[MD] Static latching & faith - part two
Ant McWatt
antmcwatt at hotmail.co.uk
Sat May 6 06:46:41 PDT 2006
Continued from “Static latching & faith – part one”./
Ant commented April 27th:
No, the beauty of a sunset isn’t anything to do with faith; it’s just the
way it is (as Elvis would say). Moreover, you’re making mysticism sound too
esoteric and mysterious. Nirvana is the here and now.
Scott:
Of course the beauty of a sunset has nothing to do with faith. It just is.
It is getting from that beauty to the notion of an “undifferentiated
aesthetic continuum” and to the proposition that the beauty of the sunset is
not subjective that has to do with faith. Or at least one gets to these
postulations non-empirically.
Ant comments:
You have things backwards here, Scott. The “undifferentiated aesthetic
continuum” is observed directly and (when abstracted from the aesthetic
continuum) becomes a concept by intuition i.e. it must be directly perceived
to be known. On the other hand, subjects and objects (in public space) are
purely theoretical entities which are related to concept by intuitions via
hypothesis and postulation. As such, Northrop terms theoretical constructs
such as metaphysical subjects and objects “concepts by postulations”.
It is worth noting therefore that neither the “undifferentiated aesthetic
continuum” or the subjects and objects in the above illustration are derived
via faith.
Ant said:
Scott had then noted (despite stating later in the same post: “I have no
experience of an undifferentiated continuum”!!!):
>It seems to me that [indeterminate aesthetic continuum] can be replaced by
>the word ‘subject’ in its intentional sense (not in its Cartesian sense) --
>that which is aware of all objects, including mental objects.
Scott said:
No contradiction here. I have no experience *of* the intentional subject. It
cannot be an object of experience. It is postulated (by me) and realized by
some mystics (e.g., Merrell-Wolff, who calls it Pure Subject, and also calls
that state of consciousness Nirvana), and in his description it sounds just
like a Realization of the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum
(“Consciousness of absence of objects is Nirvana”, as he puts it in his
aphorisms).
Ant commented April 27th:
The intentional subject (in the above context) sounds like a re-introduction
of the traditional theistic Christian God through the back door while the
undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is noted by immediate apprehension.
Scott:
No, it has nothing to do with theism. This is a red herring if I ever saw
one. The intentional subject is just a postulated “that which is aware” of
all the objects, notions, feelings, thoughts, beauty of which there is
awareness.
Ant commented April 27th:
Again, I would avoid the SOM terminology of the “intentional subject”
because it is (as with any SOM term) an ambiguous term. For instance, for
the person unfamiliar with the (metaphysical) theory from which “intentional
subject” is derived it is unclear whether you are referring to objects in
public space (which are concepts by postulation) and/or the differentiations
(such as immediately apprehended colour) found in the aesthetic continuum
(which are concepts by intuition).
The intentional subject is just a postulated “that which is aware” of all
the objects, notions, feelings, thoughts, beauty of which there is
awareness. It is not immediately apprehended. However, the undifferentiated
aesthetic continuum is _not_ another postulated notion (because it requires
immediate apprehension for verification).
>From what you have said so far, Scott, the “intentional subject” (as with
the traditional theistic Christian God, atoms, tables, chairs etc) sounds
like a concept by postulation.
Ant said previously:
Northrop might have put more emphasis on its indeterminacy and Pirsig on its
aesthetic nature but it’s a concept by intuition (part of which needs to be
directly apprehended as in noticing the orange colour in a sunset) not a
concept by postulation (i.e. a theory which is related to concepts by
intuition via hypothesis [e.g. the sun - a three-dimensional sphere in
public space 93 million miles away from the Earth - which is a theoretical
concept by postulation related to the immediately apprehended sunset via
scientific hypothesis and experiment]).
Scott:
I notice the orange color. I don’t notice an undifferentiated aesthetic
continuum. Can’t you understand the difference? You (or rather Northrop)
admitted above that the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is an
inference. Thus it is theoretical, like the theoretical three-dimensional
sphere, rather than like the orange color.
Ant comments:
OK, I think I can see the confusion here. A concept by intuition is
_indeed_ partly theoretical because it is an abstraction derived from the
totality of immediate experience/the aesthetic continuum. However, it _can_
be directly verified. On the other hand, a concept by postulation is
_purely_ theoretical. It is verified by testing the hypothesis or
postulation that constructs it either with concepts by intuition or already
established concepts by postulation.
Scott said:
What I mean is that I can say “there is a somewhat (called an intentional
subject) which is aware of all objects”, in the same way that I can
postulate that “since there is a continual awareness of changing objects, I
can postulate that there is an undifferentiated aesthetic continuum”.
What I am getting at is that both of these -- for me and I assume for any
non-mystic -- are just postulations. They are not intuitive experiences,
except for the mystic. Hence neither is empirical, except for the mystic.
Ant comments:
As I mentioned before, the term “intentional subject” has so many
traditional SOM connotations there’s absolutely no way I would use it in the
context of the Divine.
Scott:
Those “traditional SOM connotations” are a problem only because one is not
distinguishing between the intentional subject and the Cartesian subject.
Merrell-Wolff had no problems with it, but then M-W was a much more careful
thinker than Pirsig.
Ant comments:
Merrell-Wolff might possibly have “no problems” with SOM terminology but his
readers (as illustrated by your own recent confusion with his work) might
not fare so well when reading his SOM saturated work. For instance, in
LILA, it is seen that the notions of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity’ can be
assigned in SOM as either metaphysical terms (referring to types of reality
such as mind and matter) or assigned as epistemological terms (referring to
ways of knowing; as in the ‘spectatorial’ accounts of knowing criticised by
Heidegger). Though it is considered problematic to treat people like
objects but unproblematic (in most contexts) to treat them ‘objectively’
(i.e. without prejudice), it is only by subjectively identifying and
empathising with their subjects that anthropologists, for instance, can
arrive at fair-minded, informed and more ‘objective’ accounts. This is a
typical ambiguity in SOM where we observe ‘subjective’ knowledge (gained
through empathy and identification) mysteriously becoming ‘objective’.
Considering the ambiguities surrounding subject-object terminology, it comes
as no surprise that an original high quality philosopher such as Pirsig used
new terminology when constructing his metaphysical system. As such,
Merrell-Wolff certainly wasn’t as careful as Pirsig in at least this regard
(whatever the former’s other supposed merits are).
----------cut----------
Scott continued April 22nd:
Here I am just concerned with the MOQ’s claim to be “pure empiricism”.
Ant comments:
As I explained above, the MOQ is “pure empiricism” in the sense that it
starts from immediate experience and that any subsequent concepts derived
from this immediate experience are based on rational grounds. No faith
required!
Scott said:
That is how he could get away with not making the distinction…between
intentional subject and Cartesian subject. All the dissolving of the
problems
raised by the S/O division just dissolve problems raised by the Cartesian
division. They do not work, or do not work as well, when confronted with the
intentional subject. The notion of DQ in the MOQ is actually very similar to
the notion of the intentional subject.
Ant comments:
Scott, the notion of DQ in the MOQ is probably very similar to the notion of
the intentional subject. I wouldn’t know. However, Dynamic Quality is a
better term in at least one regard because, as noted above, it avoids using
SOM terminology.
Scott said:
But as a consequence there is a good deal of confusion in trying to compare
the MOQ with other philosophies.
Ant commented April 27th:
I’ll think you’ll find “the confusion” in trying to compare the MOQ with
other philosophies is usually with these “other philosophies”! (Hope I
don’t sound too biased!)
Scott:
You are. But this is the philosophology debate. Because the MOQ has not been
confronted in the professional philosophical arena, there are a lot of weak
arguments in the MOQ that haven’t been challenged.
Ant comments:
What do you think my PhD was all about? Didn’t I send you a copy?
Ant had asked April 22nd:
Well, where else do you think the aesthetic resides?
Scott replied:
As far as I can tell *empirically* it might reside in the impressionist
painter, or in the biological SQ of the infant.
Ant commented:
Really? I’ll keep this answer in mind the next time I see a sunset or
visit an art gallery. Anyway, I have this infant in front of me. How can I
tell *empirically* whether the aesthetic is in its biological SQ or not?
Scott said:
Precisely. We can’t tell, empirically. So to claim that the aesthetic is not
“just subjective” (that is, just a property of people and higher animals
with the requisite nervous systems) is not an empirical claim.
Ant commented April 27th:
The idea that the aesthetic “is just a property of people and higher animals
with the requisite nervous systems” is a concept by postulation and would
not have arisen in the first place if the aesthetic had not been noticed in
immediate experience in the first place.
Scott:
Agree -- but it is a pretty obvious postulate to make.
Ant comments:
If it was that obvious, you wouldn’t have made the SOM-type comment that “as
far as I can tell *empirically* [the aesthetic] might reside in the
impressionist painter, or in the biological SQ of the infant”.
Scott continued:
It sure is not obvious how there can be aesthetic experiences without sense
organs or the ability to feel or think. Yet the MOQ claims there are.
Ant comments:
No it doesn’t. This is another myth without foundation. The MOQ does _not_
claim that there can be aesthetic experiences without sense organs. What it
actually does is remind us that sense organs are [high quality] concepts
by postulation that have been derived at some point in history by scientific
reasoning from concepts by intuition (such as aesthetic experiences) i.e.
they are theoretical constructs used to explain our experiences. “Sense
organs” might be high quality theories which seem beyond doubt but they
remain theories. The main point about all this recent
“taking-Scott-out-of-the-SOM-prison” dialogue is that concepts by intuition
are prior to concepts by postulations in the logical sequence that
constructs the “ontological entities” of the human world. Hence, Pirsig’s
comment that a science (or philosophy) that starts theoretically from
subjects and objects (i.e. concepts by postulations) is not really so pure
(empirically speaking). That’s a critical point which Dennett etc often
overlook hence reducing the value of their philosophical work (certainly to
a point where much of it needs to be ignored if nonsense is not to be
produced!).
Best wishes,
Anthony.
www.robertpirsig.org
.
_________________________________________________________________
Are you using the latest version of MSN Messenger? Download MSN Messenger
7.5 today! http://join.msn.com/messenger/overview
More information about the Moq_Discuss
mailing list