[MD] The differentiating nothingness

[Ham Priday]

Scott (also Peter, Reinier, David, SA) --


I'll let you and Peter work out the furniture arrangements in heaven.  But
since you took the time to quote Franklin Merrell-Woff on nothingness, I'll
use the opportunity to make a few personal comments.

Wolff postulated a philosophy of Consciousness in which pure or "root"
consciousness corresponds to my Essence or Pirsig's DQ, as opposed to
consciousness as the "content" or attribute of the individual self.

In the passage you quoted, he does seem to support two points I've made
about existential nothingness ("voidness"), but the ontology is different
because it's based on "Primeval Consciousness" rather than an absolute
source.

> "Opposed to consciousness as the only existence, there stands the counter
> notion of voidness. In this sense the void is a somewhat that is not, that
> has no substance [he is using 'substance' in the Spinozan sense, as that
> which depends on nothing else]. Now, without voids there would be nothing
> within the Primeval Plenum of Consciousness to arouse self-consciousness
> into action."

I don't see the void as opposed to consciousness, although it is "the
counter notion" of Essence; in fact, it is the antithesis of Essence.  And I
agree that without voids "there would be nothing ...to arouse
self-consciousness into action" because awareness responds only to finite
beingness, and it is the voids (nothingness) which dilineate being.
Beyond that, however, the going gets tough and I have some problems with his
logic.

For example:

> "The voids may be regarded as zones of tension wherein
> consciousness negates itself and thus blanks itself out in
> greater or less degree. Such voids have the value of
> disturbance as acting like an irritant that tends to arouse
> consciousness to an awareness of itself.

First of all, consciousness is "awareness of itself" by definition, so it
doesn't need an "irritant" to arouse it to self-awareness.  Also, I don't
see negation as consciousness negating itself.  Consciousness (really the
intellect) negates otherness to "construct" a particular being image.  He
also describes negation as "an instance of *absence* arousing the power to
be aware of *presence*."  That's nice alliteration, but it seems to
contradict his theory that consciousness negates itself.  If consciousness
negates itself "by degree", then, according to this statement, the complete
negation of consciousness would result in total *presence* which would be
impossible in the *absence* of consciousness.

Scott, you see special significance in this passage:

> "The multiform combinations of the voids produce all
> the configurations of experience and thought, and these
> in turn have the value of symbols, which in the last
> analysis are of instrumental value only. The symbols
> indicate a pre-existent and formless Meaning.
> The multiform combinations of the voids produce all the
> configurations of experience and thought, and these in
> turn have the value of symbols, which in the last analysis
> are of instrumental value only. When, for any individual
> center of consciousness, the Meaning can be assimilated
> directly without the instrumentality of the symbols, then
> for that individual the evolution of self-consciousness
> within the field of consciousness of objects has been
> completed. But until that time, symbols are necessary."

[Scott]:

> Note, Ham, where he says these voids (like chairs) are
> symbols. This is what I mean when I say everything is
> semiotic -- a claim you have objected to.

I don't think FM-W is using "symbols" in a semiotic sense here at all.  I
think the term has the same meaning as the "particulars" of Plato and
Aristotle; that is finite objects.  The shape and form of an object has no
meaning except for the value it holds for the observer.  Until (or unless)
that value is realized, the objects are only "instrumental symbols".  At
least, that's my interpretation of what Wolff is saying.

Thanks for the reference, Scott.  It's always interesting to see how
somebody else expresses an epistemological concept.  Now that I've seen
Wolff's efforts, I'm less inclined to regard my own as too complex for the
average reader.

Regards,
Ham