[MD] Experience, essentialism, physicalism

[david buchanan]

Matt, Ant and all MOQers:

Matt said to Ant:
...The further reason I would describe this notion (of consciousness) in 
terms of linguistic ability is a methodological issue.  If what we are doing 
right now, the two of us exchanging views and such, is the manipulation of 
static intellectual patterns, and we follow DMB's notion that Pirsig is a 
heavy duty idealist (roughly, that everything we call "reality" is a static 
intellectual pattern, from rocks to math), then it should follow that what 
we are doing is talking about the way we should talk.  In this sense of 
idealism, when doing biology we aren't comparing our intellectual patterns 
revolving around biological static patterns to the biological static 
patterns themselves.  Rather, biological static patterns, so understood, are 
a subset creation of intellectual patterns and what we do in biology is 
compare intellectual patterns about biological patterns to other 
intellectual patterns about biological patterns. In other words, we talk 
about the way we talk.  Like DMB, I don't think this cuts us off from 
reality (as long as this kind of idealism is understood in a certain way).

dmb says:
I don't even know where to begin. Wish I could untangle all that, but I'm 
short on gumption and time. Let me just say that you seem to be taking me 
for a subjective idealist, but that's not what I mean. And I'm not saying 
that reality is nothing but intellectual static patterns. There are too many 
negatives in that sentence, but still. And I most definately do NOT think it 
follows that we should be talking about the way we talk. In fact, you must 
realize by now that one of my biggest problems with our conversations is 
your desire to talk about talking. As I've said in various ways, talking 
about talking is trivial, boring and its aim seems to be to avoid meaningful 
discussion at all costs. I think it sucks the fun and meaning out of 
philosophy. In fact, you must have realized by now that I absolutely LOVE to 
talk and I really HATE to talk about talking. This has been the source of 
much bitching by yours truly. You know, I only see it as changing the topic, 
evading the issue, missing the point and otherwise failing to engage the 
actual content of the debate. It makes me want to pull my hair out. And now 
you're suggesting this method follows from my perspective. Yikes! Dude, you 
are off the mark by billions of lightyears. How many many different ways do 
I have to complain about that before you get it? I mean, even if I'm totally 
wrong about it, you gotta know I don't like it by now.

Matt said:
So, when we make inquiries like the one about consciousness, we ask 
ourselves what the notion of "consciousness" is doing for us, what is 
extraneous and can be cut off, and what we _want_ consciousness to do for 
us.  But if everything is a static intellectual pattern in this sense of 
idealism, and what we are doing is talking about the way we talk, then in 
this sense it follows that "consciousness", along with everything else 
(including the notion of a "language"), is dependent on a way of speaking.  
And that's why I said a week ago (that started the bafflement), 
"'consciousness' (as a demarcation point between us and rocks), like 
everything else, is something that's created in a language-game."  I've been 
confused by the bafflement, particularly on DMB's part, because it seemed to 
me to be what he was arguing for in Pirsig's industrial strength idealism.

dmb says:
My bafflement continues. You say we ask ourselves what we want consciouness 
to do for us. Why? What does that mean? In what sense do we get to decide 
what we want from consciousness as part of an inquiry? And you say then it 
follows that we are talking about talking. How does that follow? Are you 
saying that language is the only kind of consciousness? Are you saying words 
can only be used to discuss words and can never discuss anything but words 
or simply that words are necessary in discussion. (Yawn) You say 
consciousness is created by language games, but won't explain what a 
language game is. Then there is the apparent contradiction of needed 
consciousness in order to play language games in the first place. And you 
don't understand why this baffles?

I'll go out of my way here to say that this peppering of questions 
expresses, as best I can, my sincere reaction to your comments. I could have 
just said "What? or "Huh?" but wanted you to get a sense of the scale and 
scope of my bafflement. I could have just said, "Sounds like a whole lotta 
gibberish to me", but I want you to have an idea of WHY it sounds like 
gibberish. It makes no sense and I'm not even sure what the point would be 
even if it did.

Matt continued:
...In one sense, consciousness comes before language (insofar as we define 
consciousness as something that bats or rocks can have) because that's the 
story of evolution we tell (the story that Scott wants to deny).  But in the 
sense I was using it, the very idea of "consciousness" is created in a 
language-game because _everything_ is created in a language game, everything 
(carefully qualified) is an intellectual static pattern, an idea, a 
"persistent deduction" as DMB calls it.  And the stress in "everything" is, 
of course, on every_thing_, as DMB points out.

dmb says:
Again, I think you're talking about subjective idealism (SOM) and not the 
MOQ. Being shorter than I wanna be, I'll just say that you have language as 
the source of subjects and objects, whereas I think DQ is the source of 
subjects and objects. I don't know about you, but I think its more like 
language is a feature of human self-consciousness and that bats and rocks 
ony "talk" by analogy.

Matt said:
...From their point of view, language interpenetrates everything, including 
whatever qualia is.  I think the idea is more or less the same as the above 
methodological suggestion.  Every_thing_ is an intellectual static pattern, 
everything we talk about is created in a language-game.

dmb says:
I still don't see how this is a reasonable conclusion. And you seem to have 
accepted this so thorougly that any other view is simply out of the 
question. This is preventing you from even beginning to seriously discuss 
DQ, mostly because, as the pre-intellectual, pre-linguistic mode, you've 
simply ruled out any such possibility. But the reasons for this rejection 
are still quite foggy and consequently they are extremely unpersuasive. Oh, 
looky here. I see you anticipated that objection...

Matt said:
...And one thing I'm guessing will come up is when I said "we do have to 
chuck the idea that qualia is non-linguistic," since DQ is often pictured as 
being non-linguistic.   I'm not suggesting that it isn't nor am I suggesting 
that there is nothing that is non-linguistic.  However, on the pragmatist 
picture
I'm suggesting, we should realize that whatever is non-linguistic is in the 
same boat as rocks and evolution--they are a function of us talking about 
them, they are a function of static intellectual
patterns.  This seems paradoxical, that the "non-linguistic" is created in a 
language game, but I think properly massaged it will seem less so.

dmb says:
OK I'll resist the urge to share the massage joke that I just cracked myself 
up with. I'll even politely agree to call it a "paradox". But I'm still 
gonna object. I think the idea that the non-linguistic is a function of us 
talking about is nonsense and there is not good reason to massage it. That's 
just a way to beg the question, as you might say.

Let me ask you a question. As with the case of Pirsig's description of 
lateral thinking, of tripping on peyote, of going insane, of being at one 
with the motorcycle and a many other examples, we are talking about an 
experience that human beings have. We are talking about that aesthetic 
component experience, as Northrop describes it. This is to be contrasted 
with the theoretic component, which is where language comes in. On what 
basis do you reject the reality or validity of such experience? On what 
basis do you assert that the nature of reality somehow rules out such a 
possibility. Why go to through such bizzare intellectual contortions to 
acomplish it? Doesn't this just trivialize and exclude the very same kinds 
of "subjective" experience that SOM bannishes. And then doesn't that very 
much miss the point of the MOQ? I think so.

Thanks.
dmb

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