[MD] Static latching & faith

[Scott Roberts]

DMB, David M,

Scott said to DMorey:
We all here (Pirsig, Wilber, you, me, and DMB) consider it a crime to ignore
the transcendental. And I'm not saying that the transcendental is beyond
experience. I'm only saying that certain claims
in the MOQ depend on the experience of a mystical few, and so according to
Pirsig's usage of 'empiricism', those claims are empirical, but according to
standard usage, they are seen as being taken on faith (in the mystics who
produce these claims).

dmb says:
Its a crime to ignore the transcendental and the transcendental is not
beyond experience. OK, I'm with you so far. And you're only saying what? You
object to certain claims that depend on the experience of a mystical few.
Why? Didn't we all just agree that it was a crime to ignore the
transcendental experience, like one sentence ago?

Scott:
You are misreading. I did not say I object to those claims. What I am 
getting it is that I don't see how these claims can be made without 
appealing to mysticism. Now are you going to respond with "OK, I misread 
what you said"? Somehow I doubt it.

DMB continued:
 And why does it matter
that standard useage disagrees that such things count as empirical when the
whole point is to get rid of that very useage for the very reason that it
does not allow such things to be counted as empirical? Why do we care that
standard useage disagrees and calls it faith when the whole point of the
MOQ's expansion of rationality is to reject that standard usage and faith? I
think you have bascially contradicted yourself in the space of two
sentences. But that doesn't even begin to cover it...

Scott:
What I am getting at is that by saying that mystical claims are empirical is 
a way of covering up the fact that claims are being made which are not 
readily understandable by all. One only accepts them because "mystics say 
so". Why shouldn't that be called faith?

Scott continued:
...What's more, if we try to bracket out those claims, the MOQ falls apart
(as an 'empirical' metaphysics). Here's what I mean: Pirsig argues *without*
appeal to mystical revelation that inorganic patterns are patterns of value.
This claim is "justified" in the following paragraph (from chapter 8):

dmb replies:
Before we get to the quote I have to ask a question or two. What does it
mean to bracket out those claims. And which claims are you refering to?

Scott:
By "bracketing out" I mean that in this discussion no appeal is made to what 
mystics say to justify a claim. The claim in question is that there is value 
in the inorganic. There is also the more complicated claim about whether it 
makes sense to talk about an undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.

DMB continued:
 The
"certain" claims that rely on "the experience of a mystical few" that you
didn't identify above either?

Scott:
Mystics say value is everywhere, so if one has faith in what mystics say, 
then it follows that there is value in the inorganic.

DMB continued:
 And how does this ?bracketing of ?claims make
the MOQ fall apart?

Scott:
Because, as I show subsequently, without the mystical claim there is no 
empirical basis for choosing the preference model over the causal model.

DMB continued:
 How do these bracketed mystical claims relate to this
preference model, which, as you say, argues without resort to mysticism?

Scott:
Without the mystical claim there is no reason to select the preference 
model.

DMB continued:
 And
weren't you saying the opposite of that just yesterday?

Scott:
What are you referring to that I said yesterday?

DMB continued:
 And which claim is
"justified" in this quote?

Scott:
In this quote Pirsig is attempting to justify that there is value in the 
organic. I put "justify" in scare quotes because the attempt fails.

DMB continued:
 See, I think you're talking about mysticism,
physics and epistemology all at the same time and its all mixed up. I think
you're pretty much lost in the woods here. Ah, you are a paragon of clarity.
  Here's the quote for easy reference, but there is more exciting debate
below that...

>"The only difference between causation and value is that the word "cause"
>implies absolute certainty whereas the implied meaning of "value" is one of
>preference. In classical science it was supposed that the world always
>works
>in terms of absolute certainty and that "cause" is the more appropriate
>word
>to describe it. But in modern quantum physics all that is changed.
>Particles
>"prefer" to do what they do. An individual particle is not absolutely
>committed to one predictable behavior.What appears to be an absolute cause
>is just a consistent pattern of preferences. Therefore, when you strike
>"cause" from the language and substitute "value" you are not only replacing
>an empirically meaningless term with a meaningful one; you are using a term
>that is more appropriate to actual observation."

Scott said:
First (minor) point. Pirsig claims that "cause" is an empirically
meaningless term, since we have no "direct awareness" of it -- that is, it
is a word employed in our conceptual framework. On the other hand, one can
note its usefulness in distinguishing certain patterns we understand in
terms of "A causes B" from patterns of the form "We don't know why there is
B". One has found out why a bug in a computer program is occurring when one
traces its cause. Fix that cause, and the bug is fixed. To say that "the bug
caused the problem " is not empirical is ludicrous. But onward to the major
point.

dmb says:
Trouble shooting a computer is one thing and quantum mechanics is another,
so I'm not buying your analogy here at all. Looking for causes and reasons
when a machine breaks down only makes sense. I think Pirsig is just saying
that it makes no sense to explain the behaviour of particles in terms of
causation because the word implies "absolute certainty". He's only saying
that it makes no sense to describe what particles do when they "do what they
do" in such certain terms because what "they do" is not certain at all. He's
only saying that, when it comes to the observed behaviour of particles,
causation doesn't work whereas value does. (And yes, I know the particles
are not observed making prefereces and they aren't observed with the naked
eye, but this is still just sensory empiricism insofar as scientific
instruments are considered extensions of the senses and the explanation is
seperate from the observed behaviour that it seeks to explain.) I think
you're making a huge, complicated deal out of a small and simple thing.

Scott:
I agree that Pirsig is in the first place saying that "cause" cannot be 
presupposed in particle behavior. What we cannot infer from that is the 
supposition that cause has nothing to do with particle behavior. All we know 
is that we don't know whether or not to apply "cause" to particle behavior. 
What they do is not certain TO US. It is possible that someday we will learn 
that the behavior of particles may turn out to be just as certain as the 
behavior of a computer.

Scott continued:
The last clause in the quoted paragraph is simply not true ("[using 'value']
is more appropriate to actual observation"). Pirsig just states that
"Particles 'prefer' to do what they do", but there is no evidence for that
claim. All the evidence shows is that we do not know why (for example) a
particle shows up in a particular place. We do know that they show up in
consistent patterns, but we cannot predict for a particular particle where
it will show up. To jump from this to saying that they show "preference" is
non-empirical. There are other possibilities: that where they show up is
purely random, or that there are "hidden variables" that determine where
they will show up (that is, where they show up is determined, but we don't
know why). The only empirical thing one can say (leaving out mystical
revelation) is that we don't know.

dmb says:
Wow. What a mess! Simply not true! Dude, you're just not getting it and its
really not that hard. You say that we can't predict where a particle will
show up AND yet saw there is no evidence for the preference model.

Scott:
Correct, there is no evidence *for* the preference model. All we can say now 
is that there is no evidence *against* it. There is no evidence for or 
against the preference model. Nor is there evidence for or against the 
deterministic model, nor for or against the pure chance model. That is, 
there is no evidence for *choosing* one model over the other. Yet that is 
what Pirsig is doing when he says "Particles 'prefer' to do what they do".

DMB continued:
 But the
unpredictable behaviour is the very evidence you deny. And so what if there
are other possibilities. As long as its a coherent explanation about the
actual observation, then it is empirically based. It only has to make sense
and agee with experience to be empirically valid and its quite all right if
there are rival theories. Its inevitiable and lovely too.

Scott:
We've been over this before. There is a difference between an "empirically 
based" claim and an "empirically consistent" claim. The preference model is 
empirically consistent. But choosing it over the others -- which is done by 
saying "Particles 'prefer' to do what they do", and that therefore there is 
value in the inorganic -- that is not empirically based. One has made that 
choice based on something other than non-mystical empirical data.

Scott said:
Thus, if we leave out mystical revelation, there is no *empirical*
justification for claiming that there is value in the inorganic. That means
that there is no empirical obstacle to claiming that value is an emergent
property in complex biological creatures, which claim of course leads us
back into SOM. The two metaphysics (MOQ and SOM -- the latter patched up so
it doesn't ignore value entirely as in logical positivism) are equally
adequate and coherent. Thus, the only reason to accept the MOQ over SOM is
because one has faith in mystical revelation (or, of course, if one has such
revelation of one's own).

dmb says:
If we leave out mystical experience there is no empirical justification of
the preference model of subatomic particles?! Um, don't you suppose the
empirical justification for "value in the inorganic" will be found by
observing THE INORGANIC - in this case the non-lawlike behaviour of
particles.

Scott:
But we do not KNOW that their behavior is non-lawlike. Further investigation 
may show that it is lawlike. No observation we can make at present tells us 
that the behavior of particles is in fact non-lawlike. We simply do not at 
present know, and no observation we know how to make can tell us.

DMB continued:
 And likewise, empirical justification for the mystical will be
found in the observation of states of consciousness, not subatomic particles
or any other sensory reality. And now you're offering a patched-up SOM over
the MOQ?

Scott:
I'm not offering it. (See -- you misread again). I am only pointing out that 
there is no empirical basis (leaving out mystical claims) for choosing the 
MOQ over a patched-up SOM. I go with the MOQ (over SOM) *because of* 
mystical claims.

DMB continued:
 Oh jeez, take up the inadequacies of SOM in another thread. That'll
keep you busy for a few months. I mean, there are tons of reason to prefer
the MOQ over SOM, even a patch up one. Your patched-up SOM gets absolutely
no respect from me. Yuk!

Scott:
It's not mine. I reject it too. But I see no way to argue for the MOQ over a 
patched-up SOM strictly on the basis of empiricism that leaves out mystical 
reports. That is the only thing I am trying to get across in this thread.

Scott said:
There is a further issue, of course, and that is which mystics one listens
to, but that's a whole 'nother topic.

dmb says:
I'd say the important thing is to listen well and listen broadly. I think
the MOQ's philosophical mysticism is fundamentally inclusive and the more
the merrier. But, Scott, here is the point DM made, the one that you managed
to avoid through that whole mess...

DM said:
...I think the whole point about recognising DQ in experience is that the
doors of perception can be opened, that the mystical can be recognised in
ordinary experience, that experience has first rights over the reductions of
experience that enable science to get on with its business. Let's not ignore
the transcendental or forget that the reality of the transcendental is
entirely apparent in experience, if you can see the movement of DQ which
declares the existence of borders and border crossings.

dmb says:
You sorta lost me somewhere near the border crossing, but otherwise I agree
emphatically. The MOQ is meant to accomodate everything quantum mechanics to
mysticism. It wants to include a broader range of experience than SOM's
scientifiic, sensory empiricism would allow. I'll give you a million dollars
if you can make Scott see this point.

Scott:
I am not talking about a scientific, sensory-restricted SOM (there are many 
SOMs that do not so restrict themselves). But, as I say, I am myself 
anti-SOM.

The question I have for David M is whether you think that "recognizing DQ" 
can make any sense to anyone without appeal to the mystical literature. If 
not, do you think it is appropriate to call the MOQ "pure empiricism"?

- Scott

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