[MD] Theism and literalism

[Scott Roberts]

DMB,

dmb had said:
...causality is taking a real beating in the sub-atomic realm, where events
may or may not occur, where events may or may not occur in one of several
ways. I mean, there is real data to support the idea that the so-called laws
of nature are not strictly followed, the data coming from quantum mechanics
and such reveals a certain inadequacy in that model. So I think it makes
sense to replace mechanistic laws with a better set of terms...

Scott replied:
I agree with this except your sentence "So I think it makes sense to replace
mechanistic laws with a better set of terms". If one wants to be
uncontroversial, then one should just drop mechanistic terms without
replacing them. By replacing mechanistic terms with 'value' and 'preference'
you are saying something about the inorganic for which there is no empirical
evidence. ...The very same laboratory data would hold if I claimed that what
electrons are "really" doing is dancing to the music of the spheres. But of
course to claim that is absurd. Yet the MOQ claims that there is value
involved in what electrons do. It does so because it has faith in the idea
that Quality is omnipresent -- and so do I. But I recognize this as faith,
that is, it is consistent with what mystics say, even though I have no
empirical evidence for it. There is empirical evidence for Quality, but only
in humans and higher animals. Not for the inorganic.

dmb now says:
First of all, I don't see how we can possibly conclude that electrons are
"dancing to the music of the spheres" from the data.

Scott:
Right, one can't. Nor can we conclude from the data that electrons like one 
state more than another (which is what "prefer" means).

DMB continued:
 The central point,
which you have ignored, is that the "preferences" conclusion is based on
empirical data.

Scott:
What data? Show me the data that shows that where an electron displays spin 
up or spin down is a result of a preference (a choice made because one state 
is liked more than the other), as opposed to randomness, or due to a 
deterministic hidden variable, or that each possibility creates a separate 
universe, or any of the other proposed solutions to the quantum measurement 
problem.

DMB continued:
 All you've done is nakedly deny that this lab data counts as
empirical evidence for that conclusion. Why does it not count?

 Why does the
"preference" model not work better than the "causal law" model? Wasn't my
main point centered on the inadequacy of that model, AS IT IS REVEALED BY
THAT DATA? Yes.

Scott:
I agree that the data shows that mechanical, spatiotemporal determinism is a 
bad model. But there isn't any data shows that 'preference' is a good model. 
These aren't the only two possibilities.

DMB said:
 And that's exactly the part you don't address. You act as if
any silly conclusion can be drawn from this data, as if it doesn't have to
make sense and be consistant.

Scott:
That's hardly what I am saying. I am only saying that claiming electrons 
shows preference is consistent with the data, but so is saying they are 
dancing to the music of the spheres -- or any other non-testable, 
non-empirical claim. It is BECAUSE they are non-testable, they are 
consistent. Some such claims are silly. I don't think that the 'preference' 
claim is silly. But there is no empirical test for it. You seem to think 
that because (a) it is not silly, and (b) it is consistent with the data, 
that that makes it empirical. Well, sorry, it doesn't. Some other non-silly 
claims were mentioned above (deterministic, non-spatiotemporal hidden 
variables, and the multi-universe interpretation -- well I think this one is 
silly, but some physicists go with it).

DMB said:
 I don't think the MOQ is making any claims
about what electrons are "really" doing. The "preference" model is simply
designed to describe the "behaviour" of subatomic particles as they are
revealed in scientific experiments.

Scott:
These two sentences contradict each other. The "preference" model is an 
addition to the behavior revealed in experiment. That sure looks like a 
claim about what they are "really" doing to me. As I said, the only way to 
keep within the empirical is to say nothing.

DMB continued:
I can't even imagine how you can deny that this is an empirically based
assertion.

Scott:
The data shows that the mechanical, spatiotemporally determinist claim is 
wrong. It does not show that the preference claim is right. Show me the 
experiment that verifies the 'preference' claim over the multi-universe 
claim and the non-local hidden variable claim and you'll have yourself a 
Nobel Prize.

DMB concluded:
And yes, I know this issue has nothing to do with the thread name. Just
wanted to give you a little taste of your own medicine.

Scott:
Hey, you're the one complaining about threads being hijacked, not me.

DMB said:
As for our discussion about theism and literalism, I shall resume when we
can agree on the basic meaning of these terms. If we can't do that, then
what's the point? Unless that happens, we're not even talking about the same
things.  Funny thing is, you recently admited what I've always suspected;
that you're a theist. Insofar as your views are based on faith and you're
asserting a supernatural divinity, you're a theist. And like every other
theist I've encountered here, you're not making sense.

Scott:
I'm puzzled at when you think I might have asserted a supernatural divinity. 
Unless you consider Consciousness-without-an-Object to be such, or Quality 
or Plotinian Intellect. I consider these divine and supernatural (and I 
consider nature as expressing the divine). I don't think this makes me a 
theist. My position is roughly the same as Merrell-Wolff's: "Thus, "God", 
whether considered as an existence or simply as an integrating concept is, 
in any case, derivative. We may properly view certain levels of 
consciousness, which transcend the human form of consciousness, as Divine 
[and, I would add, as supernatural]. All terms derived from the notion of 
Divinity certainly have a very high order of psychological significance, at 
the very least, and I do make use of them. But I do not regard them as 
corresponding to the most ultimate values."

But this too requires agreeing on the meaning of terms, in this case, of 
'divine' and 'supernatural', which in turn requires agreeing on the meaning 
of 'natural', which is more than I want to get into now.

- Scott