[MD] The differentiating nothingness

[Scott Roberts]

Ham,

Ham said:
Wolff postulated a philosophy of Consciousness in which pure or "root"
consciousness corresponds to my Essence or Pirsig's DQ, as opposed to
consciousness as the "content" or attribute of the individual self.

In the passage you quoted, he does seem to support two points I've made
about existential nothingness ("voidness"), but the ontology is different
because it's based on "Primeval Consciousness" rather than an absolute
source.

Scott:
For Wolff, Consciousness (more specifically, "absolute consciousness", that 
is, "Consciousness without an object and without a subject") is the absolute 
source.

The rest of your differences stem from this comment of yours. "First of all, 
consciousness is "awareness of itself" by definition, so it doesn't need an 
"irritant" to arouse it to self-awareness."

There is no "by definition" of consciousness. You have your definition, but 
Wolff is redefining consciousness in stating his metaphysics, just as you 
are redefining essence to state yours. Wolff distinguishes between absolute 
and relative consciousness, for example, while in your metaphysics you 
restrict the word to its relative meaning (as subject/object consciousness).

Ham said:
Scott, you see special significance in this passage:

> "The multiform combinations of the voids produce all
> the configurations of experience and thought, and these
> in turn have the value of symbols, which in the last
> analysis are of instrumental value only. The symbols
> indicate a pre-existent and formless Meaning.
> The multiform combinations of the voids produce all the
> configurations of experience and thought, and these in
> turn have the value of symbols, which in the last analysis
> are of instrumental value only. When, for any individual
> center of consciousness, the Meaning can be assimilated
> directly without the instrumentality of the symbols, then
> for that individual the evolution of self-consciousness
> within the field of consciousness of objects has been
> completed. But until that time, symbols are necessary."

[Scott]:

> Note, Ham, where he says these voids (like chairs) are
> symbols. This is what I mean when I say everything is
> semiotic -- a claim you have objected to.

Ham said:
I don't think FM-W is using "symbols" in a semiotic sense here at all.

Scott:
What other sense is there? Semiotics is the study of signs, and symbols are 
signs.

Ham continued:
I think the term has the same meaning as the "particulars" of Plato and
Aristotle; that is finite objects.

Scott:
What you are saying is that you reject calling them "symbols". Wolff is 
saying that all finite objects are symbols. You are saying they are not. I 
go with Wolff.

Ham continued:
The shape and form of an object has no
meaning except for the value it holds for the observer.  Until (or unless)
that value is realized, the objects are only "instrumental symbols".  At
least, that's my interpretation of what Wolff is saying.

Scott:
Not just the shape and form of the object, but the whole object, since there 
are objects without shape and form (like thoughts and feelings). Shape and 
form just allow us mammals to distinguish one physical object from another.

He is saying that the object's entire existence is only an instrumental 
symbol, for which the ultimate meaning is that "formless Meaning", which 
sounds a lot like DQ.

By the way, I'm not entirely happy with the way Wolff presents his 
metaphysics in this quote, though I should point out that later on in the 
book some of my difficulties are addressed, in the aphorisms. I'm referring 
to the way the "formless Meaning" is privileged over the symbolic objects. I 
prefer the contradictory identity language in relating them. He gets to this 
in his aphorisms, which you can find here: 
http://www.integralscience.org/gsc/index.html#aphorisms

- Scott