[MD] Static latching & faith

[david buchanan]

Scott said:
We jump off hot stoves because they are hot, which is different from their 
being cold. We don't need to think "this is hot and not cold" -- our bodies 
have already made that differentiation.

dmb says:
Stoves are hot and bodies already know that? Yes, according to the 
assumptions of SOM and common sense that is the standard explanation. And 
Pirsig uses the hot stove example to attack that SOM assumption. But I guess 
you missed that point last time when I said that "the hot stove example 
simply points out that you "know" its bad even before you have a chance to 
think about the cause of that badness or otherwise explain it. You "know" 
the low value of the situation before you have any "idea" about what's 
happening."

Scott:
It would help if you didn't confuse the differentiated aesthetic continuum 
with the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.

dmb says:
Ant's posts on Northrop are going to be much better than mine. But you may 
have noticed that radical empiricism actually comes from William James. 
Northrop can illuminate this concept and Pirsig has certainly been 
influenced by Northrop, but the label is directly borrowed from James.

Scott:
True, the existence of the preference model does not depend on mystical 
experience, but the *choice* of the preference model over a causal model 
depends on something, no? Is that choice radically empiric? No. Nor is it 
traditionally empiric. The MOQ makes that choice. Why?

dmb says:
Like I said, the preference model does not depend on radical empiricism. The 
preference model is based on traditional scientific empiricsm. As Ant said, 
it is simply a scientific fact that particles do not behave in law like ways 
and so the causal model does not explain the observations. And yes, beyond 
this agreement with observational experience, the preference model is 
metaphysically coherent as well.

dmb had said:
...I'm sort of just trying to explain a little bit about why radical 
empiricism is not the same thing as mysticism or the preference model and 
such. In that sense I'm still focused on the MOQ's radical empiricism, even 
if I'm just saying what it is NOT.

Scott replied:
I agree, they are not the same thing. What I am trying to get is why the MOQ 
makes the claims it does. It claims to start with a radically empiric basis, 
but what I am trying to demonstrate is that with the claim of inorganic 
value it either must invoke mystic claims or it must be violating its claim
to be "pure empiricism" -- radical or otherwise.

dmb says:
You say you agree that they are different but then turn right around and 
confuse them all again. What the heck is wrong with you, man? Look at that 
little exchange closely, mister. You agree that 1, 2 and 3 are not the same 
and one sentence later ask how 2 must invoke 3 or it is violating 1. And 
you're saying this in response to several hundred words (edited out for 
brevity's sake) in which I try to explain that you are mixing up these 
different things.

Scott:
The problem I have with it is that certain notions from Merrell-Wolff and 
Plotinus, mainly the the reality of a superhuman, superconceptual -- in fact 
for all intents and purposes supernatural -- Intellect cannot be squared 
with the MOQ, at least not without pretty much starting over.

dmb says:
One of these days I'll bring some energy to bear upon your reading of 
Plotinus. But for now I would just like to point out that the MOQ's 
compatibility with your faith has nothing to do with assessing its validity. 
It seems like you're desperately looking for a reason to discount the MOQ 
wherever it presents a challenge to your pet beliefs. That is thoroughly 
contemptable. This is a little peek at the rat I thought I smelled. Here's a 
big Bronx cheer for you, dude.

Scott said:
True, radical empiricism does not rely on faith. But the MOQ does so rely. 
Or at least on non-empirical assumptions (radical or otherwise, if one 
excludes mystical experience).

dmb replies:
I think this repeated nonsense about the MOQ being based on faith springs 
from your not-so-hidden agenda. I don't know if you want to drag it down to 
make it equal to other faith-based beliefs in supernatural, superhuman 
entities like your own or what. All I know is that it makes no sense. Plus 
your are continuing to mix up several distinctly different areas like 
radical empiricism and mysticism. As I already tried to explain, "the 
negative experience that prompts one to jump off a hot stove does not rest 
on faith or any kind of assumption. But I'm actually glad to see this 
admission about faith and revelation as the basis of your metaphysics. 
You're a clothset theist just as I suspected."

Scott said:
Huh? I've acknowledged many times that I depend on mystical revelation. How 
on earth does that make me a theist, though? It is faith that keeps a 
Zennist's butt on the meditation cushion year after year. It is faith that 
leads the non-theist Buddhist to believe they will be reincarnated in a Pure 
Land. But of course, since you take seriously Pirsig's extremely 
close-minded definition of faith, naturally you're not going to accept what 
I say.

dmb says:
OK, use whatever word you want for it. If you believe in a supernatural, 
superhuman, superconceptual Intellect, then I would call you a theist. By 
theist I mean somebody who believes in something like a supernatural, 
superhuman entity. Since there is no evidence to support this belief, I 
would say it is faith-based rather than empirical or rational. 
Re-incarnation seems to be faith-based too. But I certainly don't see how it 
takes faith to sit on a meditation cushion. Maybe there is some hope and 
some trust, but even then there is a reason for hope and trust. You can say 
I have a "close-minded" definition of these words, but at least the reader 
knows what I mean. The way you use the word "faith" seems aimed at 
obfuscation. In your hands it means trust, assumption, revelation and 
seemingly whatever suits your fancy. I suspect this is one more piece of 
nonsense that springs from your not-so-hidden agenda.

Scott said:
I hope you realize that I am thinking about you just as you are thinking 
about me (being obtuse and being a bad philosopher). I do think you are 
sincere, but I also know that most of your complaints about what I say are 
based on not paying attention to what I actually say. Many times I have 
pointed this out, but you never come back and say "Ok, I see you didn't say 
that". You just go on making the same misreadings as if my protests about 
previous misreadings didn't matter.

dmb says:
Oh come on. Can't you at least show some originality if you're gonna use 
insults. This is just the not-so-grown-up version of "whatever you say 
bounces off of me and sticks to you". Secondly, I've tried to "pay attention 
to what you actually say" to the extent that I quote what you actually say 
in my responses to what you actually say. But what I see are a whole lotta 
weasel moves. You've talking about hyposthetical somebodies, you're just 
playing devil's advocate, you're contradicting yourself, reversing yourself, 
obfuscating and confusing just about all the key terms, refusing to accept 
normal definitions in some cases and insisting on them in other cases. Dude, 
when I said you're being obtuse, when I accuse you of being confused, when I 
accuse you of having a not-so-hidden agenda and of being a clothset theist, 
I'm being polite about it. And now you want me to give you some kind of 
break about what you did and did not "actually" say. Oh, dude. I have been 
giving you a break. A huge break. I've only hinted at it, but frankly I 
think you are a real freakin' weasel when it comes to standing by what you 
"actually" say. I think you've been feeding me lots of bullshit to avoid 
standing up to it. I see what you're doing, spider man.

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