[MD] Is Morality innate in the cosmos?

[Ham Priday]

Greetings, Mike --

I said:
> I define existence is that which is experienced
> as occurring in time and space.

You replied:
> This prompts me to query the status of
> non-spatiotemporal experience in Essentialism.
> If you do not label such experience under
> "existence", does this mean you believe it to be
> 'less real' or secondary in some way?  Or are you
> using "existence" merely as a label for a
> sub-category of reality as a whole, and I'm just
> reading too much into the name you have chosen
> for it?  Apologies for having to
> continue my relentless questioning at the first sentence!

No apology necessary.  I like to receive thoughtful questions.

I assume that by "non-spaciotemporal experience" you mean random thoughts,
mental images, or rationalized precepts that one draws from memory.  I see
these abstractions as a consequence of the way in which we continually
intellectualize experience.  It has an organic (or biological) basis in that
is represents the cerebral processing of sensory information to provide a
coherent view of experience as a space/time continuum in which the 'I' or
self is the locus.

But all experience may be considered unreal or "imaginary" in that it is
differentiated, whereas ultimate reality is undifferentiated.  Which is why
I said:
> So, yes, existence is the experience.  The reason I don't usually
> phrase it that way is that it suggests that our physical reality is
> hallucinatory or "imaginary", while it is the only reality we know.

Mike:
> Yes, physical (spatiotemporal) reality should not be labelled
> as an illusion or a hallucination, because these have unaviodably
> pejorative connotations. However, I think "imaginary" can be
> used, if we drain it of its philosophically pejorative connotations,
> so that we are left with "images" (for example, of atoms bouncing
> around in a void) that are closely involved with our participation
> in them (in other words, they are dependent on the way in which
> we pay attention to them, or hold them in our consciousness,
> as we go about our lives).

Okay.
> Also, the very concept of "illusion" is based on the
> notion of 'primary reality to which our experience is
> secondary'. An "illusion" is an experience that doesn't
> match up with a putative primary reality, for example
> a stick in water 'looks bent'.  Philosophically, this is a
> formulation I'd like to avoid. Regarding the stick in water,
> I'd rather say that, when I saw it as a child, I _imagined_
> that the stick itself had been bent by the water, but, I was
> troubled by the inconsistency between this image and my
> image of sticks as tough objects that take a good deal of
> physical force to manipulate. So, when I was offered the
> alternative explanatory image that light is diffracted at the
> surface of the water, I adopted this image instead.
> Visual data is visual data, there can be nothing illusory
> about it. It is our imaginations, not the data, that deceive.

Okay.  Much of our ordinary experience is distorted in this manner, but can
be explained by physical principles such as the diffraction of light or the
doppler effect of sound.

> It might be useful to ask: where do you stand on the issue
> of illusions? Is your Primary Source such that we could
> speak of an 'illusion' in the case of mistaking reality for
> something that it fundamentally isn't?

I didn't know that optical or sonic illusions are an "issue".   At least,
they're not an issue insofar as Essntialism is concerned.  All of existence
may be considered illusionary, as I said above.  But I don't see the concept
of Essence as a "pair of corrective glasses" that we can put on to reduce
the astigmatism in our experience.  The mode of experience is proprietary
awareness divided from subjective beingness.  For me this is a given so long
as we are alive.  We can hypothesize reality as an absolute; but we can't
experience it.

> In any case, I would object that matter or substance is not
> a necessary or fundamental component of existence, but
> exists in as much as we hold it 'in mind' as we go about
> our lives (as we nearly always do from when we reach a
> certain age, because it is such a useful fiction). I should add
> that by "imagined" or "fictitious" I do not necessarily mean
> "illusory" or "unreal" (you know that I accept subject/object
> dualism as the current mode of our experience); I just mean
> that it is not fundamental or necessary.

I have no quarrel with the fact that physical precepts are useful and
practical in existence.

> If I understand you correctly, you are saying that
> "matter or substance" isn't essential to the ontology
> of the Absolute, and I agree with this assertion.
>
> I'd rather leave it at "matter/substance is not essential",
> although I'm quite willing to listen to what you're saying
> about "the Absolute".
>
> I also said:
> Existence is an individuated subject looking at a
> universal object.
>
> You said:
> So far I understand what you're saying (although I may
> disagree with it), but after this point I'm struggling to
> comprehend.

I think that was either your or Reinier's comment.

I might have said the following:
> What separates the two is nothingness.  In experience,
> this nothingness is converted to Value -- specifically, the value
> negated by Essence to create this dichotomy.  Essence
> remains undivided, encompassing all such differentiation
> as the absolute Not-other.
>
> Okay.  This is an original hypothesis based in part on Cusa's
> theory of the 'not-other' and also on Eckhart's assertion that
> "to create is to give being out of nothing."  I don't expect you
> to find it readily comprehensible, as I'll admit to having some
> problems with it myself.
> [snip]
> In brief, the principal ideas are:
> 1) Essence is not other than any (particular) other, therefore is the
> all-inclusive Not-Other.

Mike:
> Check.

> 2) Possibility and actuality are co-dependent in existence
> but coincide in the Not-Other.

Mike:
> Check.

> 3) Actuality necessitates the "appearance of Other"
> by a division of Essence.
> 4) Since Essence is indivisible by definition, this division is
> effected by a negation of its identity which creates the
> appearance of Nothingness.

Mike:
> So, for Essence to manifest itself as distinct or separate
> particulars, it has to give up its identity as Essence? And
> Nothingness becomes involved somehow at this stage?
> Please bear with me here!

According to Nicholas of Cusa, the 'first principle' (Essence) is "the
coincidence of (actualized) contrariety" as the "not-other".  What I have
been trying to work out (with Reinier's help) is how Difference (relational
existence or its experience) arises from Oneness.  My hypothesis is that
Nothingness is the differentiating factor.  It doesn't exist, we don't
experience it, hence it separates proprietary awareness from Essence and all
finite things from each other.

Ham continued:
> 5) All things are experienced as divided by Nothingness,
> which is also the conditional subject of experience.

Mike says:
> Okay... So, crudely speaking, Nothingness is the 'empty space',
> the 'gap', [that allows us to distinguish] between distinct
> particulars/objects?

Correct.

> Does Nothingness only divide objects from each
> other, or from our awareness, or both?

Both.

> I'm afraid I don't yet grasp what you mean by
> "conditional subject" of experience.

Nothingness is a contingency needed for the experience of relations.  By
"conditional" I mean provisional, temporary, relative to existential
reality.

Mike:
> [W]hen you say that value is negated by Essence, I can only
> interpret this as saying that Essence is the antithesis of value.
> This leaves me thinking that Essence and value are opposites,
> but this can't be what you mean, because Essence is the
> Not-other that encompasses all differentiation. Essence is
> not other to value. What am I missing?

You are missing the fact that I'm no longer saying that Essence negates
value.  As a result of my conversations with Reinier and SA, I'm now saying
that Essence negates Itself, that is, its Absolute Identity (Sensibility).
This creates a not-other in which proprietary awareness is infused as a
microcosm of Absolute Sensibility.  Awareness is not an "existent".  I call
it a "negate" -- a denied Essence.  It is a physical nothingness that
receives only the sentient "identity" of selfness from Essence.  Only the
contents of self-awareness appear in the "other".  Proprietary awareness is
a "not-other", as is Essence.  (So they have Essence in common.)

Ham explains (here) the need for this modification in the theory:
> Your interpretation in the first statement is wrong, and I may
> have misled you by saying that Value is negated by Essence.
> While it is true that the identity of Essence is "valuable", I now
>  believe it is more reasonable (according to Cusan logic) to
> see actualization as the negation of Difference.  In any case,
> Essence is NOT the antithesis of Value, nor is it
> 'other' to Value.  Essence is the antithesis of Nothingness.

Mike:
> Minor query: Would it be acceptable if, in my own thinking, I
> substituted "Void" for your "Nothingness"? I'm assuming that
> your use of "Nothingness" is not intended to be the same as
> Nothingness as used to denote in English the Buddhist notion
> of 'no-thing'-ness, which is not absolute Void, but rather
> denotes a lack of inherent or essential existence in something
> that nonetheless exists conventionally and dependently (thus,
> no-thingness is not quite a nihilistic term).
> "No-thingness" refers to emptiness of inherent form or essence
> (which, thinking about it, might fit somewhere into a theory of
> Essentialism), but I assume you're referring instead to absolute
> nihilistic void.

Your assumption is correct.  However, I'm still open to suggestions.

Ham also said:
> Only man is capable of rising above this causally-directed
> behavior.  Self-determination is unique to man; he is the
> Choicemaker of the universe.

Mike:
> I agree with the spirit of this, i.e. that value is common to all
> animals but the human sense of value contains greater possibilities
> for choice, and can be less confined to survival instincts.
> I only take issue with the word "causally-directed", because I take
> causation to be part of the mechanistic, so-called "natural world",
> which I think we agreed is more an "ornament" (although I hardly
> consider it to be decorative!) than a fundamental aspect of existence.
> Therefore I would rather say that "lesser creatures" are directed by
> their narrow, rudimentary sense of value, i.e. their survival
> instincts.

I consider that a minor issue, largely a matter of semantic interpretation.

Ham continued:
> The point I want to stress is that biological instincts are
> causal and promote the survival of the organism.  Man is the
> self-determinate creature who is capable of directing his own
> life insofar as its direction does not oppose the laws of Nature.
> Again, man is the Choicemaker, and existence is designed to
> ensure his autonomy in the choice of values.

Mike comments:
> To hopefully iron-out our minor disagreement about causation: I'm
> happy to say that "biological instincts are causal", but only if
> "causal" is used in the older sense, as in "fighting for a cause" or
> "rebel without a cause", NOT if used in the sense of mechanistic
> causation. The cause (in the old sense) of most creatures is limited
> to survival.  Man is able to choose his cause.

I have no quarrel with this statement.  I don't even see it as a
disagreement.

Mike:
> I also believe that consciousness is the valuation of experience.
> But so what?  There is no rationale for meaning or purpose in
> this belief.  All it suggests is that we prefer what appeals to us,
> what comforts us, what seems better to us.  Unless this
> desideristic attribute is tied to a primary source as part of an
> overall ontology, it is meaningless.

Exactly.  This is the very point I'm trying to make.
> The "rationale" is that Value IS tied to the primary source.  These
> particular value choices are the real essence of man (individually), and
> represent his unique link to Essence.

Mike:
> So we each create our own essence through our value choices?
> I like that! I'm far more inclined to the notion of a mutable essence
> than a fixed one. But, is "mutable essence" an oxymoron?

It is for me, Mike.  I believe man's values impact on Essence but do not
"change" it.  Man realizes the value of Essence by experiencing it as an
other.  In one sense, he creates value because it is always "new" for him;
but it is value that was and is always there for the "taking".  I posit
"complementary value" as every individual's real essence.  This is as close
to "quantifying" proprietary awareness that I can get.

>  The conditional values realized through experiencing Other
> (the objective "essent") nullify the primary negation
> (appearance) and affirm the absolute Oneness of Essence.

Mike:
> Might this be in any way akin to saying "valuation re-unifies subject
> and object"?

I think it might be.

Mike said:
> Desire and need are basic, rudimentary senses of meaning,
> from which more subtle and sophisticated meanings can grow,
> with the aid of language.

Ham said:
> Perhaps.  But I don't see language playng a significant role in the
> value-sensibility of the individual.

Mike:
> We should probably leave this one on the shelf for a while.
>
> Lastly, could you point me to any crucial parts of your thesis
> that I should prioritise?  I'm eager to understand the basic tenets
> of Essentialism, but I won't have time to finish reading the entire
> thesis in the near future.

Ham suggested:
> I would ask you to consider the other original postulate of Essentialism:
> The inaccessibility of Absolute Truth is consistent with the principle of
> Individual Freedom.  This affords a logical explanation for our inability
to
> possess absolute knowledge.  IMO it makes Individual Freedom the core
> morality of the Philosophy of Essence, offering a meaningful teleology for
> the experience of essential value.  (Something, I would add, that I do not
> find in the MoQ.)

Mike asks:
> I must admit to feeling a little lost when you introduce "Absolute
> Truth", because I'm not exactly sure what you're asking me to think
> about. Are you referring to something like Kantian, independent
> noumena behind the phenomena?

Absolute truth is ultimate reality -- Essence itself.

> Anyway, I can see that you're locating yourself within the
> free will vs determinism debate, and clearly (and
> quite rightly, in my view) you are on the side of free will.
> However,  as I see it, you are in no danger of espousing
> determinism unless you subscribe to an objectivist,
> mechanistic view of reality, which clearly you do not.
> I can't quite see how epistemological issues come
> into this. Absolute and infallible knowledge about the
> nature of things would not entail a loss of freedom to act
> upon that knowledge as one chooses. I'm probably just
> missing something again - would it be possible for you
> to elaborate on what "absolute knowledge" would
> entail in the ontology of Essentialism?

All knowledge is information about otherness, so there is no "absolute
knowledge".  This is why I reject the notion of divine omniscience, and
dislike "Intelligent Designer", although Sensibility is obviously an
attribute of Essence.

Mike concludes:
> Well, I do feel that I'm making some progress in
> understanding your philosophy. I hope that all these
> questions aren't too tiresome.  Please feel free to take
> your time with your response, if that would suit you
> (I see that you're involved in a couple of other discussions
> at the moment).

All my discussions are directed toward a single goal.  As Reinier recently
remarked, "So you just want to answer the question 'How does God work?' ;-)
To which I replied, "Yep, that's all we need to accomplish here."

Welcome to our discussion, Mike.  I think you've demonstrated a good
understanding of my philosophy of Essence, as well as its shortcomings.

Essentially yours,
Ham