[MD] Experience, essentialism, physicalism

[Ant McWatt]

Matt,

Firstly, thanks for jogging my memory about the frontal and lateral truths 
mentioned in ZMM.  I obviously haven’t read that section for a while!  
Anyway, in an effort to look at the essential underlying problem here, I’ve 
had another look at Dennett’s “Consciousness “Explained” in conjunction with 
yours and DMB’s last posts.

As I mention in Chapter 3 of my PhD, you will see that I make the case that 
though Dennett is attempting to extract modern philosophy away from the 
Cartesian form of SOM (which we both see as a worthwhile project) he fails 
because he’s still trapped in the SOM box.  Briefly speaking, this is 
because Dennett’s proposed solution simply denies the so-called subjective 
element of existence (such as qualia) rather than starting from a completely 
new way of looking at the universe or reconciling the subjective and 
objective elements in a broader context (on the lines that the MOQ does).

Even if we are generous with Dennett and assume he is not committed to 
regarding consciousness as an ‘illusion’ but regards it as, for instance, a 
certain state of the central nervous system, the fact remains that such a 
system is a theoretical deduction (i.e. a concept by postulation) whereas 
much conscious experience (such as thirst, fear, the perception of colour) 
consists of immediately apprehended concepts by intuition.

Northrop (1947, p.63) notes the implications when philosophers (such as 
Dennett) confuse the two:

“Failure by… Western philosophy to distinguish the concepts by intuition… 
from the concepts by postulation of the stage of deductively formulated 
theory in Western science… has resulted in incalculable error.”

Even within the SOM tradition, this (very naughty) conflation has not 
escaped notice.  For instance, in Dennett’s (“Consciousness Explained”, 
1991, p.372) statement: ‘I agree wholeheartedly that there seem to be 
qualia’, Chalmers (“The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory”, 
1996, pp.190-91) has discerned Dennett’s ambiguous use of the word ‘seem’:

“There is a phenomenal sense of ‘seem’, in which for things to seem a 
certain way is just for them to be experienced in a certain way.  And there 
is a psychological sense of ‘seem’ in which for things to seem a certain way 
is for us to be disposed to judge they are that way.  It is in the first 
sense that a theory of experience must explain the way things seem.  But it 
is in the second sense that Dennett’s theory explains it.  Once this subtle 
equivocation [between concepts by intuition and postulation] is noted, the 
argument loses most of its force.”

Chalmers’ observation is of particular interest from the viewpoint of 
Northrop’s philosophy (and, in consequence, the MOQ) because the phenomenal 
sense of ‘seem’ is a ‘concept by intuition’ while the psychological sense of 
‘seem’ is a ‘concept by postulation’.  Not only does Chalmers confirm that 
it’s the phenomenal sense of ‘seem’ that’s important for a theory of 
experience, it’s also apparent that Dennett can only deny Chalmers’ 
criticism (of having a weak argument) if he (erroneously) conflates the two 
understandings of ‘seem’.  However, as noted above in reference to Northrop 
(1947, p.63) such conflation is not only misleading but results in nonsense 
because ‘a concept by intuition, such as “red” in the sense of the 
empirically sensed color, gets its meaning directly from immediately 
apprehended fact, [and, as such] does not depend for its meaning upon the 
scientific or philosophical theory, into which it enters as a term.’

In other words, a concept by intuition (such as the phenomenal sense of 
‘seem’) keeps its meaning constant whether it is employed by one scientist 
(or philosopher) or by another.  However, this is not the case with a 
concept by postulation (such as the psychological sense of ‘seem’):

“Such a concept has no meaning apart from a specific deductively formulated 
theory.  This follows from its definition, as previously stated: A concept 
by postulation is one the meaning of which in whole or part is proposed for 
it by the postulates of some specific deductively formulated theory.  It 
follows, therefore, that when such a word is used in two different sets of 
postulates of two different deductively formulated theories, it has two 
quite radically different meanings… If one treats the concepts of Western 
philosophy, which almost invariably are concepts by postulation, as if they 
were empirically given concepts by intuition, vague rubbish is precisely and 
inevitably what one will get.”  (Northrop, 1947, pp.63/67)

When I first read “Consciousness Explained” one of the thoughts that came to 
me is the idea that Daniel Dennett is actually a fictional character created 
by an anti-physicalist philosophy department as a joke.  His texts being 
written as a team effort by the department and the amiable bearded man (like 
Father Christmas!) who occasionally appears on TV and in conferences as 
“Daniel Dennett” being actually an actor.  Dennett seems to be asking us not 
to believe in qualia though it is a lot easier not to believe in him!  
Either way, I do tend to ignore his work as I found his project of solving 
the problems caused by Cartesian SOM well off track and that it actually 
just causes more philosophical problems than it solves.

For instance, if we look at the Dennett/Rorty type of consciousness as being 
the first person stance which you have put forward in your recent posts, 
it’s not much of a surprize that we have seen the following difficulties 
arising:

1. The hypothetical contrary to fact (about bats speaking human language) 
that I pointed out.  As the MOQ is a form of radical empiricism it shouldn’t 
be containing any relationship or thing that doesn’t exist and this 
Dennett/Rorty limited definition of consciousness seems to be doing just 
this.

2. The limited scope of this Dennett/Rorty type of definition.  For 
instance, it denies most animals as having some form of consciousness simply 
because they can’t speak a human language.  Does that mean, therefore, that 
babies suddenly become conscious when they speak their first words or 
parrots (such as Alex, the parrot at MIT who can count, make simple 
mathematical calculations and recognise colour) should be regarded as being 
conscious while their non- human speaking counterparts shouldn’t?

(Dr Pepperberg who works with Alex at MIT noted the following in a recent 
on-line interview:  ‘What I’ve tried to explain to parrot owners is that 
what they have in a cage in their living room is a creature with the 
sentience of a four to six-year-old child.’  
http://www.edge.org/documents/archive/edge126.html).

I note that you assert that your limited definition of consciousness is 
attempting to simply explain that every thing we would want to say has a 
“locus of consciousness” has a particular view point and, in that this 
sense, bats have consciousness.  However, isn’t a “particular viewpoint” a 
human invention imposed on other creatures?  Moreover, if “rocks and 
evolution are a function of us talking about them, [and, therefore] a 
function of static intellectual patterns” then isn’t the bat’s ‘particular 
viewpoint’” an example of the latter as well?

3. As I mentioned previously, if you were taking a psychedelic trip, a 
broader definition (such as the one of Timothy Leary’s provided on page 
40-41 of “Psychedelic Prayers”, 1966, reprinted 1997, p.40-41) would be far 
more useful to the “Dynamic explorer” than this Dennett/Rorty type of 
definition.  I know such psychedelic exploration is not a hugely popular 
idea with governments who don’t want a huge mass of free-thinking 
individuals but it remains the case that such exploration can provide us 
with useful insights into the fundamental nature of reality not accessible 
by other methods.

4.  The paradox in your concluding paragraphs i.e. “we do have to chuck the 
idea that qualia is non-linguistic”, “that the ‘non-linguistic’ [such as 
Dynamic Quality] is created in a language game” and “is a function of us 
talking about them, they are a function of static intellectual patterns” 
completely causes havoc with the internal logical consistency of the MOQ.  
It’s difficult enough to remain clear-headed in relating the logic of the 
MOQ with the tetralemma (which I think IS a worthwhile project) without the 
major modifications that your proposal would lead to!

5. As Professor David E. Cooper argues in his text “The Measure of All 
Things” (2002) there is also the matter of hubris that philosophers such as 
Rorty and Dennett are engaged in denying, or at least, denying the 
importance of, the non-linguistic source of all (static) things.  The MOQ 
re-centres metaphysics from being human-centric to Quality-centric which 
entails a correct recogniiton of the Tao (unlike, for instance, some human 
invented language game).  Moreover, what is (philosophical) life without 
mystery?

Finally, I remember Pirsig mentioning last Summer that the components of the 
MOQ are very much intertwined so it is very difficult to radically change 
one part without undermining the whole lot.  I also have my doubts that the 
Dennett/Rorty idea of consciousness would be useful even outside the MOQ 
context though that doesn’t mean everything they’ve written on consciousness 
is not without interest or value (for instance, even as an SOM philosopher, 
Dennett still realises – unlike some of his physicalist colleagues - the 
importance of the social level in the development of the intellectual one).  
However, it’s worth remembering that even by the late 1950s, some Oxbridge 
philosophers (such as Bertrand Russell and Ernest Gellner) had realised that 
there were some serious difficulties with the “linguistic turn”   I would 
therefore highly recommend the latter’s 1959 text: “Words and Things, A 
Critical Account of Linguistic Philosophy and a Study in Ideology” for 
anyone who takes the idea of language games at all seriously.

Best wishes,

Anthony.


www.robertpirsig.org



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