[MD] Static latching & faith

[david buchanan]

Scott said:
What I am getting at is that by saying that mystical claims are empirical is 
a way of covering up the fact that claims are being made which are not 
readily understandable by all. One only accepts them because "mystics say 
so". Why shouldn't that be called faith? ...By "bracketing out" I mean that 
in this discussion no appeal is made to what mystics say to justify a claim. 
The claim in question is that there is value in the inorganic. There is also 
the more complicated claim about whether it makes sense to talk about an 
undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.

dmb says:
Just in case its not totally obvious, I'm responding to what you "actually" 
said. What you "actually" said is quoted directly above. There you are 
asking about several different things all at the same time. As I keep trying 
to explain, the claims of radical empiricism to depend on mystical 
experience or even the reports of mystics. The preference model is does not 
depend on radical empiricism or upon mysticism, just regular scientific 
empiricism. Radical empircism, and scientific empiricism and the as yet 
underdeveloped science of mysticism are THREE DIFFERENT THINGS. Your 
question confuses these three things, incorrectly assumse one can be 
justified or proven by another. And what's worse is you are also bringing 
SOM assumptions to bear, when all three of them are more or less aimed at 
rejecting those assumptions.

Scott:
Mystics say value is everywhere, so if one has faith in what mystics say, 
then it follows that there is value in the inorganic.

dmb replies:
Here you are confusing mysticsim, faith and physics. Not to mention that it 
is Pirsig as metaphysician who says something like "value is everywhere" and 
that trusting someone's to provide accurate reports is not what "faith" 
means. If that were true all scientific knowledge would be considered 
faith-based except for the scientists who actually preformed the experiment. 
Since that is obviously a ridiculous impossibility, we have things like an 
established scientific method and a peer-reviewed publishing system. All we 
can do is try to insure the honesty and integrity of the reporters through a 
reasonalble verification process. In other words, there are good, rational 
reasons to believe these reports. Yes, the process depends on trust in some 
sense of the word, among other things, but faith-based beliefs are held in 
the absence of any such reasons or even in oppostion to such reasons. The 
reports of mystics are going to be more difficult to handle than physics and 
the assertions of mystics can't be based on physics and there is a cultural 
bias that says their experiences don't count as empirically valid, but it 
still would work in the same way. Experiments would be set up, the data will 
be collected and reported to people who are qualified to understand what 
that data means, etc. Yes, the physicist and the mystics are reporting two 
completely different kinds of experience and so they will have completely 
different ways to do experiements and they'll use a different sort of 
language to report thier findings, but in both cases knowledge is based on 
experience. And to top it all off, radical empiricism is neither of these. 
See what I did there. I didn't anwer your question but I addressed it. I 
tried to explain a little about how and why these three things are 
different. I know you keep saying that you understand that these are 
different, but you keep producing questions in which all three are 
entangled.

Scott said:
.., as I show subsequently, without the mystical claim there is no empirical 
basis for choosing the preference model over the causal model.

dmb says:
Man, I just don't know how you do it. Didn't you just quote the paragraph 
where Pirsig lays out the empirical basis for the preference model AND point 
out that it doesn't rely on mysticism? Now you're saying that there is no 
basis without a mystical claim. Like I keep saying, of course the preference 
model doesn't rely on mysticism. It can't. That's what I mean when I say you 
are confused - becaue you apparently think it can or should. To think that 
physics can be verified by mystics is a confusion of categories of 
experience. One can not be used to justify the other.

Scott:
Without the mystical claim there is no reason to select the preference 
model.

dmb replies:
Yes there are reasons to select the preference model, but none of them is 
mystical. That model is selected over the causal model becasue the causal 
model does not explain the data and the preference model does. This is based 
on the observed behaviour of subatomic particles, not the reports of 
mystics. That fact that mystics would like it and agree with it is only a 
plus. The fact that this model also fits coherently into the MOQ is only a 
plus. These are just MORE reasons to believe that it works. But its 
basically just a scientific fact that particles behave in such a way that 
the causal model no longer makes any sense. Its just plain old sensory 
obvervation, standard scientific empiricism and good old fashioned logic 
that leads us to "select" the preference model. As Pirsig puts it, the 
preference model "is more appropriate to actual observation". That's the 
empirical basis.

Scott:
In this quote Pirsig is attempting to justify that there is value in the 
organic. I put "justify" in scare quotes because the attempt fails.

dmb says:
The attempt fails? How so?

Scott said:
I agree that Pirsig is in the first place saying that "cause" cannot be 
presupposed in particle behavior. What we cannot infer from that is the 
supposition that cause has nothing to do with particle behavior. All we know 
is that we don't know whether or not to apply "cause" to particle behavior. 
What they do is not certain TO US. It is possible that someday we will learn 
that the behavior of particles may turn out to be just as certain as the 
behavior of a computer.

dmb says:
He's not just saying it can't be presupposed. He's saying that it doesn't 
agree with the actual observation. The observations pretty much demand that 
we find a better term than "cause". This data does not just put things up in 
the air so that "we don't know whether or not to apply" that term. The data 
pretty much rules out causality and so we do know whether or not to apply 
the term. NOT. I think the introduction of ambiguity and uncertainty and 
speculation about the data of the future here is just a bunch of confused 
nonsense.

Scott said:
.., there is no evidence *for* the preference model. All we can say now is 
that there is no evidence *against* it. There is no evidence for or against 
the preference model. Nor is there evidence for or against the deterministic 
model, nor for or against the pure chance model. That is, there is no 
evidence for *choosing* one model over the other. Yet that is what Pirsig is 
doing when he says "Particles 'prefer' to do what they do".

dmb says:
I guess you have your own definition of evidence? And what do you imagine 
the difference is between evidence for a model and evidence for *choosing* a 
model. I mean, I have offered "the actual observation" and the model as an 
explanation of that observed data over and over again. Why does this fail to 
count as evidence? Why does the model's agreement with experience and 
logical coherence fail to count as a vaild reason to choose it? I keep 
offering this as an answer to your question, but you keep asking as if I had 
not offered anything at all.  Like I said in the post you are responding to 
here, "the unpredictable behaviour (of particles) is the very evidence you 
deny. And so what if there are other possibilities? As long as its a 
coherent explanation about the actual observation, then it is empirically 
based. It only has to make sense and agee with experience to be empirically 
valid and its quite all right if there are rival theories. Its inevitiable 
and lovely too."

Scott replied:
We've been over this before. There is a difference between an "empirically 
based" claim and an "empirically consistent" claim. The preference model is 
empirically consistent. But choosing it over the others -- which is done by 
saying "Particles 'prefer' to do what they do", and that therefore there is 
value in the inorganic -- that is not empirically based. One has made that 
choice based on something other than non-mystical empirical data.

dmb says:
Oh, now its "empirically consistent" but not "empirically based"? And its 
not empirically based because choosing it is based on something other than 
"non-mystical empirical data"? I might be tempted to ask what you mean, but 
I'm pretty sure that you have no idea either. Again, why does the model 
fail? Its in agreement with the data and it is logicallly consistent. What 
else do you expect from empirically based assertion? Absolute cetainty? You 
think the selection of one explanation over another has to be contained in 
the data that it seeks to explain? I mean, we are allowed to interpret the 
data, right? I mean, we must interpret the data if it is going to be used to 
produce anything like knowledge, right? Is there some school of empiricism 
that would object to using logic and coherence as a reason to select one 
explantion over another?

dmb had said:
If we leave out mystical experience there is no empirical justification of 
the preference model of subatomic particles? Um, don't you suppose the 
empirical justification for "value in the inorganic" will be found by 
observing THE INORGANIC - in this case the non-lawlike behaviour of 
particles.

Scott replied:
But we do not KNOW that their behavior is non-lawlike. Further investigation 
may show that it is lawlike. No observation we can make at present tells us 
that the behavior of particles is in fact non-lawlike. We simply do not at 
present know, and no observation we know how to make can tell us.

dmb says:
What could you possibly mean? You're asking for evidence that "no 
observation we know how to make can tell us"? All this seems to imply that 
you think Pirsig is making mighty big claims. Ae you taking this 
"preference" idea too literally and then asking for evidence that the 
particles have some kind of tiny subatomic consciousness were they ponder 
the options like a subjective self or what? In any case, I think you're 
asking for impossibe evidence to back up claims that have not been made in 
the first place. I mean, these objections don't make no sense. You say that 
"we don't KNOW that their behavior is non-lawlike", for example. I don't get 
that AT ALL so let me break it down a little...

OK, let's say you're a scientist and are otherwise in a postition to observe 
the behaviour of particles. And because you're a traditional scientist you 
hope to discover the "laws" of the subatomic realm. But when you watch them 
you see that sometimes they do one thing and sometimes they do another. A 
certain percentage will do this and the rest do that, but you can never tell 
when or where or why - or which ones. About the thing you know for sure is 
that they behave in non-lawlike ways! If they acted according to causal 
laws, they would do the same thing ever time. They would always obey the 
laws, otherwise you can't really call them laws. Not in physics anyway.

That's it, Scott. That's all Pirsig claims in his preference model. No big 
deal. Very simple. So let me ask you about the perference model again. Why 
does the actual observation of this non-lawlike behavior fail to count as 
evidence for the preference model? If the preference model is based on this 
observation, then in what sense is it not empirically based? And I ask you 
to stick to this issue without confusing mysticism and radical empiricism 
into questions and statements about this issue. Like I said last time, 
"empirical justification for the mystical will be found in the observation 
of states of consciousness, not subatomic particles" and vice versa.

Scott said:
It's not mine. (a patch-up SOM) I reject it too. But I see no way to argue 
for the MOQ over a
patched-up SOM strictly on the basis of empiricism that leaves out mystical 
reports. That is the only thing I am trying to get across in this thread.

dmb says:
Oh jeez, you're such a weasel. How many different "only things" have you 
tried to "get across in this thread"? What you've done in this thread is ask 
one bogus question after another, constantly shifting your positon, which is 
filled with contradictions, reversals and is otherwise incoherent. Are you 
doing an impersonation of Sam, or what? You ask the same bogus questions 
over and over without any real engagements with the answers offered. Why do 
I bother? Sigh. Guess I comfort myself with the hope that somebody will get 
something out of this conversaton even if its not you.

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