oneness of Essence.

Might this be in any way akin to saying "valuation re-unifies subject
and object"?

> Mike:
> > Desire and need are basic, rudimentary senses of meaning,
> > from which more subtle and sophisticated meanings can grow,
> > with the aid of language.
>
> Perhaps.  But I don't see language playng a significant role in the
> value-sensibility of the individual.

We should probably leave this one on the shelf for a while.

[snip]

> Mike:
> > Lastly, could you point me to any crucial parts of your thesis that I
> > should prioritise?  I'm eager to understand the basic tenets of
> > Essentialism, but I won't have time to finish reading the entire
> > thesis in the near future.
>
> I would ask you to consider the other original postulate of Essentialism:
> The inaccessibility of Absolute Truth is consistent with the principle of
> Individual Freedom.  This affords a logical explanation for our inability to
> possess absolute knowledge.  IMO it makes Individual Freedom the core
> morality of the Philosophy of Essence, offering a meaningful teleology for
> the experience of essential value.  (Something, I would add, that I do not
> find in the MoQ.)

I must admit to feeling a little lost when you introduce "Absolute
Truth", because I'm not exactly sure what you're asking me to think
about. Are you referring to something like Kantian, independent
noumena behind the phenomena? Anyway, I can see that you're locating
yourself within the free will vs determinism debate, and clearly (and
quite rightly, in my view) you are on the side of free will. However,
as I see it, you are in no danger of espousing determinism unless you
subscribe to an objectivist, mechanistic view of reality, which
clearly you do not. I can't quite see how epistemological issues come
into this. Absolute and infallible knowledge about the nature of
things would not entail a loss of freedom to act upon that knowledge
as one chooses. I'm probably just missing something again - would it
be possible for you to elaborate on what "absolute knowledge" would
entail in the ontology of Essentialism?

Well, I do feel that I'm making some progress in understanding your
philosophy. I hope that all these questions aren't too tiresome.
Please feel free to take your time with your response, if that would
suit you (I see that you're involved in a couple of other discussions
at the moment).

Regards,
Mike