[MD] Static latching & faith

[David M]

Hi DMB:


Borders? Well we simply experience very little at any given moment,
the SQ comes and goes, such are the borders surrounding our experience,
yet we postulate a whole cosmos and experience its vast possibilities.

DM


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "david buchanan" <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Monday, May 01, 2006 3:10 AM
Subject: Re: [MD] Static latching & faith


> Scott, DM and all MOQers:
>
> Scott said to DMorey:
> We all here (Pirsig, Wilber, you, me, and DMB) consider it a crime to 
> ignore
> the transcendental. And I'm not saying that the transcendental is beyond
> experience. I'm only saying that certain claims
> in the MOQ depend on the experience of a mystical few, and so according to
> Pirsig's usage of 'empiricism', those claims are empirical, but according 
> to
> standard usage, they are seen as being taken on faith (in the mystics who
> produce these claims).
>
> dmb says:
> Its a crime to ignore the transcendental and the transcendental is not
> beyond experience. OK, I'm with you so far. And you're only saying what? 
> You
> object to certain claims that depend on the experience of a mystical few.
> Why? Didn't we all just agree that it was a crime to ignore the
> transcendental experience, like one sentence ago? And why does it matter
> that standard useage disagrees that such things count as empirical when 
> the
> whole point is to get rid of that very useage for the very reason that it
> does not allow such things to be counted as empirical? Why do we care that
> standard useage disagrees and calls it faith when the whole point of the
> MOQ's expansion of rationality is to reject that standard usage and faith? 
> I
> think you have bascially contradicted yourself in the space of two
> sentences. But that doesn't even begin to cover it...
>
> Scott continued:
> ...What's more, if we try to bracket out those claims, the MOQ falls apart
> (as an 'empirical' metaphysics). Here's what I mean: Pirsig argues 
> *without*
> appeal to mystical revelation that inorganic patterns are patterns of 
> value.
> This claim is "justified" in the following paragraph (from chapter 8):
>
> dmb replies:
> Before we get to the quote I have to ask a question or two. What does it
> mean to bracket out those claims. And which claims are you refering to? 
> The
> "certain" claims that rely on "the experience of a mystical few" that you
> didn't identify above either? And how does this ?bracketing of ?claims 
> make
> the MOQ fall apart? How do these bracketed mystical claims relate to this
> preference model, which, as you say, argues without resort to mysticism? 
> And
> weren't you saying the opposite of that just yesterday? And which claim is
> "justified" in this quote? See, I think you're talking about mysticism,
> physics and epistemology all at the same time and its all mixed up. I 
> think
> you're pretty much lost in the woods here. Ah, you are a paragon of 
> clarity.
>  Here's the quote for easy reference, but there is more exciting debate
> below that...
>
>>"The only difference between causation and value is that the word "cause"
>>implies absolute certainty whereas the implied meaning of "value" is one 
>>of
>>preference. In classical science it was supposed that the world always
>>works
>>in terms of absolute certainty and that "cause" is the more appropriate
>>word
>>to describe it. But in modern quantum physics all that is changed.
>>Particles
>>"prefer" to do what they do. An individual particle is not absolutely
>>committed to one predictable behavior.What appears to be an absolute cause
>>is just a consistent pattern of preferences. Therefore, when you strike
>>"cause" from the language and substitute "value" you are not only 
>>replacing
>>an empirically meaningless term with a meaningful one; you are using a 
>>term
>>that is more appropriate to actual observation."
>
> Scott said:
> First (minor) point. Pirsig claims that "cause" is an empirically
> meaningless term, since we have no "direct awareness" of it -- that is, it
> is a word employed in our conceptual framework. On the other hand, one can
> note its usefulness in distinguishing certain patterns we understand in
> terms of "A causes B" from patterns of the form "We don't know why there 
> is
> B". One has found out why a bug in a computer program is occurring when 
> one
> traces its cause. Fix that cause, and the bug is fixed. To say that "the 
> bug
> caused the problem " is not empirical is ludicrous. But onward to the 
> major
> point.
>
> dmb says:
> Trouble shooting a computer is one thing and quantum mechanics is another,
> so I'm not buying your analogy here at all. Looking for causes and reasons
> when a machine breaks down only makes sense. I think Pirsig is just saying
> that it makes no sense to explain the behaviour of particles in terms of
> causation because the word implies "absolute certainty". He's only saying
> that it makes no sense to describe what particles do when they "do what 
> they
> do" in such certain terms because what "they do" is not certain at all. 
> He's
> only saying that, when it comes to the observed behaviour of particles,
> causation doesn't work whereas value does. (And yes, I know the particles
> are not observed making prefereces and they aren't observed with the naked
> eye, but this is still just sensory empiricism insofar as scientific
> instruments are considered extensions of the senses and the explanation is
> seperate from the observed behaviour that it seeks to explain.) I think
> you're making a huge, complicated deal out of a small and simple thing.
>
> Scott continued:
> The last clause in the quoted paragraph is simply not true ("[using 
> 'value']
> is more appropriate to actual observation"). Pirsig just states that
> "Particles 'prefer' to do what they do", but there is no evidence for that
> claim. All the evidence shows is that we do not know why (for example) a
> particle shows up in a particular place. We do know that they show up in
> consistent patterns, but we cannot predict for a particular particle where
> it will show up. To jump from this to saying that they show "preference" 
> is
> non-empirical. There are other possibilities: that where they show up is
> purely random, or that there are "hidden variables" that determine where
> they will show up (that is, where they show up is determined, but we don't
> know why). The only empirical thing one can say (leaving out mystical
> revelation) is that we don't know.
>
> dmb says:
> Wow. What a mess! Simply not true! Dude, you're just not getting it and 
> its
> really not that hard. You say that we can't predict where a particle will
> show up AND yet saw there is no evidence for the preference model. But the
> unpredictable behaviour is the very evidence you deny. And so what if 
> there
> are other possibilities. As long as its a coherent explanation about the
> actual observation, then it is empirically based. It only has to make 
> sense
> and agee with experience to be empirically valid and its quite all right 
> if
> there are rival theories. Its inevitiable and lovely too.
>
> Scott said:
> Thus, if we leave out mystical revelation, there is no *empirical*
> justification for claiming that there is value in the inorganic. That 
> means
> that there is no empirical obstacle to claiming that value is an emergent
> property in complex biological creatures, which claim of course leads us
> back into SOM. The two metaphysics (MOQ and SOM -- the latter patched up 
> so
> it doesn't ignore value entirely as in logical positivism) are equally
> adequate and coherent. Thus, the only reason to accept the MOQ over SOM is
> because one has faith in mystical revelation (or, of course, if one has 
> such
> revelation of one's own).
>
> dmb says:
> If we leave out mystical experience there is no empirical justification of
> the preference model of subatomic particles?! Um, don't you suppose the
> empirical justification for "value in the inorganic" will be found by
> observing THE INORGANIC - in this case the non-lawlike behaviour of
> particles. And likewise, empirical justification for the mystical will be
> found in the observation of states of consciousness, not subatomic 
> particles
> or any other sensory reality. And now you're offering a patched-up SOM 
> over
> the MOQ? Oh jeez, take up the inadequacies of SOM in another thread. 
> That'll
> keep you busy for a few months. I mean, there are tons of reason to prefer
> the MOQ over SOM, even a patch up one. Your patched-up SOM gets absolutely
> no respect from me. Yuk!
>
> Scott said:
> There is a further issue, of course, and that is which mystics one listens
> to, but that's a whole 'nother topic.
>
> dmb says:
> I'd say the important thing is to listen well and listen broadly. I think
> the MOQ's philosophical mysticism is fundamentally inclusive and the more
> the merrier. But, Scott, here is the point DM made, the one that you 
> managed
> to avoid through that whole mess...
>
> DM said:
> ...I think the whole point about recognising DQ in experience is that the
> doors of perception can be opened, that the mystical can be recognised in
> ordinary experience, that experience has first rights over the reductions 
> of
> experience that enable science to get on with its business. Let's not 
> ignore
> the transcendental or forget that the reality of the transcendental is
> entirely apparent in experience, if you can see the movement of DQ which
> declares the existence of borders and border crossings.
>
> dmb says:
> You sorta lost me somewhere near the border crossing, but otherwise I 
> agree
> emphatically. The MOQ is meant to accomodate everything quantum mechanics 
> to
> mysticism. It wants to include a broader range of experience than SOM's
> scientifiic, sensory empiricism would allow. I'll give you a million 
> dollars
> if you can make Scott see this point.
>
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